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Civil aviation has matured to become a vital piece of the global economy, 
providing the rapid movement of goods and people to all regions. This has already led to 
significant growth and expectations of further growth are on the rate of 5% per year. 
Given the high projected rate of growth, environmental consequences of commercial 
aviation are expected to rise. To mitigate the increase of noise and emissions, governing 
bodies such as ICAO and the FAA have established and are considering additional 
regulation of noise, NOx, and CO2 while the European Union has integrated aviation into 
their Environmental Trading Scheme. The traditional response to new regulation is to 
integrate technologies into the aircraft to reduce environmental footprint. While these 
benefits are positive on the aircraft level, fleet growth is projected to outpace benefits 
provided by technology alone. To further reduce environmental footprint, a number of 
mitigation strategies are being explored to determine the impact. One of those strategies 
involves changing the mission specifications of today’s aircraft by reducing range, speed, 
or payload in an effort to reduce fuel consumption and has been predominantly focused at 
the vehicle level. 
This research proposes an approach that evaluates mission specification changes 
from the aircraft design level up to the fleet level, forecasted into the future, to assess the 
impact over a number of metrics to fully understand the implications of mission 
specification changes. The methodology Mission Specifications and Fleet Implications 
Technique (MS-FIT) identifies stakeholder requirements that will be tracked at either the 
xxix 
 
vehicle or fleet level and leverages them to build an environment that will allow joint 
evaluation to facilitate increased knowledge about the full implications of mission 
specification adoption. 
Additionally laid out is an approach on how to select prospective routes for 
intermediate stops based on fuel burn and operating cost considerations. Guidance is 
provided on how to filter down a list of candidate airports to those most viable as well as 
regions of the world most likely to benefit from intermediate stops. 
Three sample problems were used to demonstrate the viability of MS-FIT: cruise 
speed reduction, design mission range reduction, and the combination of speed and range 
reduction. Each problem was able to demonstrate different implications from the 
implementation of the different specification changes. Speed reduction can negatively 
impacts cost while range reduction has consequences to noise at the intermediate airports. 
The combination of the two draws in negative implications from both even though the 
environmental benefits are better. 
Finally, an analysis of some of the assumptions was conducted to examine the 
sensitivity to the results of speed and range reduction. These include variation in costs, 
reductions in annual utilization of aircraft, and variation in intermediate stop adoption. 
Speed reduction is strongly sensitive to increases in crew and maintenance rates while 
landing fees significantly eat into the benefits of range reduction and intermediate stops. 
Minor utilization reductions can significantly reduce the viability of speed reduction as 
the increase in capital costs offset all the savings from fuel reduction while range 
xxx 
 
reduction is a little less sensitive. Intermediate stop variation does not eliminate the 
benefits of range reduction and even can provide cost savings depending on the design 
range of the reduced variant but it can have consequences to airport noise to higher traffic 
airports. 
With the proposed framework, additional information is available to fully 
understand the implications with respect to fuel burn, NOx emissions, operating cost, 
capital cost, noise, and safety. This can then inform decision makers on whether pursuing 




CHAPTER  1 
INTRODUCTION 
Aviation has matured over the last fifty years to become a vital piece of the global 
economy and critical for the American economy, enabling the rapid movement of goods 
and people to all regions. Even in the face of growing American trade deficits, aviation 
continues to be the largest export sector for the United States and contributes to $1.3 
trillion of economic activity – consisting of 5.6% of gross domestic product. In 2007 the 
U.S. airspace was responsible for 767 million passengers, 836 billion revenue passenger 
miles, 67 billion revenue ton miles of freight, and 61.1 million aircraft operations.[1] 
The expected growth of aviation is significant moving forward. The Boeing 
Current Market Outlook forecasts a 5.1% growth in revenue passenger kilometers from 
2010 to 2030.[2] It projects the most significant growth to occur in the Middle East, the 
Asia-Pacific region, Africa, and Latin America with rates greater than 5% annually 
compared to the projected 3-4% of Europe and North America. The Airbus Global 
Market forecast projects an annual growth of 4.8% in revenue passenger kilometers from 
2010 to 2029.[3] Growth rates for global regions are similar to those from the Boeing 
forecast. A comparison of both manufacturers’ growth forecasts with respect to global 




Figure 1. Growth Projections 2010-2030 [2][3] 
The only major difference in the two manufacturer forecasts is the projected total 
fleet deliveries with respect to total global vehicle seat classes. Boeing expects to see far 
more growth in the single aisle class while Airbus expects significant growth in the large 
class. These projections are in line with recent and coming products from both 
manufacturers and are provided in Table 1. These are not individual company deliveries 
but projections on total fleet future deliveries. 
Table 1. Projected Future Deliveries for Total Fleet [2][3] 
Seat Class Airbus Boeing 
Single Aisle 17,870 23,370 
Twin Aisle 6,240 7,330 



















































The anticipated growth in aviation will have far reaching effects on a variety of 
stakeholders, impacting the environment, economics, reliability, sustainability, safety, 
capacity, and security. A greater number of aircraft operations will result in a negative 
impact on the environment through increased emissions and noise. From an economic 
perspective, significant growth results in a greater demand for new aircraft and an 
increased number of operations provides more revenue for airlines. The reliability of the 
system could be measured in terms of the total amount of delay. As operations increase, 
increased traffic will likely lead to an increase in delay due to weather uncertainty, 
increased congestion, and air traffic control challenges. 
Sustainability is impacted by increased growth through a required increase in 
materials for manufacturing and oil for fuel so more aircraft and operations will demand 
significantly more resources. Increasing operations around a limited number of airports 
means that if any delay occurs, more aircraft will be flying in close proximity to both the 
airport and each other, leading to increased potential for an accident or incident. A similar 
consequence of limited airports comes with capacity concerns as there is a limit to the 
numbers of departures and arrivals as capacity projects are unable to keep pace with 
rising demand. Finally, security becomes much more challenging as there is an increase 
in both passenger and cargo that is required to be scanned as well as flights in the air. 
All of these concerns pose substantial challenges for continued aviation growth 
but together are too complex to assess simultaneously. The impact of increased aviation 
operations on environmental concerns of noise and emissions, however, is a major 
concern that needs to be better understood. Aircraft noise impacts the surrounding airport 
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community and has been the primary cause for delay of expansion projects at airports.[4] 
Assessing the true impacts of noise is difficult because noise tolerance is subjective 
though it is important enough to cause health concerns such as sleep disturbance, stress, 
and cardiovascular problems.[5] The perception of airport noise is still negative such that 
people living outside of the significant noise areas around airports consist of over half of 
the related complaints. To offset some of the negative impacts of noise, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) has spent $9.1 billion on noise compatibility projects 
over 256 airports since 1982.[6] For Chicago O'Hare, the specific amount is $565 million 
to date.[7] 
Nitrous Oxides (NOx) and particulate matter worsen air quality in the airport area. 
Both of these emissions can damage lung function and worsen respiratory diseases like 
emphysema and bronchitis while also having a negative impact on the cardiovascular 
system. In a survey of major airports conducted in 2000, while noise was listed as the 
primary concern of airports regarding future growth with emissions being third, 
emissions will become more important in a future timeframe.[8] Significant attention is 
now starting to be paid to carbon dioxide (CO2) as climate change concerns increase. 
There are concerns over the significance of aviation's contribution as the predominant 
amount of emission is at altitude where the impact is thought to be greater.[9] 
Efforts to mitigate the environmental impacts of aviation have been undertaken 
for over forty years and continue today. Programs from organizations like the FAA, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Joint Planning and 
Development Office (JPDO), and Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe 
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(ACARE) are investing a significant amount of money to both understand and mitigate 
environmental impacts. These programs focus on both technical and operational 
measures to reach their goals. As a part of International Civil Aviation Organization's 
(ICAO) efforts to confront climate change, a basket of measures was proposed that 
member states can adopt to meet climate change goals. These measures can be economic 
or market-based, regulatory, alternative fuels, improved air traffic management and 
infrastructure use, more efficient operations, and aircraft-related developments.[10] One 
of the difficulties of these proposed categories is that ICAO does not tell participating 
States how to go about identifying or selecting measures to meet environmental goals. It 
is simply left to each State to select measures that are deemed appropriate. This in itself is 
a challenging problem as the last four categories can potentially have a significant 
number of measures that would provide potential improvements. 
Tax implementation uses a financial penalty to encourage operators to reduce 
their impact whether it is through more efficient aircraft or more efficient procedures. 
Airport specific examples include NOx emissions taxes implemented in Switzerland in 
1994 and the Heathrow airport noise charging.[11][12] At a larger level, the European 
Emissions Trading Scheme sets a price for carbon in the European market and effective 
January 1, 2012, aviation has been added to the market.[13] 
Unfortunately, economic measures have the shortcoming of simply becoming a 
part of the cost of doing business. Unlike ground transportation where roads are required 
to get anywhere, operators build their networks around routes that are profitable such that 
flights to Switzerland and London are in demand. Within a fleet, operators could simply 
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shift utilization of less emitting or quieter aircraft to the appropriate airports and use the 
less environmentally friendly aircraft at airports without such a charging scheme. While it 
does achieve local improvements, there is no real change in the big picture. With respect 
to the Emissions Trading Scheme, it may press operators to purchase more fuel efficient 
aircraft but given the recent addition of aviation to the program, it will take some time to 
see whether it has the desired impact. 
Regulation has been introduced through the Committee for Aviation 
Environmental Protection (CAEP), a subgroup of ICAO. Regulations for NOx and noise 
have already been established and recent work has been focused on researching a CO2 
standard. CAEP first established standards for NOx in 1986 and noise in 1972 and these 
standards have been updated over time.[14] Regulation offers additional external pressure 
to manufacturers to develop aircraft that are more environmentally friendly beyond that 
from business as usual. 
NOx regulations were initially established as Dp/Foo, a measurement of grams 
emitted during takeoff and landing cycle divided by the rated thrust of the engine vs. the 
overall engine pressure ratio of the engine. Two sets of regulations exist and are 
separated at 89 kN (20,000 lb) thrust. Standards have been updated in 1991, 1995, 2004, 
and 2010 and can be seen in Figure 2. Over time, the standards have become far stricter 
on engines operating in the lower engine pressure ratios such that under CAEP/8 
standards, NOx emissions are required to be 50-60% of the original standard. Regulations 
are not as aggressive on the higher side of engine pressure ratio because while the 
7 
 
standard goes up to pressure ratios of 80, engines currently max out in the 40s yielding 
around a 40% reduction from the baseline standards. 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of NOx Certification Standards [15] 
Noise regulations are split into three points: cutback, sideline, and approach; 
however, they have been combined in Figure 3 to show cumulative noise. Stage II 
regulations were initially established as a set noise limit vs. takeoff gross weight. A new 
standard was developed 12 years later as Stage III and then updated to Stage IV in 2001 
with just a 10 dB reduction in cumulative noise. Three sets of regulations exist based on 
the number of engines on the aircraft and as the number of engines increase, the 





































Figure 3. Evolution of Noise Certification Standards [17] 
 
Figure 4. Noise Certification Observer Locations [16] 
Even though standards exist for both NOx and noise, regulations are enforced in 
two different fashions. The first is a certification standard such that new aircraft must 
meet the standard. In the event that new regulation would result in an in-production 
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improvements into the vehicle or simply cease production on the non-compliant aircraft. 
All new aircraft must meet the CAEP 8 NOx and Stage IV noise stringencies. 
The other enforcement approach is an operational standard meaning that if an 
aircraft is unable to meet the standard, it is not allowed to fly regardless of production 
status. An example of this approach occurred from the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 
1990.[18] This bill required the phase out of all Stage II aircraft by 12/31/1999. Airlines 
either retired non-compliant aircraft and replaced them with compliant ones or retrofitted 
the aircraft with newer engines or engine hush kits to meet compliance. This approach is 
rarely used as it may have severe economic consequences for airlines and manufacturers. 
All aircraft in service must meet the Stage III noise stringency. 
Thus far, CO2 has largely gone unregulated as there is already existing market 
pressure to reduce fuel consumption. Figure 5 shows how the energy intensity of aircraft 
has reduced overtime as a measure of fuel energy per passenger-kilometer. Notice that 
new aircraft have around a third of the energy intensity of aircraft produced 50 years ago. 
A large part of this is due to market pressure from airlines and holding companies as 
reduction in fuel consumption minimizes the variability of their operating costs. 
However, there is significant pressure growing to address CO2. As previously mentioned, 
CAEP members are investigating metrics for a CO2 regulation as well as the introduction 
of aviation to the European Emissions Trading Scheme has occurred [19]. During 
President Obama's 2008 campaign, he laid out national emissions reductions targets 80% 
by 2050. Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency was granted authority by the 
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Supreme Court to regulate CO2 under the Clean Air Act through to the decision of 
Massachusetts vs. Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
Figure 5. Evolution of Aircraft Energy Intensity [20] 
Pressure from both regulation and airlines has encouraged the development and 
adoption of advanced technologies into new aircraft. One problem is that both pressures 
operate at the engine/airframe level. Fleet size is projected to double by 2030 such that 
future growth will overshadow future reductions in both NOx and CO2 in future aircraft. 
Noise exposure was significantly reduced once the Stage II phase outs were completed - 
population exposed went from 2.7 million people in 1990 to 440 thousand in 2000 as 
estimated by the General Accounting Office (GAO).[21] While the population exposure 
was greatly reduced, the GAO estimated this came at a cost ranging from $3.8 to $4.9 
billion in 2000 dollars. However, number of operations has a great influence on the 
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number of people exposed and there is the potential that the trend will reverse and this 
may limit increases in future growth. NOx reductions are occurring in all modes of 
transportation but other transportation sources are being reduced more quickly so that 
aviation's impact is becoming more significant in comparison. Emissions growth is also 
expected to be a growing concern among airports per a GAO survey of the United States’ 
50 busiest commercial service airports.[8] 
The other challenge of fleet impact reduction is that an aircraft’s lifespan is 
significant. The FAA Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) assumes a retirement age of 25 
years.[22] The Boeing projections indicate that in 20 years almost a third of the original 
fleet still remains in service as shown in Figure 6. A consequence of the lifespan is that 
technical measures take a significant amount of time to take full effect due to slower 
adoption rates. By 2030, the fleet is predominantly newer aircraft but now twice the size 
of the original 2010 fleet. If 2030 fleet-wide emissions are to match the baseline, the new 
vehicles would need to have their environmental impact halved and significantly more so 
if the objective is to reach some target such at Obama’s 80% of 2005 CO2 emissions. 
NASA N+2 targets are particularly aggressive but the expected entry into service date of 
2030-2035 results in zero fleet penetration in the short term.[23] This leads to a 




Figure 6. Projected Future Fleet Composition [2] 
Given these potential shortcomings, efforts have branched out to many research 
areas to attempt to find a combination of solutions that will reduce the environmental 
impact of aviation at both the vehicle and fleet levels. At the aircraft level, this includes 
technology infusion, advanced vehicle concepts, mission specification changes, and 
alternative fuels. Operation changes, more frequent maintenance, inventory changes, and 
infrastructure improvements are proposed strategies to make improvements to utilization 
of the existing aircraft that will be unable to benefit from the vehicle level improvements. 
Technology has long been the major driver in reducing aviation's environmental 
impact and will continue to be an important enabler going forward. Examples of these 
improvements include more efficient combustors, lighter vehicle materials, and acoustic 
dampening materials. NASA, FAA, and ACARE have laid out aggressive goals for 













An extension of technology development is the development of advanced 
airframe and engine concepts. While the wing tube concept continues to see reductions in 
environmental impact, physical limitations of the vehicle will eventually be reached. An 
example would be as engine noise reductions continue, there is some floor that exists 
such that airframe noise becomes dominant and either more technology development is 
required or this leads to a shift to an alternative airframe concepts. Additionally as 
technology progresses, one will also encounter increased difficulty in reaching those 
limitations such that transitioning from the traditional wing tube concept may not only 
yield greater benefits but also have room for additional improvements at far less 
difficulty. Examples of these concepts are found in Figure 7 and include the hybrid wing 
body and truss braced wing airframe concepts and geared turbofan and open rotor engine 
concepts. 
 
Figure 7. Proposed Advanced Airframe and Engine Concepts [25][26][27][28] 
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Mission specification changes will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 2 but 
the objective is to change the baseline speeds, ranges, or payloads in order to reduce the 
environmental impact of aviation. 
Alternative fuel could hold promise as these fuels may have different emissions 
characteristics such that significant reductions may be possible. The objective is to reduce 
the net increase in atmospheric carbon through the usage of various feedstocks, such as 
biodiesel, plant oils, synthesis of natural gas or coal, and alcohols, to use existing carbon 
in the atmosphere to produce the fuels as opposed to using carbon found in underground 
oil.[29] Alternative fuels could potentially also penalize aircraft performance if there is 
either a lower energy density or greater fuel density. The Commercial Aviation 
Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI) is a United States research effort that focuses on 
providing increased energy security and sustainability through the usage of alternative 
fuels.[30] Partners in this effort include airlines, manufacturers, researchers, and 
government agencies. 
Reynolds et. al. took a different approach and broke the mission down into its 
individual segments to identify potential operational improvements.[31] This study was 
purely qualitative with respect to fuel, climate, air quality, noise, difficulty to implement, 
and system impact. Categories include surface, departure, cruise, approach, landing, and 
miscellaneous. Surface is primarily focused on ground optimization at airports. Departure 
and approach are geared towards finding optimum noise procedures. Proposed cruise 
improvements include technologies that allow for reduced vertical and horizontal 
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separation minima or cruise climb. Miscellaneous discussed multiple solutions at the air 
traffic control level but also contains contingency fuel reduction. 
Part of the more efficient operations measure involves maintenance procedures. In 
2002 ICAO conducted two fuel burn workshops that identified a variety of techniques 
that would provide savings to fuel burn. Weight management encompasses passenger 
service items, potable water, cargo and baggage containers, and removal of trapped 
moisture or dirt from surfaces to minimize the excess weight in the vehicle. Airframe 
concerns include seal maintenance, surface mismatches, and surface cleanliness to reduce 
excess drag buildup. Engine maintenance includes seal and valve replacement and engine 
wash to minimize efficiency losses from operation. The impact of engine wash can be 
seen in Figure 8. While all these savings are individually small, they can become quite 
significant if implemented together and when considered over the lifespan of the aircraft. 
Boeing and Airbus each have produced their own documentation on this matter as 
well.[32][33] 
 
Figure 8. Impact of Engine Wash on Fuel Efficiency [32] 
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Given the significant lifespan of aircraft in the fleet, one needs to identify 
measures to improve performance of aircraft within the fleet. One approach could be an 
accelerated phase out of older aircraft within the fleet to reduce environmental impact. As 
opposed to being required to do so by regulatory measure, this would be an entirely 
voluntary process. These older aircraft would be replaced with newer aircraft that would 
provide similar capability at reduced impact. Another approach would involve the retrofit 
of existing vehicles with technology packages such as winglets or a new engine. Azzam 
proposed a different method to reduce emissions through shifting the distribution of 
aircraft size to larger vehicles.[34] Figure 9 shows that the baseline fleet lies 
predominantly with vehicles sized in the 90-150 seat range. When shifting the aircraft 
distribution to 330-420 seat range, one can get a 10% fuel burn reduction but this may 
come at increased noise at airports given the utilization of larger vehicles even 
considering the removal of multiple smaller aircraft operations. 
 




One of the challenges in adopting these measures is that cost considerations can 
be quite significant for operators and ICAO even identifies this as a potential drawback. 
The purchase of new aircraft cannot be made solely with environmental concerns alone. 
Additionally, most operators have developed fleet plans to address both growth and 
retirement of aging aircraft. While some measures like retrofitting could be done fairly 
quickly in the short term as a part of maintenance, other measures such as aircraft 
replacement or fleet composition distribution shifts would require a significantly long 
timeframe to be implemented and may run contrary to operator business plans. 
As a part of improving air traffic management and infrastructure use, 
governments on both sides of the Atlantic have established programs focusing on 
updating and improving the existing traffic management systems. Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) and Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) are 
the respective American and European efforts to upgrade the air transportation networks. 
Objectives include improved safety, reliability, and efficiency. These programs are 
working jointly to ensure that all measures are capable of working seamlessly with each 
other as well as standardize procedures to protect the environment. NextGen currently 
estimates that by 2018, total flight delays will be reduced by 21% and save 1.4 billion 
gallons of fuel.[35] SESAR projects that by 2020, the total cost savings will be 
approximately €8 billion, the average air traffic flow management delay per flight will be 
half a minute from 2.2 minutes, and fuel savings of 17 Megatonnes will be possible.[36] 
While there has been a significant level of interest in all of these different 
approaches, mission specification changes are significantly interesting as there are 
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implications at the vehicle level that will have additional impacts at the fleet and will be 
further detailed in Chapter 2. These changes are with respect to modifying the design 
capabilities of future aircraft through range, speed, or payload changes for a new aircraft. 
Unlike technology infusion, vehicle concepts or alternative fuels, these aircraft cannot 
simply be considered direct replacements of existing vehicles as they can operate 
differently in the fleet, resulting in a linkage of aircraft design characteristics and fleet 
operational capability. This is unlike the four fleet level strategy categories where the 
aircraft impacted are already in operation and cannot be modified to capture potential 
benefits of mission specification changes. However, the implementation and introduction 
of these modified specification aircraft may have impacts beyond the traditional 
environmental metrics that are typically analyzed and need to be quantified. 
1.1 Research Objective 
The objective of this research is to develop a methodology that will enable the 
evaluation of aircraft mission specification changes at the fleet level over a multitude of 
metrics. To meet this objective, a series of questions are posed here and addressed in 
Chapter 2. 
 What is the current state of the art of mission specification analysis? 
 What modeling and simulation tools are available? 
 What capabilities will be required? 




CHAPTER  2 
BACKGROUND 
This chapter’s focus is on providing insight into the questions posed in the 
previous chapter, addressing the research objective. It is organized as follows: an analysis 
of the current state of the art of mission specifications, an analysis of the various 
stakeholders and their metrics of interest, followed by a review of vehicle and fleet 
modeling and simulation tools, and concludes with the methods for identifying airports 
for intermediate stop operations. 
2.1 How One Conceptually Designs an Aircraft 
Before discussing the existing literature regarding mission specification changes, 
a brief overview of how one designs an aircraft will be provided. 
The process begins with a set of customer requirements regarding cruise speed, 
flight range, and payload. Given the maturity of the aviation industry today, this might 
include conversations with major customers to determine what their needs and interests 
are, particularly with respect to prospective new routes of interest. Or in the case of the 
military, a request for proposal will be issued detailing specific requirements for the 
aircraft. However, these aircraft are more complicated and outside the scope of this work 
and will not be focused on here. However, the steps required are similar. 
Once these requirements have been established, a mission profile is defined based 
on the needs of the customer. An example commercial aviation profile is provided in 
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Figure 10. This entails a taxi out period to the runway, takeoff, climb to cruising altitude, 
primary cruise, descent, landing, and taxi in. In this example, the primary cruise mission 
is a step cruise mission where cruising altitude is held constant until it is more fuel 
efficient to operate at a higher altitude. In addition to primary mission, there is also a 
reserve mission in the event that one cannot land at the arrival airport due to some reason. 
This is also defined in the right portion of Figure 10. This assumes a climb to a lower 
altitude, a short cruise leg to an alternate airport, and descent and landing there. A loiter 
phase is often modeled as part of this mission as well. 
 
Figure 10. Notional Commercial Aircraft Mission Profile 
With requirements and mission defined, the next step is to evaluate aircraft 
performance. But to do this, one first needs to have an idea of the vehicle concept used to 
conduct the mission. This will entail making some decisions about the concept itself is 
some of these components were not defined from customer requirements. This includes 




Taxi out and Takeoff
Landing and Taxi in
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things like aircraft body shape (wing tube or an advanced concept), number of engines, 
engine location, and tail location.  
From a simplified perspective, the Bruguet range equation can be used to 
calculate overall mission performance. This is demonstrated in Equation 1. A number of 
vehicle characteristics are required to fully conduct this analysis. The design range R and 
cruise speed V are defined by customer requirements. Engine fuel consumption cT is 
defined by engine analysis or provided by engine manufacturers. This can also be 
assumed from historical data. Aerodynamic performance of the aircraft is defined by L/D, 
which represents the lift to drag ratio of the vehicle and represents the overall efficiency 
of the airframe. Finally, the weights of the vehicle Wi and Wf represent the initial takeoff 
weight and the fuel weight respectively. All of these inputs can be defined from historical 
data; however, more advanced analysis methods could be used to provide numbers that 








     
 
(1)  
Additionally, using constraint analysis one can also better understand the feasible 
design space using constraint analysis to better understand what requirements drive 
performance requirements. These can include takeoff field length, approach speed, cruise 
speed, and climb performance and will provide insight in terms of the required thrust and 
wing areas to complete the mission. This information is invaluable to better estimate the 
weight and fuel burn estimates for the vehicles. 
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It is an iterative process to determine the overall aircraft design as one guesses an 
initial weight and the outcome then defines what the new guess should be until the 
desired range is met. Even using far more advanced tools to conduct different parts of the 
analysis, the approach is still the same. 
2.2 Mission Specification Changes 
As technology and design knowledge has improved, aircraft have become capable 
of carrying far more passengers further distances at slightly increased speeds. The first 
DC-9 aircraft delivered in 1965 was capable of carrying 90 passengers a distance of 
1,265 nm at 561 miles per hour. Just over forty years later marked the delivery of the first 
A380, which is capable of hauling 644 passengers a distance of 8,300 nm only slightly 
faster. The premise of mission specification changes is to reduce design parameters from 
where they are now to lower values to reduce excess fuel carried during long range 
flights or drag due to higher cruise speeds. 
2.2.1 Rationale for Future Aircraft Designs 
This work is framed solely for new designs and not for existing aircraft. Airlines 
can purchase aircraft at lower takeoff weights than the certified maximum takeoff gross 
weight (MTOW); however, for a given flight that is within both payload-range envelopes 
they will see identical performance. This is shown in Figure 11. The baseline 777-200ER 
is represented by the black line and a purchased 777-200ER with a lower gross weight is 
the red line. These aircraft are identical so although the red line represents a reduced 
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range aircraft, the performance at a point within both payload-range diagrams, like the 
one represented by the star at 4,000 nm, is identical. 
 
Figure 11. Comparison of Range Reduction on an Existing Aircraft [37] 
With respect to speed reduction, one approach to reduce fuel consumption would 
be to fly slower as this would reduce drag on the aircraft. This practice does not 
necessarily translate to improve fuel burn as seen in Figure 12. For a given aircraft at a 
given altitude and weight, there is a cruise speed that provides the best fuel efficiency 
called maximum range cruise (MRC) speed where the nautical air miles (NAMs) per 
pound of fuel is maximized. Although cruise speeds can vary based on a variety of 
conditions, typically airlines operate at long range cruise (LRC) where the speed is such 
that the fuel efficiency of the aircraft is 99% of the maximum range cruise value. This 
allows the airline to reduce the costs associated with crew. Slowing from LRC to MRC 
provides increases in fuel efficiency but further reductions beyond MRC result in losses 
Baseline TOGW Lower Max TOGW
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in specific range such that aircraft fuel burn will increase. For these reasons, this work 
will focus on mission specification changes to future aircraft designs. 
 
Figure 12. Impact of Cruise Speed Reduction on Fuel Efficiency on Existing 
Aircraft [38] 
2.2.2 Literature Review of Mission Specification Work 
A review of the state of the art regarding mission specification changes has been 
conducted to identify areas where contributions can be made. These changes are 
associated with how much payload is moved, how far it can be moved, and how quickly 
it reaches the destination. 
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2.2.2.1 Payload Modification 
Payload refers to passenger and cargo transported for a given operation. Aircraft 
are typically designed with a particular passenger payload in mind and then include 
additional payload over this for a maximum structural payload (MSP) for operators that 
utilize their aircraft as a freighter. Economon lowered MSP requirements for a small twin 
aisle aircraft and found that fuel savings were 1% for every 10% reduction in 
payload.[39] 
Yutko looked at the impacts of varying design payload of 25 to 1,500 passengers 
over a significant design range and multiple cruise speeds.[40] The objective of the work 
was to identify a handful of aircraft that if introduced into the fleet would have the 
greatest impact on fleet fuel burn. Vehicle selection was conducted through evaluating 
the design space by stepping through all three design parameters and each vehicle was 
flown in the fleet for feasible flights. Figure 13 demonstrates the results of that analysis 
with contours of fuel burn and the minimum fuel burn aircraft is identified by the red dot. 
Further vehicle selection was conducted with all the previously identified vehicles placed 
into the fleet. The observation of this work is that the selected vehicles provided designs 
that were fairly similar to existing aircraft with respect to payload and the final vehicles 
are provided in Table 2. Additional analysis was conducted with respect to speed and 
range variation as well as intermediate stops analysis (ISO). Outcomes from those studies 




Figure 13. Yutko Approach to Identifying Fleet Minimum Fuel Burn Aircraft [40] 






1 150 3,240 0.84 
2 250 7,775 0.84 
3 400 7,130 0.84 
4 100 2,590 0.84 
 
Table 3. Yutko Results with Joint Variation and Fuel Stop Introduction [40] 
Passengers 












150 3,480 0.681 3,240 3,240 3,455 3,455 
250 6,870 0.718 7,775 5,400 6,700 4,100 
400 7,685 0.752 7,130 4,320 6,480 5,185 
100 2,515 0.689 2,590 1,944 2,160 2,160 
200 - - 6,050 4,536 5,830 4,320 




Payload modification has received fairly limited interest in literature. Figure 14 
helps to illustrate why the results from Economon indicated that payload reduction would 
yield a trivial impact to fuel burn. The aircraft in this figure is Boeing 777-200ER with 
the y-axis representing operating empty weight (OEW) and payload – the minimum value 
is the OEW value. MSP is represented by the horizontal line at the top of the payload 
range diagram while the design passenger payload is represented by the dashed line 
within the chart. As MSP is nearly twice the passenger value, any reduction in MSP 
would not significantly impact the vehicle design as the maximum takeoff gross weight 
has not changed. 
 
Figure 14. Comparison of MSP to Maximum Passenger Payload [37] 
Payload variation alone provides a challenge though as payload is also a measure 
of aircraft capability. Suppose the maximum design payload was varied significantly such 
that the observations from the previous figure were neglected. Figure 15 contains the 
payload-range diagrams of the various Boeing aircraft in operation today with data 
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collected from airport planning documents.[37] Dashed lines represent the design 
payload for each aircraft. If one was to take the B767 aircraft, represented by the red line, 
and increase the maximum payload, the aircraft would become sized enough to compete 
with the B777 aircraft. On the other hand, reduction in payload would put it in the same 
size as the B737. Because aircraft are designed to operate within particular seat classes, 
utilization of different aircraft for different seat classes will essentially capture payload 
variation. If usage of only one aircraft model is desired, then payload variation should be 
conducted in a process somewhat similar to Yutko. 
 
Figure 15. Comparison of Payload Characteristics of the Four Aircraft 
 
2.2.2.2 Range Reduction and Intermediate Stop Operations 
Range reduction has seen an increase in interest since the early 2000s. But this is 
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747 are compared to the payload-range diagram for the aircraft in Figure 16 (777 top, 747 
bottom).[37][41] This comparison demonstrates that many operations do not fly close to 
the maximum design range on the aircraft and by reducing the aircraft design range, the 
vehicle would be better sized to operate for these reduced range missions. 
 
 
Figure 16. Comparison of Operations to Design Capabilities of the B777 and B747 
[37][41] 
The Greener by Design technology group proposed that payload range efficiency 
(measured as Range * Payload Weight / Mission Fuel) would be maximized by 


































this work and suggests that aircraft can reduce fuel consumed in long range cruise by 
50% by breaking the flight into three stages (this will be referred to as intermediate stop 
operations (ISO) from here on) and conjunction with redesigning the aircraft for this 
shorter range.[44] One of the limitations of this work is the low fidelity modeling 
conducted by the Breguet range equation. Another is the usage of the payload range 
efficiency metric as it is inherently weighted against long range flights. A third is the 
assumption that the airport considered for intermediate stops will lie directly along the 
route 
Hahn conducts a similar analysis with a higher fidelity model and finds savings 
are closer to 22.5%. A comparison of his results to that of Green and Nangia is provided 
in Figure 17 as well as that of the B777-200 and B737-900. He also comments on 
potential negative impacts of ISO airliner service. These include safety reductions 
through additional takeoff and landing cycles, increased travel time due to additional 
refueling stops, increased environmental impact at the intermediate stop airports, and the 




Figure 17. Comparison of Tool Fidelity on Reduced Range Aircraft Design [45] 
Tyagi conducted trade studies on the number of intermediate stops with respect to 
fuel burn, block time, and operating cost. Three scenarios are considered: a direct flight, 
one intermediate stop, and two intermediate stops. The results of this work are shown in 
Figure 18 and each dot for a given number of stops represents variation in cruise Mach 
number – baseline is 0.85 and it is reduced in 0.05 steps to 0.70. Transitioning to one stop 
from a direct flight provides 27% fuel burn savings and a 12% operating cost savings for 
an hour increase in trip time. The move to a second stop provides some savings but there 
is a significant reduction in impact. Additionally, it provides a significant increase in 




Figure 18. Impact of Intermediate Stop Count on Fuel, Time, and Cost Metrics [46] 
Creemers conducts analysis similar to Green and Nangia but for a B747 sized 
aircraft.[47] This uses Breguet as well and finds a 27% increase in fuel efficiency when 
the aircraft is designed for medium range operation instead of long range. However, the 
wrong conclusions are drawn from this work. Creemers contends that intermediate stop 
operations would enable more airports to be used and this would open up new markets. 
Additionally, he mentions that these new aircraft would produce less noise since the 
takeoff thrust requirements are lessened. While the observation that those aircraft would 
produce less noise is true, it neglects the aircraft contribution at the airport level. These 
new airports that would be served will see an increase in noise as they are receiving more 
operations than in the existing operational framework. On the other hand, the airports that 
currently operate these larger may see reductions in noise to the community but this 
would also depend on the total number of operations occurring at a given airport. For a 
sufficiently large airport, one may find that the impact is trivial to the total noise 
exposure. 
Kenway conducted analysis comparing the performance of a short range A330-
200 derivative against the baseline A330 and two A320s.[48] Reductions in CO2 per 
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passenger were reduced by 13% and 5.4% for the two other aircraft operations. Operating 
cost benefits of the reduced range aircraft are in the range of 10% for both alternatives. 
Economon conducts a similar analysis on a small twin aisle aircraft and finds that a R1 
range (maximum range at maximum payload in the payload range diagram) reduction of 
30% can yield a 4-5% reduction in fuel consumption.[39] 
From the fleet perspective, Langhans conducted an analysis of both the offset and 
detour of airport locations for a large twin aisle aircraft using Official Airline Guide 
operations data.[49] Offset measures the location of the intermediate airport from the 
origin airport such that a value of 0.5 represents the midpoint between the origin and 
destination. Detour represents the excess distance added due to the usage of an 
intermediate airport and the benefits are linearly reduced as more excess distance is 
added. For a 6,400 nm mission with no resizing, the benefits are around 6.5% savings in 
fuel burn for an airport located at the midpoint and ISO provides savings until the excess 
distance is approximately 7% of the great circle distance. Resizing this aircraft for a 
3,200 nm range provides 15.5% fuel burn savings when operated under intermediate 
stops for the 6,400 nm mission. Additional analysis is undertaken to identify which 
airports become optimum utilization under the ISO concept and these are presented in 
Figure 19. The five busiest airports are marked – three lie in eastern Canada, one lies 
between Russia and Alaska, and the other lies in Turkey. It is noted that many of these 
airports may suffer problems with respect to capacity as well as inclement weather but it 
is expected that this concept would ease in and allow these airports to grow sufficiently. 
Langhans conducted a secondary study to identify ideal locations for intermediate 
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airports, neglecting whether an airport was there. Promising locations were again in 
Alaska, Canada, and Turkey as well as Russian and India. For both studies, fleet analysis 
was conducted for only one year. 
 
Figure 19. Distribution of Optimum Intermediate Airports for 3,000 nm Design 
Range [50] 
 
Martinez-Val assessed both the environmental and operating cost savings 
potential through the usage of short-range aircraft with intermediate stops.[51] Although 
this analysis is predominantly focused on the aircraft level, the relevance to the fleet is 
due to the analysis of routes departing from London, Paris, Frankfurt, and New York City 
with intermediate airports in real cities rather than along the great circle path. The aircraft 
design elements are on the same level as Green and Nangia while the cost models are first 
order but capture depreciation, crew, fuel, tax, and maintenance as a function of range 
and weight ratios. Findings suggest that minimizing extra distance is of far greater 
importance than finding an airport along the midpoint. Other performance findings are 
similar to Langhans. From an economic perspective, only long range flights (>6,500 nm) 
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provide operating cost savings when conducted with intermediate stop operations. When 
no detour and perfect splitting is assumed, the cost savings are around 10%. 
2.2.2.3 Cruise Speed Reduction 
Cruise speed reduction has also been proposed as a means to reduce aircraft fuel 
consumption. Drag is proportional to the square of the flight speed such that flying 
slower will provide some fuel savings if aircraft are designed for these speeds. Economon 
analyzed the impact of cruise speed reduction and found that moving from Mach 0.84 to 
0.70 will allow for a 13.1% fuel savings but 11.4% of these savings have been realized at 
Mach 0.74.[39] The Subsonic Ultra Green Aircraft Research study identified that if 
meeting the NASA fuel burn goal was the only objective, aircraft cruise speed would be 
Mach 0.60. However, economic concerns set the minimum cruise Mach to 0.70 as seen in 
Figure 20.[52] Lower speeds increase the operating costs on airlines as well as reduce the 




Figure 20. Analysis of Design Cruise Mach on Vehicle Fuel Burn [52] 
Bonnefoy demonstrated that modification of both cruise speed and vehicle 
concept could provide significant reductions in fuel consumption.[53] Additional analysis 
was conducted with respect to airline scheduling such that only a slight shift in departure 
time was found to be required for 30-65% of flights and these modifications could be 
absorbed in the slack in the schedule. Fan continued this analysis with respect to airline 
economics of speed reduced aircraft.[54] Cost analysis included fuel, crew, maintenance, 
and depreciation elements and was conducted over five seat classes. The cost elements 
were then combined with airliner scheduling to determine what levels of cruise reduction 


















For range reduction, all of the vehicle level work presented has been primarily 
focused on fuel burn. Vehicle level analysis has assumed that the intermediate stop 
locations lie along the route and that is not likely to be true as seen in work by Langhans. 
An additional point of concern is the assumption of fixed technology levels. It is likely 
that future technology infusion will reduce the benefits of mission specification changes. 
Fuel burn has also been the predominant focus of speed reduction as well. Although some 
analysis has focused on airline impacts, the analysis neglects the prospective impact of 
block time increases on annual aircraft operations by assuming that slack in the schedule 
can be absorbed. The airline operating costs analysis also neglects the impact technology 
has on reducing fuel usage such that the operating cost savings should be less due 
technology reducing the impact of cruise speed reduction on fuel burn. 
A couple of authors with range reduction work have made reference to other 
metrics that may improve or degrade but minimal quantitative analysis has been done. In 
many cases, conflicting results are present. Hahn proposes that noise will increase while 
Creemers suggests that range reduction will reduce noise. Kenway observed operating 
cost savings when a range reduced aircraft is used for short ranges while Martinez-Val 
concluded that costs savings are only possible for long range flights. However none of 
these metrics have been quantified at the fleet level. Speed reduction may have less 
impact on other metrics but there is little work done to quantify change to other metrics 
either. The speed reduction analyses have typically focused on the assumption that slack 
in the schedule can be freely used and would not require additional aircraft. 
38 
 
From the fleet perspective, the predominant metric of interest is again fuel burn. 
Langhans briefly touches on capacity in his work but it is not the focus of the work. 
Safety is mentioned only by a bubble in the Langhans work that suggests ISO would 
provide a minimum impact. Noise is not run for any of these fleet analyses. 
Literature typically neglects the impact of fleet evolution by conducting complete 
vehicle replacement instead. This results in an overestimation of the benefits with respect 
to fuel burn as in reality, airlines would not replace entire portions of their fleet. The 
Langhans and Yutko analyses ultimately capture a maximum potential benefit but one 
that is not achievable. Additionally, the fleet benefits are often conducted for a given year 
of operations as seen with Langhans and Yutko. Overall operating cost has not been 
considered at a fleet level. Langhans focused on life cycle cost of the aircraft and 
Martinez-Val looked at a handful of operations for cost analysis. 
This literature research has yielded three additional research questions: 
 What are the other metrics that should be considered for aircraft mission 
specification changes? 
 How does the introduction of mission specification changed aircraft impact these 
metrics? 
 Are the impacts of mission specification changes reduced when technology is 
introduced to the aircraft? 
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2.3 Stakeholder Interests 
To quantify the implications of aircraft mission specification changes, one needs 
to identify metrics that would be impacted by these design changes. The first step would 
be to identify the relevant stakeholders and then from there, determine what their interests 
are. Those interests then define the metrics that would be potential implications. 
Stakeholders include passengers, flight crew/mechanics, airlines, airports, 
manufacturers, regulators, air traffic control, airport area residents, and technically 
everyone. Although this list may not be entirely comprehensive, it serves as a starting 
point. 
Passenger priorities depend on whether the customer is a leisure or business 
traveler. Wessels conducted a study on consumer loyalty in the airline industry.[55] The 
number one leisure passenger concern is price followed by safety and then ease of 
scheduling and non-stop flights. On the other hand, safety leads for business travelers and 
then is followed by price, scheduling ease, and on-time performance. The top 10 for both 
is provided in Figure 21. This prioritization of fare price can also be observed by the 





Figure 21. Passenger Priorities in Airline Selection [55] 
Flight crew and mechanics both have an interest in maximizing safety as ensuring 
safety provides job security. However, pilots are facing new challenges in the cockpit as 
fatigue and more automation in the cockpit can result in crew sleeping in the cockpit. 
This has resulted in recent changes to some of the rules involving pilot daily work hours, 
rest hours, and limits on hours on duty per month. Another interest for flight crew and 
mechanics is income, which is something that one would always enjoy being 
maximizing. 
Airline priorities are focused on reliability, costs, and route selection. Reliability 
relates to downtime of aircraft as well as on-time performance of the flights. The 
introduction of intermediate stops to the flight schedule can have significant 
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consequences as this increase the total stress on the aircraft such that failures may be 
more likely to occur. This behavior can be observed from Southwest Airlines flights 812 
and 2294 where significant cycling of the aircraft led to fuselage failures.[56] Minimizing 
downtime has been a priority of manufacturers as well because this is a selling point for 
airlines. On-time performance improvements have also increased recently; however, 
these improvements are also due to increased schedule padding such that many flights are 
arriving early.[57] The other perspective is operating costs – indirect and direct. Indirect 
operating costs include staff, marketing, administrative, and interest/depreciation. Direct 
operating costs include fuel, flight crew, maintenance, route fees, and landing fees.[58] 
As fuel is a significant contributor to airline costs, this has been the major driver for fuel 
burn reduction for manufacturers. Route selection is the other realm of interest as 
identifying new market pairs is a critical asset for future profitability as well as deciding 
to end service on a particular route. 
Airport concerns focus on capacity and environmental concerns with respect to 
future growth. Some facilities are currently operating near their maximum capacity such 
that future growth will quickly lead to delays or airlines moving to other facilities. Part of 
these capacity limits are due to environmental concerns via noise or emissions. New 
runways will greatly increase airport capacity but this will increase the noise footprint of 
the airport in the surrounding community and increase emissions in the area. These 
concerns along with others are illustrated in Figure 22 for present and future concerns. 





Figure 22. Airport Environmental Concerns – Present and Future [8] 
Manufacturer objectives are focused on providing the most competitive aircraft on 
the market that complies with current regulations but also provides a significant buffer to 
potential future regulations. Competitiveness has partially been driven by minimizing 
fuel burn as airlines are interested in reducing their operating costs. However, 
manufacturer decisions are also made with respect to decisions from their competitors. 
Boeing had originally planned on replacing the B737 with a clean sheet design rather 
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than refreshing the existing airframe with some new technology. When Airbus announced 
the A320 NEO, airline interest was significant and resulted in significant pressure to 
upgrade the B737 over developing a new vehicle.[59] 
Regulators have an interest in making sure everything works properly. The 
objective is to maximize safety while making sure all participants in the system follow 
the established regulations. Additionally, they set regulations on emissions and noise 
limits and these rules are updated to help reduce environmental footprints, spurring new 
developments in aircraft technology. Other rules are updated to address new 
circumstances such as rules addressing pilot fatigue.[60] This job is critical to ensure that 
the air transportation system maintains such a high level of safety. 
Air traffic control is a particularly stressful job with a very heavy workload 
required to maintain the level of safety that exists today. Aviation growth will only 
increase the work level required. Although the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System is projected to provide significant improvements to traffic control, changes to the 
system, such as the introduction of intermediate stop operations will result in an increase 
in takeoff and landing at the stop airports and result in greater workload. 
Residents in the airport area face constant disturbance from airport operation. 
Each departure and arrival generates noise, which can be particularly problematic in the 
evening even though the number of operations has been reduced. The impact of noise 
disturbance on a variety of different human factors has been studied extensively and will 
likely continue going forward. The other impact is emissions that impact air quality. It is 
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much harder for individuals to identify as it is not directly observable to the naked eye 
but the emissions can cause a variety of health related issues. Aviation growth will only 
make both of these concerns worse. 
Technically, everyone is a stakeholder in aviation as well. Any source of energy 
or mode of transportation that emits CO2 contributes to climate change. Consequences 
include changing weather patterns, increases in temperature, and rising ocean levels. 
These changes will have significant impacts to civilization. Concerns have also been 
raised that aviation’s contribution is more significant as the CO2 release is at cruise 
altitude instead of near the ground. 
These stakeholder interests can be translated into a smaller list of metrics that can 
then be used for analysis. Some interests have been combined together into one metrics 
like fares, salary, and research and development have been compiled into cost but this is 
not meant to be one all-encompassing metric. Block time is kept separate as total increase 
in flight time is of interest. Noise, emissions, and fuel burn are kept separate as each is a 
particular metric of interest for environmental research. Capacity, safety, and reliability 
are also metrics of interest with respect to future impacts. A mapping of stakeholders to 
this reduced metric set is provided in Table 4. 
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Passengers          
Flight Crew          
Maintenance Crew          
Airlines          
Airports          
Manufacturers          
Regulators          
Air Traffic Control          
Airport Area Residents          
Everyone          
 
These metrics can then be separated into the aircraft level and the fleet level. At 
the aircraft level, regulations currently include certification noise and NOx and will 
include CO2 in the near future. Research and development and acquisition costs are 
important in evaluating vehicle level changes. Finally, mission performance will be 
necessary to measure fuel burn, emissions, and travel time. The fleet perspective shifts to 
total numbers with respect to emissions, fuel burn, block time, operating costs, and 
operations. Airport noise is a function of the operations schedule and future growth. 
Safety, capacity, and reliability are also metrics of interest at the fleet level. 
2.4 Modeling and Simulation 
Fulfilling the objective of providing a methodology to evaluate the implications of 
aircraft mission specification changes at the fleet level requires detailed, complex, 
quantitative analysis, relying on sophisticated modeling and simulation (M&S) tools. 
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There is no one tool that is capable of handling the job alone such that this task requires 
tools modeling the aircraft level and the fleet level. The following section addresses the 
requirements needed for tools in both realms, provides background on existing tools, and 
ranks the tools against the mentioned criteria. 
2.4.1 Aircraft Level Modeling 
To capture the impacts of mission specification changes, an aircraft level tool 
should be able to capture the engine thermodynamic cycle, engine mechanical design, 
aircraft design and performance, and noise and emissions analysis. There are a number of 
existing tools that meet this capability either at a disciplinary level or as an integrated 
toolset. Preference is given to an integrated toolset as this eliminates the need to link 
disciplinary codes together, thus integrated tools will be the primary focus of this 
literature search. In the event that a capability is lacking in a selected toolset, appropriate 
discipline level tools will be identified to fill that gap. 
2.4.1.1 Criteria 
The previous section outlined metrics of interest with respect to various 
stakeholders. These include mission performance with respect to fuel burn, flight time, 
and emissions. Mission performance is critical for capturing fleet level impact. Future 
aircraft will also be subjected to certification requirements for noise and NOx. If these 
future aircraft are unable to meet these regulations, the prospective fuel savings are 
irrelevant as they will not be allowed to operate. Additional noise data is required to 
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capture noise for the airport beyond the certification requirements in the form of noise-
power-distance curves that measure the noise emitted from an aircraft at a given power 
setting and altitude from an observer point. Changing aircraft design requirements will 
impact a variety of costs – specifically research and development, operating, and 
acquisition costs. These cost changes could mean the difference between these aircraft 
entering production or not because market viability. These metrics are then required 
outputs from the vehicle level analysis. 
Other characteristics for M&S tools include physics based analysis. One of the 
common shortcomings in mission specification changes is a lack of analysis with respect 
to technology integration. Although one approach of modeling technology is to use 
factors within a tool to scale outputs up or down (examples include reducing wing weight 
by 20% to account for a materials change or a reduction in fuel consumption to represent 
engine technology), this method does not capture the true physics of the problem and can 
break the interdependencies between different metrics. By modeling an engine 
technology as just a percent reduction of fuel consumption, one may not capture changes 
to the engine exhaust that results in different noise outcomes. For this reason, the aircraft 
design tool utilized needs to capture this behavior as accurately as possible and 
necessitates the need for physics based analysis. 
Other desired criteria include automation and rapid analysis. Automation allows 
for a removal of a human in the loop with respect to running the analysis code and can 
help expedite analysis time. However this does not remove the user from data analysis as 
automation is not capable of identifying whether a given design is feasible or not. Rapid 
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analysis is clearly beneficial as it allows for faster turnaround between problem definition 
and data analysis. 
On the inverse side of rapid analysis is modeling fidelity. Tool fidelity is critical 
for whether the analysis being conducted should be taken seriously. Anyone can create 
their own design capabilities in a tool but that does not mean the results are reputable. To 
remove doubt regarding confidence in the analysis, utilization of established design tools 
with a reputation of high fidelity is critical. Previous work in mission specification 
changes has made extensive use of the Breguet range equation and other first order sizing 
principles. These techniques are incredibly rapid and if one built a spreadsheet with the 
correct linkages, it would take seconds to provide results. The problem is that these 
analysis methods are very low fidelity. On the other hand, computational fluid dynamics 
is a very detailed analysis technique. It provides very high fidelity to a designer but 
suffers from lengthy analysis time such that one may only be capable of running a few 
different designs. This trade requires perspective on the scope of the problem at hand to 
determine the appropriate level of fidelity and analysis time.  
Any aircraft design tool should be capable of modeling mission specification 
changes such that this consideration is simply assumed. A summary of the vehicle level 
modeling and simulation criteria and the associated rationale and importance is provided 
in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Vehicle Level Modeling and Simulation Selection Criteria 
Criteria Importance  Rationale  
Physics-based High  
Modeling of mitigation strategies requires 
capturing the physics of the problem  
Fidelity High  
Tool fidelity is critical to assurance that 
the resulting analysis is reasonable 
Automation capability High  Removes need for human in the loop  
Rapid Low  Reduces cycle time  
Noise High  
Noise is one of the key drivers for this 
research  
Emissions High  
Emissions is one of the key drivers for 
this research 
Cost Medium 
Cost captures changes in acquisition and 
R&D costs which can impact the fleet  
Source code Low  
Capability to develop higher fidelity if 
needed  
2.4.1.2 Aircraft Level Tools 
The Environmental Design Space (EDS) is a physics-based aircraft design 
environment that has been developed at the Georgia Institute of Technology within the 
Aerospace Systems Design Lab.[61] This effort has been developed through the FAA, 
NASA, and Transport Canada as a part of a suite of tools to enable analysis of the 
environmental impact of aviation.[62] EDS is an integrated tool suite capable of 
performing engine thermodynamic cycle, engine mechanical design, aircraft design and 
performance, and noise and emissions analysis. The underlying tools are Compressor 
Generator for compressor performance, Numerical Propulsion System Simulation for 
engine cycle, Weight Analysis of Turbine Engines for mechanical design, Flight 
Optimization System (FLOPS) for aircraft performance, P3-T3 methods for NOx 
emissions, and Aircraft Noise Prediction Program for noise. Further information on the 
development history of EDS is available in Kirby.[61] 
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Capability exists in EDS to model both current and future vehicles whether they 
contain new technologies or use advanced concepts such as the hybrid wing body 
airframe or open rotor engine. EDS has been applied to analysis conducted for 
technology assessments for both the FAA and NASA as well as policy making for 
CAEP.[63][64] A flowchart of EDS is provided in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. EDS Framework [61] 
Developed at the Technical University of Brunschwig, the Preliminary Aircraft 
Design and Optimization (PrADO) is capable of iterative multidisciplinary design of 
aircraft. It is capable of being run in analysis, parameter study, or optimization modes. 
PrADO contains 19 modules that capture geometry, aerodynamics, engine rubberizing, 
flight simulation, weight prediction, center of gravity, and takeoff and landing 
constraints.[65] These modules are run consecutively and then checked against 




Figure 24. Design Process of PrADO [66] 
The British company QinetiQ has developed a tool called Requirements 
Exploration, Technology Impact, and Value Optimization (RETIVO) to calculate basic 
engine and aircraft performance to model the impact of technologies.[67] It was 
developed as a part of the Integrated Wing Aerospace Technology Validation 
Programme, a United Kingdom project funded through both the government and industry 
partners. Another QinetiQ capability is the Multi-Disciplinary Concept Assessment and 
Design (MDCAD) tool that allows for a more detailed geometry to be represented and 
designed. The two capabilities are somewhat different with RETIVO being considered a 
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broad but shallow approach versus MDCAD being a narrow but deep one.[68] However, 
usage of both tools provides a basis for both types of studies. 
Lissys Ltd has developed Project Interactive ANalysis and Optimization v5 
(PIANO) is an aircraft conceptual design package that is built on methods from industrial 
and academic sources.[69] It additionally comes with a database of existing aircraft with 
sources being both public and private; however, all aircraft are considered Lissys' best 
estimate and are not endorsed by any manufacturer. PIANO has been used in support of 
CAEP analysis and has a large list of customers within industry.[70] Some drawbacks of 
PIANO include a required human in the loop, a lack of capability to capture 
unconventional vehicles, and no internal noise calculation though it does have the 
capability to link required information to an appropriate noise tool. 
Stanford University developed Program for Aircraft Synthesis Studies (PASS) to 
perform aircraft analysis but is now maintained by Desktop Aeronautics.[71][72] It was 
originally developed for conventional aircraft but can perform analysis of non-
conventional aircraft such as hybrid wing bodies. It is capable of full mission analysis as 
well as optimization. Capabilities are similar to other tools but one point of interest is that 
all analyses are capable of using both gradient and non-gradient based optimizers. PASS 
also ensures that resulting designs meet a variety of real-world constraints such as field 
lengths, noise requirements, and climb gradients. 
AVID AirCraft Synthesis (ACS) was developed by Avid Aerospace based on 
experience gathered from research at NASA and Virginia Tech. ACS is a successor to the 
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NASA software package AirCraft SYNThesis (ACSYNT).[73] ACSYNT was originally 
developed at NASA Ames as a tool for preliminary aircraft design and is on par with the 
capabilities of FLOPS. AVID integrated an optimizer with components from ACSYNT 
and the result is ACS. It is an interdisciplinary tool capable of propulsion, aerodynamics, 
trajectory, geometry, and takeoff and landing analysis.[74] 
2.4.1.3 Evaluation of Tools 
Physics-based and fidelity are fairly intertwined and while some elements of a 
particular tool might be physics-based, others are not and that can impact the overall 
fidelity. Generally ranking lower on physics-based analysis will result in similar fidelity 
scores. PIANO is an outlier as many methods used in the code have been drawn from 
industry sources such that it may use less physics-based analysis but be higher fidelity. If 
the objective of this work was to extend to advanced vehicle concepts, then many of these 
tools would score even lower. 
Many of these tools do not appear to be capable of being automated such that the 
human in the loop is required. Analysis speed runs counter to fidelity. Only a couple of 
these tools are capable of modeling noise (EDS, PrADO, PASS, and AVID ACS) 
although, only EDS is capable of modeling airport noise as it is the only tool that 
generates noise-power-distance curves. The only emission modeled in most of these tools 
is NOx. Cost can be captured in many of the tools but fidelity level is somewhat 
uncertain. Source code availability is determined with respect to the author. 
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Table 6. Rankings of Vehicle Modeling and Simulation Environments 
Criteria Imp EDS PrADO RETIVO MDCAD PIANO PASS AVID ACS 
Physics-based High  High Low Low High Low Med Med 
Fidelity High  High Low Low High Med Low Med 
Automation 
   capability 
High  Yes No No No No Yes Yes 
Rapid Low  No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Noise High  Yes No No No No No No 
Emissions High  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Cost Med Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Source code Low  Yes No No No No No No 
2.4.2 Fleet Level Modeling 
To capture the impact of mission specifications at the fleet level, an initial 
operations schedule will need to be grown to capture the impact of future demand growth 
as well as introduce new aircraft in the fleet to address the new operations. There are a 
number of integrated toolsets that address the fleet level metrics. 
2.4.2.1 Criteria 
The previous section also outlined the metrics from the fleet perspective for the 
different stakeholders. Reducing the growth in aviation’s fuel consumption is the main 
driver of aircraft mission specification changes and must be captured to assess the 
benefits due to their introduction and adoption into the fleet. This requires analysis over a 
significant time frame to assess the impact of future demand as well as the impact of fleet 
evolution. Fleet evolution is critical as some analysis assumed complete replacement of 
all aircraft impacted. This decision does not reflect reality as complete fleet replacement 
would bankrupt an airline and no manufacturer could afford to produce enough aircraft to 
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replace the entire fleet and then shut down a significant portion of the manufacturing 
capacity. 
At the fleet level, the primary metrics of interest include total fuel burn and NOx 
emissions as the overall environmental benefits are the main driver for proposing the 
adoption of mission specification changes. The analysis of stakeholder interests also 
identified airport noise, total block time, total operating costs, safety, capacity, and 
reliability as other responses to consider. Airport noise can be measured either by overall 
contour area or by a measure of population exposed. Block time can be used to measure 
changes to the number of aircraft required. Operating costs are important as it provides a 
measure of whether adoption of mission specification changes provides savings to the 
airlines. Safety, capacity, and reliability are somewhat more difficult to measure at a fleet 
level but can use the total number of operations to measure the impact. Other criteria 
include analysis speed, setup time, ease of vehicle integration, and fidelity. These criteria 
are provided in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Fleet Level Modeling and Simulation Selection Criteria 
Criteria Importance  Rationale  
Analysis Speed High  Allows for more fleet analysis 
Setup Time High Enables more fleet analysis 
Ease of Vehicle 
   Integration 
Medium 
Documented vehicle format for new 
vehicles 
Fidelity High Provides confidence in the results 
Fuel Burn High 
Key driver behind mission specification 
adoption 
Emissions High  Key driver behind research 
Noise High  Airport impact of mission specifications 
Block Time High Passenger impact of mission specification 
Operating Costs High  Airline impact of mission specifications 
Safety Low  System impact of mission specifications 
Capacity Low System impact of mission specifications 
Reliability Low Airline impact of mission specifications 
Source Code Low Add new capability if necessary 
 
2.4.2.2 Integrated Tools 
The University of Cambridge's Institute for Aviation and the Environment is 
managing the Aviation Integrated Modeling (AIM) project. AIM is focused on the 
development of a tool capable of policy assessment to capture the environmental impact 
of aviation.[75] AIM has multiple modules capable of capturing aircraft technology and 
costs, aircraft movements, airport activity, air transport demand, global climate, local air 




Figure 25. Structure of AIM [76] 
In 1994, CAEP sponsored the Dutch Civil Aviation Authority to develop the 
Aviation Emissions and Evaluation of Reduction Options - Modeling System (AERO-
MS). AERO-MS contains similar modules to those in AIM such as aircraft technology 
development, air traffic demand, operating costs, direct economic effects, and emissions. 
The organizational framework of AERO-MS is provided in Figure 26. For some time 
traffic demand was scaled to a base year of 1992 but that has been updated to 2006.[77] 
Regardless, technology is modeled through post-processing with input from industry such 




Figure 26. Framework of AERO-MS [78] 
The Aviation Environmental Design Tool (AEDT) is another component of the 
tools being developed out of the FAA.[62] It provides the capability to perform aircraft 
fleet analysis. AEDT comprises of four existing FAA tools: the Integrated Noise Model 
(INM), the Emissions and Dispersion Modeling System (EDMS), the Model for 
Assessing Global Exposure from Noise Transport Aircraft (MAGENTA), and the System 
for assessing Aviation's Global Emissions (SAGE). INM and EDMS are the components 
for modeling local noise and emissions respectively. MAGENTA and SAGE capture 
global level noise and emissions. The strength of this approach is that the tools are 
integrated in a consistent fashion, which allows for assessment of the interdependencies 




Figure 27. Development History of AEDT [79] 
The Aviation Portfolio Management Tool for Economics (APMT-E) was 
developed as a part of the FAA/NASA/Transport Canada tool suite to be capable of 
modeling airline and aviation market outcomes to changes in environmental policy.[80] It 
projects future operating cost, demand projections and capacity requirements, fleet 
development projections, and fleet assignment over a set of operations with the objective 
of assessing the interdependencies between aviation environmental impacts and costs. It 
can address three different types of policy options: supply side responses where airlines 
changes their fleet mix, demand side responses where passengers may forego air 
transportation if fares significantly rise, and operational responses where airlines change 
operations to offset policy related cost increases. The flowpath of how APMT-E runs is 




Figure 28. Overview of APMT-Economics Modeling Process [80] 
Two challenges regarding these tools are the required setup time and the analysis 
times are significantly lengthy. This poses a particularly large challenge as it will be 
difficult to assess the implications of mission specification changes with a limited amount 
of fleet data. Therefore, a capability is needed to provide rapid fleet analysis with many 
of the same assumptions with limited sacrifices in fidelity. This was the main driver 
behind the following two tools. 
The Global and Regional Environmental Aviation Tradeoff tool (GREAT) was 
developed to be an interactive, rapid aviation tradeoff capability that utilized a surrogate 
fleet representation developed by Becker with a surrogate representation of both current 
and future operations.[81] GREAT allows for vehicle-level technology infusion and 
propagation to the fleet, linking EDS and AEDT capabilities.[82] It is capable of utilizing 
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various demand forecasts and calculates the total global or US centric fuel burn, NOx, and 
airport specific operations sets for noise analysis. The process by which fleet-level 
assessments are performed is provided in Figure 29. 
 
Figure 29. Overview of the GREAT Process [82] 
As GREAT is only capable of fleet-level emissions, the Airport Noise Grid 
Integration Method (ANGIM) was developed to capture noise contours for individual 
airports. ANGIM operates on a set of pre-computed aircraft single-event noise grids and 
then converts them to sound pressure levels, applies operation quantity adjustments, adds 
multiple event noise-grids, converts to DNL in decibels, and finally exports the 
accumulated levels at each point in the grid.[83][84] Multiple runways are combined, 
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rotated as appropriate, and finally calculate a representative contour area. This process is 
demonstrated in Figure 30. The linkage to GREAT is in the yearly flight data, which can 
be manipulated to provide noise contours for different airports. ANGIM can also process 
noise grids produced within EDS, linking the vehicle- and fleet-level assessments for 
noise. 
 
Figure 30. ANGIM Approach for Calculating Airport Noise [83] 
2.4.2.3 Evaluation of Tools 
An evaluation of the mentioned tools was conducted and the results are in Table 
8. Based on this analysis, GREAT and ANGIM would both be excellent fits based on the 
criteria used but neither tools addresses operating costs or flight time; however, the 
source code for GREAT is available such that this lack of capability could be created. 
With respect to broader metrics such as safety, capacity, and reliability, it appears that 
these are much harder to capture and other considerations must be made, potentially 
using total number of operations or flight time as surrogates for these metrics and 
analyzing how changes in the flight numbers impacts them. 
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Table 8. Rankings of Fleet Modeling and Simulation Environments 
Criteria Imp  AIM 
AERO-
MS 
AEDT APMT-E GREAT ANGIM 
Analysis Speed High  Med Med Low Low High High 
Setup Time High Med Med High High Low Low/Med 
Ease of Vehicle 
   Integration 
Med N Y N N Y Y 
Fidelity High Med Med High High Med Med 
Fuel Burn High Y Y Y Y Y N 
Emissions High  Y Y Y N Y N 
Noise High  Y N Y N N Y 
Block Time High Y Y Y Y N N 
Operating Costs High  Y Y N Y N N 
Safety Low  N N N N N N 
Capacity Low N N N N N N 
Reliability Low N N N N N N 
Source Code Low N N Y N Y Y 
 
2.5 Identifying Intermediate Stop Airports 
The final challenge lies in identifying routes for intermediate stop airports at the 
fleet level. Note that this is a concern only when range reduction is introduced. When 
modeled at the vehicle level only, the analysis does not capture the reality that 
intermediate airports do not lie along the direct route so the benefits will be overestimated 
as there is no additional flight distance added to reach the intermediate airport. 
However, this problem has been approached in literature by both Langhans and 
Yutko. Langhans looked at a selection of long range flights that could benefit from 
intermediate stops but the process for identifying the airports is not directly specified 
beyond the usage of a fuel ratio between the two airports.[49][50] The process itself is 
still somewhat vague. The analysis by Yutko is more clear as airport viability is based 
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around a fixed runway length but route selection is predominantly focused on fuel 
burn.[40] The cost impacts are modeled only as a minimum improvement factor which 
would prevent intermediate stop adoption if fuel savings are small. 
Graph theory is another approach that has been used to model relations between 
objects. A graph is simply a pairing of a set of vertices and edges which then represent a 
system in a simpler form. It has been applied to a number of problems in different fields 
but of particular interest are route problems. The most famous of these examples is the 
traveling salesman problem; however, the shortest path problem is of particular interest 
as it in many ways is similar to the problem at hand.[85][86][87] 
The objective is to introduce intermediate stops to minimize fuel burn and given 
an origin (O), destination (D), and some number of prospective airports (a->e2), there is a 
path that will provide the minimum fuel burn and minimum cost. Those two routes may 
be the same or they may be different depending on how much fuel is saved in comparison 
to the fees associated with the deviation from the original flight. An example of the 




Figure 31. Example of Graph Theory Applied to Intermediate Stops Analysis. 
That in itself is a graph, although simple in comparison to many of the other 
applications that graph theory has been used in. As aircraft range is reduced, the direct 
path OD may no longer be viable such that one of the other routes will become the most 
viable option. 
Other techniques do exist for determining interconnectivity between different 
fixed hubs. One such method is trip generation and distribution modeling.[88] The 
objective of trip distribution modeling is to link up regions based on trips generated This 
area is primarily utilized in ground transportation and its application to intermediate stops 
could be interesting. The most commonly used is the gravity model and there have been a 
number of gravity models developed for aerospace purposes but they are predominantly 
limited to small network expansion problems.[89][90][91] Another popular model is the 









efforts.[92] Based on these example problems, it would appear that these techniques 
would be overboard for this problem. 
The objective here is not necessarily to identify the best method for conducting 
intermediate stops, but one that works and can be understood transparently. Graph theory 
appears to fit this need well and will be used to address this. 
2.6 Hypotheses 
The literature review has provided insight into the research questions. The first 
two questions are provided below.  
 What is the current state of the art of mission specification analysis? 
 Are the impacts of mission specification changes reduced when technology is 
introduced to the aircraft? 
 Literature has primarily been focused on mitigating fuel burn. While this is an 
important metric, it is plausible that mission specification changes will impact other 
metrics. This led to further research in addressing the various stakeholders in aviation and 
then determining their metrics of interest. 
Research Question 1: What other metrics should be considered when looking at 
mission specifications? 
Research Question 2: How does the introduction of mission specifications 
impact those metrics? 
This review led to the development of the first hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 1: Fuel burn only analysis is insufficient to adequately capture the 
impact of mission specification changes at the fleet level. 
 A review of the current state of the art provided the observations that the analysis 
is primarily at the vehicle level and technology infusion is largely neglected.  
Research Question 3: How does future growth impact the fleet level metrics? 
Research Question 4: How significantly different are the results comparing the 
immediate replacement vs evolution? 
Research Question 5: Does the introduction of advanced technology reduce the 
impact of mission specification changes? 
This yields the next three hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: Mission specification changes must be evaluated at the fleet level 
and forecasted into the future to capture the overall impact. 
Hypothesis 2a: Fleet evolution will be a significant contributor to reducing the 
overall impact at the fleet level. 
Hypothesis 3: Aircraft technology infusion will reduce the sensitivity of mission 
specification changes at the fleet level. 
Finally, a review was conducted to address the final research question. 
Research Question 6: How does one select intermediate airport locations? 
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Research Question 7: How does airport location impact results in comparison to 
vehicle level analysis? 
 Multiple methods exist to capture schedule changes due to design range changes 
that would require the adoption of intermediate stop operations. However, the focus here 
is using a graph theory based approach to modify an operations schedule for intermediate 
stops. 
Hypothesis 4: A graph theory approach can be used to modify an operations 




CHAPTER  3 
METHODOLOGY 
With the background information in mind, the next step is creation of a 
methodology to address the research objective. Development of a new methodology 
involves starting with an initial set of steps and then adapting them to fit the problem at 
hand. This research uses the generic Integrated Product/Process Development (IPPD) that 
was developed at Georgia Institute of Technology by Schrage.[93] The IPPD 
methodology is provided below in Figure 32. The key steps of any process are as follows: 
establish the need, define the problem, establish value, generate feasible alternatives, 
evaluate alternatives, and then make the decision. 
 
Figure 32. Generic IPPD Methodology [93] 
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These initial steps can then be expanded to develop the methodology that will be 
used for this research. As a reminder, the objective of this research is to develop a 
methodology that is capable of evaluating the implications of aircraft mission 
specification changes at the fleet level. 
Starting from the standpoint of just comparing different mitigation strategies such 
as advanced technologies, operational changes, and others, there are five general steps 
that must be conducted to capture the fleet level implications. The first is to identify the 
stakeholders so that the potential metrics can be selected. The next step is to select the 
mitigation strategies of interest as they will in combination with the metrics selected 
define the modeling and simulation environment required. The third step is to create the 
M&S environment based on the criteria defined in this document. The remaining steps 
consist of evaluating the strategies, and assessing the implications. 
 
Figure 33. Generic Mitigation Strategy Analysis Framework 
Now this framework is overly broad. One particular reason is that no one 
methodology will be capable of capturing all the considerations for different categories of 
mitigation strategies as each will have different requirements for modeling and 











generate a specific methodology for evaluating aircraft mission specification changes. 
Therefore, this generic framework needs to become further detailed to create the 
methodology. For the problem of mission specification changes, there are six necessary 
steps that need to be undertaken to fully analyze their impacts through the fleet level.  
Step 1: Problem Definition 
 Capturing the impact of global aviation growth is a significant task and will take a 
considerable amount of work to provide a high level of confidence in the results. 
Therefore, the first step is to scope the problem to a manageable level. 
 Metric selection will provide insight into the problem being addressed and this is 
defined by the list of stakeholder needs that will be evaluated. This will set requirements 
for all the analysis going forward and will drive modeling and simulation environment 
decisions. Back in Chapter 2, an examination of different stakeholders was made and 
their associated interests which is provided here for reference. This list can be expanded 































































Passengers          
Flight Crew          
Maintenance Crew          
Airlines          
Airports          
Manufacturers          
Regulators          
Air Traffic Control          
Airport Area Residents          
Everyone          
 
 The next step will be to select the mission specifications of interest and the 
associated ranges of interest. There are three specification changes as aircraft capability is 
measured as a function of how much payload can be moved, how far it can be moved, 
and how fast it can get there. Not all of these specification changes are necessarily 
applicable to all vehicle sizes. This can require modeling aircraft sizes through 
representative models or utilizing one aircraft model and scaling it throughout the 
boundaries of interest. Selection decisions can be made by prior design knowledge, 
literature review, left to the choice of the researcher, or vehicle level analysis can be 
conducted and not passed to the fleet if there is insufficient benefits. 
 As the objective is to assess how mission specification changes impact the future 
fleet, technology infusion should be considered as future aircraft designs will always 
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integrate some level of new technology. This package should contain improvements to 
both the engine and the airframe and would be expected to impact the metrics selected. 
Technologies in the package should also have a relatively similar entry into service date 
as technology does not necessarily phase in while the aircraft is in production. Data can 
come from a variety of sources such as current technology programs if specific 
technologies are of interest or general targets for future impact. 
 Finally, the prospective future needs to be defined. This requires an initial 
operations set for the fleet, a demand forecast to grow the initial operations, a retirement 
schedule to remove aging aircraft from the fleet, and a replacement schedule to define 
when new aircraft will enter service. The baseline operations set is what will be used to 
forecast all future operations information. One source of data can be from the Department 
of Transportation Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The T100 is a collection of 10% of 
monthly flight totals but does not contain tail tracking.[94] The DB1B is a 10% ticket 
sample containing the number of passengers and the origin and destination airports.[95] 
On-time performance data contains data for domestic flights with flight numbers and 
origin and destination airports along with where delays were experienced.[96] Another 
operations set is the Common Operations Database developed by the Modelling and 
Database Task Force within CAEP which consists of six weeks of global operations.[40] 
Commercial entities such as Official Airline Guide also have compiled data for use. 
 Forecasts define what future growth will look like with respect to vehicle size and 
location of growth over particular regions. The Terminal Area Forecast is developed by 
the FAA and focuses on activity at FAA facilities to develop planning needs.[22] The 
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TAF is focused on the growth rates of specific facilities and much less detail on 
international flights. 
 Retirement curves can be provided from industry, they can be generated through 
usage of a mathematical function, or could simply be a hard cap which would suggest 
that once an aircraft reaches a certain age, it is removed from the fleet. Replacement 
schedules set when new aircraft are introduced into service. This schedule could be as 
simple as a switch at a given year from the current aircraft to the future one or a phase-in 
where the current aircraft is reduced over time and the future aircraft is gradually 
introduced.  
Step 2: Create Modeling and Simulation Environment 
Modeling and simulation will be required to enable analysis of aircraft mission 
specification changes at both the aircraft and fleet level. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there 
is no one tool that is capable of conducting the entirety of the work. This will require the 
creation of an environment that will enable the analysis. This methodology is intended to 
be independent of tool selection and instead lays out criteria that will enable this analysis. 
 As this is a two-tier problem, both an aircraft level sizing and performance tool 
and a fleet forecasting tool will be required. Although the criteria for both tiers are 
provided in Chapter 2, they will be provided here again. 
A summary of the vehicle level modeling and simulation criteria is provided in 
Table 10. Physics-based analysis is critical to capture the interdependencies of 
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technology integration and mission specification changes on the various vehicle level 
metrics. High fidelity is desirable as it increases confidence in the resulting analysis; 
however, it comes at a cost with respect to execution time. Rapid analysis enables 
significantly more alternatives to be evaluated and that additional analysis can provide 
further insight into understanding the impacts of mission specification changes. 
Automation capability can remove the need for having a human in the loop in terms of 
generating data. Noise, emissions, and cost are all important as they are the drivers of this 
research. Noise specifically requires curves measuring aircraft noise, power, and distance 
such that airport noise can be quantified. Finally, source code is a benefit if the desired 
capability is unavailable. Ideally, one would select a tool that predominantly meets the 
other criteria but if there is limited availability of other tools or a tool of interest meets 
most of the metrics, then developing a capability can be a solution. 
Table 10. Vehicle Level Modeling and Simulation Selection Criteria 
Criteria Importance  Rationale  
Physics-based High  
Modeling of mitigation strategies requires 
capturing the physics of the problem  
Fidelity High  
Tool fidelity is critical to assurance that 
the resulting analysis is reasonable 
Automation capability High  Removes need for human in the loop  
Rapid Low  Reduces cycle time  
Noise High  
Noise is one of the key drivers for this 
research  
Emissions High  
Emissions is one of the key drivers for 
this research 
Cost Medium 
Cost captures changes in acquisition and 
R&D costs which can impact the fleet  
Source code Low  





The criteria for fleet modeling and simulation tools are available in Table 11. The 
most important two are analysis speed and setup time. There are a number of high fidelity 
fleet analysis tools in existence; however, many of them require significant computation 
and setup times to conduct the modeling. This is limiting in terms of data available for 
analysis. Ease of vehicle integration is not as critical but it is preferable that introducing 
the new vehicles to the fleet would not require significant amounts of additional analysis 
at the aircraft modeling level. This could result in greatly lengthening the run-time of the 
vehicle tools. Fuel burn, emissions, noise, block time, and operating costs are necessary 
to quantify the impact to various stakeholders such as airlines, airports, and passengers. 
Safety, capacity, and reliability are not as critical as these are challenging to capture from 
a modeling perspective and impacts can be measured through changes in operations. 
Table 11. Fleet Level Modeling and Simulation Selection Criteria 
Criteria Importance  Rationale  
Analysis Speed High  Allows for more fleet analysis 
Setup Time High Enables more fleet analysis 
Ease of Vehicle 
   Integration 
Medium 
Documented vehicle format for new 
vehicles 
Fidelity High Provides confidence in the results 
Fuel Burn High 
Key driver behind mission specification 
adoption 
Emissions High  Key driver behind research 
Noise High  Airport impact of mission specifications 
Block Time High Passenger impact of mission specification 
Operating Costs High  Airline impact of mission specifications 
Safety Low  System impact of mission specifications 
Capacity Low System impact of mission specifications 
Reliability Low Airline impact of mission specifications 




The overall flowchart of data should follow Figure 34. Problem definition will 
establish which mission specifications will be modeled, what technologies will be 
integrated into the aircraft, and the operations information necessary for future 
forecasting. The mission specification and technology information will be passed to the 
vehicle design tool to capture engine and aircraft performance with respect to the metrics 
of interest. This vehicle performance information is passed to the fleet level analysis but 
also to an operations modification module. This module would then update the operations 
set and then fleet analysis could be conducted. Then the fleet results will be analyzed to 
assess the overall impact of mission specification changes and determine the 
implications. Depending on the mission specifications analyzed, metrics could be 
considered a cost, a benefit, or neither. An example would be that speed reduction will 
not provide a change in the number of operations being conducted while intermediate 
stop operations will see an increase based on the number of flights modified. 
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An explanation of the data flow between elements will help provide insight into 
what is required for each set of arrows. Stakeholder selections ultimately define the 
modeling and simulation environment and the only data flow here is what metrics need to 
be tracked at both the vehicle and fleet levels to quantify the impact of mission 
specifications. Mission specification selection established what inputs will need to be 
modified for vehicle design to thoroughly conduct design space exploration to identify 
the optimal aircraft for a given mission specification setting. Technology definitions 
indicate what vehicle level inputs need to be changed to model its integration. 
The pertinent data from the vehicle design that passes to operations modification 
is the fuel burn and block time performance to model the environmental and cost impacts 
of intermediate stop operations. The vehicle design data that passes to the fleet requires 
more information than the operations modification data pass. Not only does the fuel burn 
and block time performance need to be passed, but the NOx, aircraft price, and noise 
information also need to be passed. Of those three, the noise is the most complicated as it 
is more than just certification values. Detailed noise contours for each aircraft is needed 
to understand how the noise of all the different aircraft at the airports of interest should be 
integrated to determine the overall airport noise impact. This noise contour information 
from the vehicle level is a critical part of the vehicle level modeling. 
The operations information is equally important even though it serves as just an 
input to the fleet level analysis. One needs to come up with a representative operations set 
to use for fleet modeling that is driven by the scope of the problem. The rest of the data – 
the forecast, the retirement schedule, and the replacement schedules – need to be defined 
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and just passed into the fleet analysis. The last data flow is the fleet analysis results being 
available for processing. For cost metrics and all the environmental metrics that aren’t 
noise, this should be the cumulative total from the years of investigation. The noise 
should be contours on an airport by airport basis over the years selected for that particular 
analysis. 
Step 3: Develop Future Vehicles 
 Future vehicles will need to be designed for mission specification changes and 
technology infusion. This entails more than just running the sizing code for the new 
design parameters. The baseline aircraft performance constraints must also be considered. 
These include takeoff field length, landing field length, approach speed, and time to 
climb as any new aircraft would have to match performance of the baseline aircraft at a 
minimum. To further increase efficiency of the engine for cruise speed reduction, the 
engine can also be slightly redesigned for this new speed; however, this requires 
consideration of various engine constraints. Range reduction does not require this engine 
redesign if cruise speed is held constant as the engine itself could be scaled to provide 
adequate thrust. 
 Aircraft and engine technologies will also need to be modeled in this step. This 
will require linking the associated impacts to inputs within the aircraft modeling and 
simulation environment to capture the changes due to technology infusion. To establish 
the performance constraints for the future aircraft, the baseline aircraft must first be 
modeled to establish the new baseline performance values. Then these values can then be 
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used as constraints for the mission specification aircraft or if one has a particular set of 
customer requirements, then those values can be used to further guide the future 
technology vehicle design. 
 As a part of this step, one can also evaluate the performance of the different 
vehicles with respect to the mission specifications of interest. If there is clear evidence 
that a particular aircraft size does not benefit from its introduction, then there is no need 
to evaluate it at the fleet level to further demonstrate that it does not benefit. 
Step 4: Modify Operations Set 
Operations modifications are required for range reduction to account for the 
introduction of intermediate stop operations but this step could be considered whether or 
not range reduction is being considered. This could be done by hand for a small 
operations set; however, if dataset is sufficiently large, this would be a significant time 
investment as one would need to evaluate the performance of the direct flight against all 
prospective airports within some range of the operation. To expedite this analysis, an 
automated module should be utilized. The module will need to start with the initial 
operations set and an airport list and then return modified routes for the long range flights 
based on the aircraft design ranges generated. The selection criteria for the intermediate 
stop location should be based on minimizing fuel burn or operating cost and this outcome 
should be repeatable. 
This process starts with identifying the candidate airports that might be used as 
intermediate stop locations. This will require latitude and longitude information of the 
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airport as well as runway length and width information for all the runways. Runway 
information can be used to filter out airports that will be unable to allow for operation of 
the aircraft of interest. An example would be considering DeKalb Peachtree Airport, a 
general aviation reliever airport, as an intermediate stop for a B747. 
With the airport list compiled, the next step is to calculate the distance between 
the airports as flight distance will be used to evaluate performance to assess which route 
should be taken between the origin and destination airports. The distance calculations can 
be calculated using great circle distance equations between the two points. Additional 
distance can be added to address that the flown distance rarely matches the great circle 
value due to wind optimized routing and inefficiency in the air transportation system. 
Once the distances between airports have been calculated, the next step is to generate 
prospective routes. 
Using the airport list and the flight distances, prospective routes can be generated 
by evaluating each airport as an intermediate airport by comparing the distance between 
the origin and destination airports. For a large number of airports, this would generate a 
significantly lengthy list of routes. However, additional filtering can be performed based 
on distance. 
Now that the route pool has been generated, the final step is to evaluate aircraft on 
the routes. Route selection is a function of the chosen metrics. Traditionally, range 
reduction has primarily focused on fuel burn savings such that fuel burn should always be 
considered. Operating cost could also be considered between the baseline route and the 
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prospective origin-intermediate-destination (OID) routes. Calculation of both metrics will 
require aircraft performance data to get the total fuel and cost for each route as well as the 
associated cost information. 
After all the prospective OID routes have been evaluated, the final step is to find 
the top handful of routes for each metric so the final selection can be made. In some 
cases, one may find multiple airports in close vicinity in terms of metric performance. An 
example would be John F Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark airports that serve the New 
York City region. This will also help identify regions that will be expected to see a 
significant rise in total operations. 
This process will need to be conducted for all the origin/destination pairs of 
interest for all the aircraft of interest. This process is illustrated in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35. Intermediate Airport Selection Process 
The assumption for operations modification is that only the airport that could 
handle the modified aircraft at the baseline technology level can be used for the future 
technology aircraft. Handling includes considerations such taxiway and gate 
infrastructure that are not information that is as easily available as runway data. While 

























determine whether the airports that were filtered out due to baseline runway information 
would build the infrastructure necessary to accommodate aircraft in larger seat classes. 
Step 5: Evaluate Fleet Performance 
The new aircraft are then introduced to the fleet. The operations set, demand 
forecast, retirement curves, and replacement schedule are used in the fleet analysis tool to 
evaluate the impact of mission specification changes at the fleet level. 
Seat classes should be evaluated individually initially to quantify the fleet level 
sensitivity of mission specification changes. Comparisons of ISO vs direct flights can 
also be conducted with and without redesigning the aircraft in this step. 
Once the seat class outcomes are fully understood, one can then look to combine 
different designs to evaluate the full impact at the fleet level whether it is through a 
minimizing fleet fuel burn or minimizing operating cost or a different metric. 
Noise will need to be modeled through a set of airports for associated years of 
interest. Those operations will need to be identified and the vehicles need to be made 
available to assess the impact. Although one could look at the noise impacts of airports 
through contours, a potentially safer approach is to use models that represent existing 
infrastructure and only look at changes to the area of the contours. This approach may not 
work when considering population exposure and a suitable method would be needed. 
Step 6: Assess Implications 
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 With the fleet level analysis concluded, the final step is to examine the impacts 
due to changes in mission specifications. This will involve comparisons of the different 
vehicle designs against the baseline results where the existing replacement aircraft are 
used. Once all the data is compiled, one can assess the benefits and costs of adopting the 
respective mission specification changes. This could be comparisons in fuel burn vs 
operating cost or benefits of intermediate stops vs the noise impact at those new airports. 
Additional exploration could be conducted by varying the assumptions used to further 
understand the sensitivities of mission specifications to those assumptions. 
In summary, this chapter has proposed a new methodology for evaluating the fleet 
implications of aircraft mission specification changes. A visual of where each step of 
Mission Specifications and Fleet Implications Technique (MS-FIT) occurs is included in 
Figure 36. 
 



















CHAPTER  4 
TECHNICAL APPROACH 
In order to evaluate the hypotheses, a research plan is required. This chapter will 
discuss the process utilized and the experiments conducted in the following three 
chapters. 
4.1 Experimental Setup 
The first step is to select the mission specifications and metrics of interest for this 
research. Mission specification changes are not a particularly lengthy list with only cruise 
speed and mission range being of interest. In Chapter 2, a variety of stakeholders and 
their associated concerns were presented. This research will focus on two levels of 
metrics: aircraft and fleet specific. Aircraft metrics include mission performance with fuel 
burn, NOx emissions, and mission time and design attributes with acquisition costs and 
certification noise and NOx values. The fleet level will focus on total annual fuel burn, 
NOx emissions, and costs, airport noise from a select number of generic airports, and less 
quantitative metrics such as safety. 
To begin evaluating mission specification changes, one must redesign aircraft for 
speed and range reductions. At this level, the objective is to identify which seat classes 
benefit from mission specification changes so that selected vehicles can then be carried 
through to the fleet level for further analysis. Additionally, any vehicles that show 
benefits for both speed and range reductions independently can then be considered 
together. These three problems will represent demonstrations of MS-FIT. Vehicle 
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redesigns will be conducted for both existing technology as well as a future technology 
package. 
Five seat classes will be modeled: regional jet (RJ), single aisle (SA), small twin 
aisle (STA), large twin aisle (LTA), and large quad (LQ). Representative reference 
vehicles have been identified for demonstration purposes and are provided below in 
Table 12. 
Table 12. Aircraft Models Used for Study 
Seat Class Airframe Engine 
Regional Jet CRJ900 CF34-8C5 
Single Aisle B737-800 CFM56-7B26 
Small Twin Aisle B767-300ER CF6-80C2 
Large Twin Aisle B777-200ER GE90-94B 
Large Quad B747-400 PW4056 
 
For each specification change, bounds need to be established with respect to the 
original baseline values. These will be open to be reevaluated based on performance data 
as the analysis is conducted in the event that further exploration is deemed unnecessary. 
However, Table 13 contains the initial bounds intended to be used in this study for cruise 
speed and mission range. Steps in speed reduction will be conducted in intervals of Mach 
0.02 from the baseline. The initial minimum speeds will likely be far less than that for 
minimum fuel burn; however, the objective is to insure thorough coverage of the space. 
Steps of range reduction will be conducted increments of 5% from the baseline down to 
35% of the baseline value, represented by the initial minimum in Table 13. Boundary 
readjustment will be driven by analysis of results based on level of benefit. Speed 
reduction will stop after the minimum fuel burn design has been identified while the 
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range reduction analysis would conclude if benefits are limited at 50% range with one 
intermediate stop. 














Regional Jet 0.60 0.80 0,693.0 1,980 
Single Aisle 0.60 0.78 1,036.0 2,960 
Small Twin Aisle 0.60 0.80 2,072.0 5,920 
Large Twin Aisle 0.66 0.84 2,635.5 7,530 
Large Quad 0.67 0.85 2,471.0 7,060 
 
Additionally, all aircraft designs have been evaluated at an economic range at full 
passenger payload to compare performance beyond just the baseline design mission. 
These economic ranges are points within the payload range diagram that represent flown 
distances more commonly seen in operation. These ranges are provided in Table 14. As 
range reduction results in large twin and large quad variants with a maximum range less 
than the primary economic range, a secondary economic range was also used to 
additionally evaluate economic performance. 
Table 14. Economic Ranges for Each Seat Class 
Seat Class 
Economic 
Range 1 (nm) 
Economic 
Range 2 (nm) 
Regional Jet 0,800 - 
Single Aisle 0,900 - 
Small Twin Aisle 1,800 - 
Large Twin Aisle 4,000 2,500 
Large Quad 4,400 2,400 
 
The baseline vehicles were first run through EDS to generate the necessary files 
for use in a Modelcenter FLOPS based environment. This was done to facilitate design 
optimization for each speed and range redesign for each aircraft. To generate the 
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associated speed reduction engine decks, the aircraft were run through EDS with reduced 
speeds. This process is documented in Chapter 6. 
The primary objective of the optimization was minimization of design mission 
fuel burn by varying both engine thrust and aircraft wing area, though wing sweep and 
thickness were varied for speed reduction as a function of cruise Mach.[97] To capture 
changes in takeoff and landing maximum lift coefficient from wing changes, RELACS 
was used.[98] It was also used to generate the respective drag polars for all designs. 
The aircraft was subject to the following performance constraints: takeoff field 
length, landing field length, approach speed, excess thrust, and time to climb. Constraint 
limits were taken from the respective technology level baseline aircraft model results. 
The Modelcenter environment was run with multiple starting points to ensure that 
the optimum result truly was the global outcome. After the optimum vehicles were 
designed, the corresponding vehicle was then run in EDS and evaluated to ensure 
sufficient similarity in performance. Comparisons of the results between the two 
environments required that design mission fuel burn results were within 1% of each 
other. 
Technology assessment requires a set of technologies that will be integrated into 
the vehicles. There are a variety of sources that one can use for this analysis as the 
number of aviation technology programs provides a large number of options. For this 
research, a review of current aeronautical research and development programs was 
conducted and a subset of technologies was selected that impacted fuel burn, NOx, and 
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noise. Note that technology selection is not the objective of this work, such that there will 
only be one technology package. This group was compiled based on technologies that 
would be available in the middle of the 2020s. Table 15 contains the name of the 
technologies used and their respective designations from the referenced report. All 
technologies were applicable to all representative aircraft. 
Table 15. Future Technology Package 
Technology Name Designation 
Composite Technologies (2010 Baseline) T01 
Excrescence Reduction T02 
Continuous Moldline Link for Flaps T03 
Landing Gear Integration T04 
Advanced Powder Metallurgy Disk 
- HPC Last Stage Disc/HPT Disc/LPT First Stage 
Disc 
T05 
Advanced TBC Coatings 
- Turbine Blades 
T06 
N+2 Advanced TBC Coatings 
- Turbine Blades 
T07 
Advanced TBC Coatings - LPT  Blade T08 
Advanced Turbine Superalloys 
- HPT Blades/LPT Last Stage Disc 
T09 
CMC HPT/LPT Vane + Hi Temp Erosion 
Coating 
T10 
CMC Exhaust Core Nozzle T11 
Polymer Matrix Composites (PMC) 
- Nacelles/Fan/Bypass Duct 
T12 
PMC Fan Blade with Metal Leading Edge T13 
Aft Cowl Liners T14 
Combustor Noise Plug Liner T15 
Fixed Geometry Core Chevrons T16 
Over the Rotor Acoustic Treatment T17 
Soft Vane T18 
Zero Splice Inlet T19 
Lightweight CMC Liners T20 
RQL Combustor (TALON X) T21 
Advanced Engine Components T22 
Low Interference Nacelle T23 
Blisk T24 




From the fleet perspective, forecasting was done using a number of forecasts from 
various sources such that they were combined to get a representative forecast for fleet 
evolution. As the forecast extends only to 2036, growth rates have been exponentially 
extrapolated up to year 2050. The datum set of operations is six weeks of global flights 
from 2006 originating from BTS data. 
For range reduction, it is from this datum set of operations that the determination 
of viability for intermediate stops will be made. An overview of the modeling and 
simulation analysis for intermediate stops is located in Chapter 5 and the range reduction 
problem is in Chapter 7. To evaluate the fleet level performance, GREAT and ANGIM 
will be used. 
Aircraft designed using existing technology were introduced in 2020 and phased 
in as replacements over a four year period. Designs that have future technology integrated 
into them were phased in at 2024 with the same four year integration timeframe in mind. 
This is reflected in terms of what aircraft are used for the new operations in a given year. 
So for years prior to entry into service in Figure 37, all the new operations for that year 
consist of the baseline aircraft. In 2020 or 2024, 25% of the new operations are the 
replacement aircraft and continues to grow such that in EIS + 3 and beyond, all the new 




Figure 37. Replacement Strategies of New Vehicles 
For the range reduced aircraft, there is a need for two variants. Figure 38 
demonstrates that the short range variant is viable up to a particular range threshold and 
beyond that value, the long range variant is the only one used. This threshold is defined 
by the maximum range of the aircraft for a particular payload. In the short range variant 
regime, the distribution can be varied to allow for long range variants to operate there as 
well and this is investigated from a 100%-0% of SR-LR to a 50%-50% in increments of 
10%. 
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An example of how this is implemented for the 80%-20% distribution for a future 
technology scenario is in Figure 37 for range reduction. For ranges below the threshold 
values, the red line represents the new operation distribution of the short range variant 
while the green line represents the long range aircraft. Combined, they equal the same 
purple line as before. And for operations to the right of the threshold value, only the 
purple line is used as there are no short range variants and the operations are entirely the 
long range aircraft. 
To capture elements regarding aviation safety, Boeing documented historical 
trends of accident rates from 1959-2012 for worldwide operations.[99] This data is 
provided in Figure 39. This trend will be fitted from 1985 to 2012 and extrapolated to 
2050. 
 
Figure 39. Accident Rate per Million Operations [99] 
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However, accident rate per million operations does not adequately capture any 
changes that are due to speed reduction. This same presentation has data linking annual 
departures to flight hours from 1993-2012 such that speed reduction can be assessed as 
well. This data is in Figure 40 and will be fitted and extrapolated through 2050. 
 
Figure 40. Linkage of Flight Hours to Operations [99] 
For the noise analysis, a subset of global airports was selected to represent high, 
medium, and low traffic levels and world regions. Data used to select these airports came 
from a couple of sources. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s 2013 
Airport Traffic Report contains a significant amount of data regarding the top 50 
domestic and top 50 international airports by traffic.[100] Much of their data comes from 
Airports Council International, which tracks passenger, cargo, and movements 
globally.[101] In addition, the top five airports from intermediate stop traffic analysis 
were also added to capture the effect that this operating strategy impacts these otherwise, 
limited traffic airports. Given potential concerns of using actual airport layouts, generic 
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airport configurations have been used to represent them as documented in 
Bernarndo.[102] Classifications of the airports as well as generic runway configuration is 
provided in Table 16. 
Operations for each airport will be generated using the operational data from 
GREAT and then scaled to represent a single day. This does bring some challenges as 
one could look at every individual year to assess the annual growth of a particular set of 
airports. That is not the objective of this research such that each year is not necessary. 
Instead, the years 2036 and 2050 were selected. As the new mission specification aircraft 
are being introduced in 2020 or 2024, operations before 2030 will not have allowed 
enough time to ensure significant numbers in operation of the new aircraft. 
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Hartsfield-Jackson – Atlanta, USA Parallel Single 
O’Hare – Chicago, USA ORD 
Capital Intl – Beijing, China Parallel-Single 
Heathrow – London, UK Parallel 
Dubai Intl – Dubai, UAE Parallel 
Charles De Gaulle – Paris, France Parallel 
Medium 
John F Kennedy – New York City, USA Parallel-Intersecting 
San Diego Intl – San Diego, USA Single 
Salt Lake City Intl – Salt Lake City, USA Parallel-Single 
Incheon Intl – Seoul, South Korea Parallel 
Eleftherios Venizelos Intl – Athens, Greece Parallel 
Low 
Palm Beach Intl – Palm Beach, USA Intersecting 




Gander Intl – Gander, Canada Intersecting 
Goose Bay – Goose Bay, Canada Intersecting 
Lajes – Lajes, Portugal Single 
Amilcar Cabral Intl – Sal, Cape Verde Single 




Contours of interest are 55 and 65 dB. Noise results will be represented as a 
summation of the group rather than individual airport. Specific airport noise contours will 
not be provided. A summary of the modeling and simulation environment showing how 




Figure 41. Modeling and Simulation Environment 
There are a number of assumptions that have been made in order to conduct this 
analysis. They have been summarized in Table 17 so that they are available in one 
















-Change in Fuel Burn
-Change in NOx
-Change in airport noise
-Change in operations costs



















-Replace long flights with 
staged short range flights
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Table 17. Summary of Research Assumptions 
Vehicle 
Engine modeling 
 Speed: OPR increase and airflow scaling 
 Range: airflow scaling 
 Joint: OPR increase and airflow scaling 
Aircraft are design with minimizing fuel burn as 
the target objective 
 Wing area and engine thrust were varied 
 Wing thickness and sweep are defined as 
a function of cruise Mach number 
 All other parameters were kept at 
existing values or sizing ratios 
Sizing subject to performance constraints 
 Takeoff field length 
 Landing field length 
 Approach speed 
 Excess engine power 
 Time to climb 
Aircraft price is calculated as a function of 
takeoff gross weight 
 Future aircraft price is an increase based 
on fuel burn savings over the lifespan of 
the vehicle 
 Both are defined in Chapter 5 
Technologies were modeled as k-factors to the 
respective inputs of interest in the model 
Intermediate stops were modeled directly along 
the route 
 Halfway for one stop 
 Even thirds for two stops 
 
Fleet 
Fixed cost assumptions over the timeframe of 
interest 
 Fuel price fixed at $3.00/gallon 
 Crew, maintenance fixed at seat class 
rates 
 Route and landing fixed at their regional 
values 
Fleet results are for the six week operation set 
Fleet results for each year are cumulative 
Noise is 55 and 65 dB contour areas over the 
airports of interest 
Airports are modeled through generic runway 
configurations 
Datum set of operations are from 2006 for a six 
week period 
Forecast was generated by combining various 
sources to get a representative approach for fleet 
evolution 
New vehicles are phased in over a four year 
period 
 2020 for baseline technology 
 2024 for future technology 
Range reduction requires a short range and a 
long range variant – threshold of maximum 
range dictates with replacement strategy is used 
 Defined mix for short ranges 
 Long range aircraft only for long range 
 
  
4.2 Experimental Plan 
Throughout Chapter 2, a number of observations were made that led to a number 
of hypotheses. In order to test these hypotheses, a number of tests need to be conducted. 
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The following section will explain the design and objectives of the experiments 
conducted in the following chapters. 
Hypotheses 1 is focused on metrics beyond the traditional metric of fuel burn. The 
sole focus of much of the analysis of specification changes in literature has been on fuel 
burn and that does not address that many other requirements are at play in making a 
decision to use an aircraft. For this work, those other metrics will be operating cost and 
total cost (the combination of operating and capital costs). An example of how this might 
look is presented in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42. Generic Presentation of Hypothesis 1 Test 
Testing Hypothesis 2 concerns differences between aircraft and fleet level impact 
and forecasting those aircraft into the future. Figure 43 compares what the fuel burn 
results might look like for range reduction at the aircraft level. The best fuel burn aircraft 
might occur at the minimum bounds of interest; however, when introduced to the fleet, 
the operational distribution and fleet growth would yield an aircraft that has a longer 











Figure 43. Generic Presentation of Hypothesis 2 Test 
To test the sub hypothesis that is concerned with fleet evolution being a 
significant contributor to reducing the overall impact, the fleet results with fleet evolution 
will be compared to complete replacement results at the entry into service for both 
technology levels and then forecasted through to the year 2050. The objective will be to 
see what fleet level impacts occur because of this. It is expected that fuel burn savings 
will be overestimated. Additionally, as the forecast reaches the year 2050, the difference 
in the two results should become close. A generic presentation of the results is provided 
in Figure 44. 
 




















To test Hypothesis 3 with respect to aircraft technology infusion reducing the 
impact of mission specification changes at the fleet level, both vehicles will be introduced 
in 2020 and the fleet results will be analyzed. The predominant metric of interest is fuel 
burn as it is the motivating factor but impacts to NOx, operating cost, and total cost will 
also be examined. A notional figure is provided in Figure 45 highlighting how these 
results will be presented. 
 
Figure 45. Generic Presentation of Hypothesis 3 Test 
In order to test Hypothesis 4 regarding the usage of graph theory to modify an 
operations schedule, a demonstration will be conducted as a part of this work. This will 
be found in Chapter 5. 
Additional trade studies will be conducted and briefly mentioned here. The first 
looks at variation in the cost elements impacted by specification changes to understand 
how their changes will impact the economic desirability of making these changes. The 
next one addresses the impact that annual utilization changes will have on capital costs 
and ultimately the total fleet cost. There may be consequences in terms of aircraft 
positioning due to specification changes such that the actual utilization will be less than 

















Technology Technology + Specification
101 
 
The final study looks at how modifications in the intermediate stop distribution 
will impact desirability of short range variants. This study attempts to model how some 
airlines may elect to not adopt intermediate stops or business travelers may prefer to pay 
a premium to get a direct flight while leisure travelers will not such that potential benefits 
cannot be fully realized.  
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CHAPTER  5 
MODELING AND SIMULATION 
This chapter will document modeling approaches used for both the cost model 
and intermediate stop models in this research. Although this chapter comes in advance of 
the following results chapters, some of the results presented here were dependent on that 
work being done later. It is presented here to allow the future results chapters to remain 
more focused on the mission specification analysis. 
5.1 Cost Modeling 
This section documents the logic and assumptions used in the fleet cost analysis. 
5.1.1 Operating Cost Model 
So although AEDT and APMT-E meet the fidelity requirements desired from a 
modeling and simulation standpoint, the lengthy analysis time is a limiting factor to 
conducting any significantly large trade study in a timely fashion. This led to the original 
development of GREAT for fuel burn and NOx analysis and ANGIM for airport noise 
assessment to allow for much more rapid analysis at the fleet level. Neither tool computes 
fleet operating cost and this capability needs to be developed to capture the impact that 
mission specification changes will have on the relevant cost metrics – operating cost and 
capital cost. An initial capability exists through a post-processing of GREAT results but 
this requires simplifying assumptions. 
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The operating cost model consists of six elements: fuel cost, crew cost, 
maintenance cost, route fees, landing fees, and capital cost. The first five are calculated 
for both existing aircraft as well as the future replacement aircraft. Capital cost is only 
calculated for the replacement aircraft and the rationale is provided in the associated 
section. 
Fuel cost calculations are actually straight forward as one multiplies the fuel burn 
by the fuel price but to maintain consistency with the other elements, their calculation is 
conducted the same way. 
On an annual basis, the fuel burn, NOx, and block time for each route is calculated 
using the input aircraft performance data. Equation 2 represents the necessary 
computation to determine annual fuel cost. Every year is a double summation of all the 
routes and each individual aircraft’s performance. The total fuel cost for a given 
route/aircraft combination is the total number of flights on that route for the aircraft 
multiplied by the aircraft’s fuel burn on the route multiplied by the fuel price. 
               
  ∑ ∑                       
              
          
            
         
                       
(2)  
GREAT measures fuel burn in kilograms and fuel price is input in $/gallon such 
that a conversion factor is required. The value used in this research is 0.328 as the 
conversion factor for kilograms to pounds is 1:2.2 and fuel is 6.7 pounds per gallon. For 
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implementation in other models, the conversion factor should be modified as appropriate 
based on the units used in the tool. Also worth noting is that fuel price is input on an 
annual basis such that changes to fuel price can be made to capture the introduction of 
new fuel taxes, price fluctuations due to scarcity, or a notional fuel price forecast. For the 
purposes of this research, fuel price was fixed at $3/gallon. 
Crew and maintenance costs are a function of block time, which is calculated for 
each flight per aircraft, via hourly rates. Block time is calculated in a similar fashion to 
fuel burn or NOx in GREAT through second order equation as a function of flown 
distance. 
Hourly rates for crew and maintenance costs are user input as a function of seat 
class. Both costs also are input on an annual and seat class basis to allow for increases in 
costs over some of all seat classes. 
Both crew and maintenance costs are calculated in a similar fashion to fuel cost, a 
summation of performance over all the routes for all aircraft. For a given route, aircraft, 
and year combination, the total number of flights is multiplied by the block time of the 
flight and the associated hourly rate for the aircraft. Hourly rates vary with seat class, 
which requires knowledge of the seat class for the aircraft. Maintenance cost can also be 
dependent on production status of an aircraft with the implication that out of production 
aircraft will require greater maintenance rates than in production aircraft. Equations for 
both crew and maintenance cost are provided in Equation 3 and Equation 4. 
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(3)  
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(4)  
Route fees represent the costs associated with air traffic management and are 
dependent on what regions the aircraft is flying over. The forecast utilized for this study 
has 23 different regions and these are defined in Table 18. Note that while regions may 
sound similar between groups 11-16 and 18-23, the difference is that intra-region 
contains flights like United States to Mexico or Canada to Mexico while domestic region 
refers to flights within Mexico or Canada exclusively. 
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1 North Atlantic 13 Intra Europe 
2 South Atlantic 14 Intra Latin America 
3 Mid Atlantic 15 Intra Middle East 
4 Transpacific 16 Intra North America 
5 Europe - Asia / Pacific 17 
Other International 
Routes 
6 Europe - Africa 18 Domestic Africa 
7 Europe - Middle East 19 Domestic Asia / Pacific 
8 North America - South America 20 Domestic Europe 
9 
North America - Central 




10 Middle East - Asia/Pacific 22 Domestic Middle East 
11 Intra Africa 23 
Domestic North 
America 
12 Intra Asia / Pacific   
 
Route fee implementation is similar to the others where the routes and aircraft are 
iterated through on an annual basis. In this case, the number of flights is multiplied by the 
flight distance, the route fee, a conversation from nautical miles to kilometers, and a fee 
growth rate. The need for a conversion factor is due to the fact that flight distances are 
measured in nautical miles and the route fees are input as $/km. This results in a factor 
value of 0.539957. 
The route fees vary over seat class such that larger aircraft pay larger route fees. 
The growth rate allows for freedom to annually vary all route fees. Additional 
modifications could be made such that each route group could be varied individually in 
the event that particular routes become crowded due to increased growth and costs rise to 
address the issue. 
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The equation for calculating route fees is provided in Equation 5. 
                
  ∑ ∑                           
              
          
            
         
                                                
(5)  
Landing fees are the cost associated with using the arrival airport. Countries are 
separated into seven regions, as defined in Table 19, and the respective airports are 
assigned to their regions. 
Table 19. Landing Region Definitions 




4 Central America / Caribbean 
5 Middle East 
6 North America 
7 South America 
 
For all routes and aircraft per year, the number of flights is multiplied by the 
landing fee for the arrival airport determined by aircraft seat class and the fee growth rate. 
This fee growth rate is separate from that of the route fees to allow for different levels of 
variation between the two fees. It currently impacts all landing fees equally but it could 
also be expanded on to allow for variation between each of the landing regions. The 
equation for landing fees is below in Equation 6. 
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(6)  
Landing fees are defined as a fixed dollar fee as a function of airport and seat 
classes. 
Capital cost represents the annual cost of owning all the aircraft in the fleet. If the 
fleet level analysis tracks the total number of aircraft for each year, calculating this 
component would be simple as one just multiplies this number by capital costs of the 
individual aircraft. In the event that total aircraft numbers are not tracked, a scheme will 
be required to determine the fleet size from other means. As an example, GREAT does 
not technically track the number of aircraft in the fleet – just the number of operations. 
The next logical means to calculating fleet size involves looking at total flight 
time. Using the same block time information from the crew and maintenance cost section, 
one can determine the total flight hours of a given aircraft on an annual basis. Provided 
assumptions regarding annual aircraft utilization, getting the total number of aircraft is 
feasible. 
To calculate the total number of aircraft required, the annual block time per seat 
class is divided by the utilization and multiplied by a conversion factor to correct the 
annual utilization to be in line with the size of the initial operating set – in this case, it is 
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six weeks so the factor is 8.69 (52.14 weeks in a year/ 6 week operations set size). This is 
demonstrated by Equation 7. 
                       
 ∑
                
            
           
              
          
 
(7)  
For this research and modeling effort, the capital cost of the existing aircraft was 
neglected. The rationale is that any changes to the fleet composition through something 
like accelerated retirement would manifest as increased capital costs from replacement 
aircraft. Additionally, for a fixed set of retirement assumptions, one can consider the 
capital costs of the existing aircraft to be constant and therefore not critical for this 
research. 
Once the number of aircraft is determined, the next step is to calculate the equivalent 
annual cost (EAC). This represents the annual component of an aircraft’s capital cost that 
is paid and determined from aircraft price and a couple other assumptions. This process is 
as follows[103][104]: 
1. Calculate the present value of the scrapped item PVscrap using the scrap value SV, 
depreciation rate d, and number of years of useful life n. Scrap value can be any 
percent of the initial price but the general assumption is 10% of the price. 
2. Calculate the present value of annuity due ӓni using the finance rate i, the 
depreciation rate d, and the number of years of useful life n. Assumptions for this 
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work was a finance rate of 5%, a depreciation rate of 3%, and a useful life of 25 
years. 
3. Finally calculate the equivalent annual cost using the purchase price PC, the 
present value of the scrapped item, and the present value of annuity due. 
The necessary equations are summarized in Equation 8 through Equation 10. 
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(10)  
To calculate aircraft price, a variety of means can be used. Aircraft costing tools 
can be used to calculate the vehicle acquisition cost. This requires a variety of cost input 
data for the aircraft such as component weights, labor and material rates, and complexity 
factors to determine what an aircraft’s price should be. Many of these numbers can be 
somewhat difficult to ascertain as cost is something that many companies hold close to 
their chest; however, one could calibrate costs somewhat using information from 
different publicly available sources. This also would be sufficient for this problem if the 
work was limited to only to baseline technology levels. For the future technology levels, 
these values are generally unknown which could lead to problems with confidence in the 
future technology price estimates. 
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Historical data was used to calculate price as a function of maximum takeoff 
weight. The data used to develop this model is provided in Table 20 and the 
corresponding price model is in Equation 11. For future technology, the aircraft price 
reduces since technology infusion results in a reduction in aircraft weight. 





Embraer 190 114,200 $1131,540,792  [105] 
Boeing 737-700/700LR 133,000 $1174,909,381  [106] 
Airbus Industrie A319 141,096 $1182,400,319  [107] 
Boeing 737-800 155,500 $1189,201,302  [106] 
Airbus Industrie A320-100/200 162,040 $1190,186,952  [107] 
Boeing 737-900 174,200 $1189,600,000  [106] 
Airbus Industrie A321 182,984 $1105,760,218  [107] 
Boeing 767-200/ER/EM 345,000 $1157,901,090  [108] 
Boeing 767-300/300ER 380,000 $1183,133,723  [106] 
Boeing 767-400/ER 400,000 $1166,751,945  [109] 
B787-800 Dreamliner 476,000 $1208,760,617  [106] 
Airbus A330-300 507,064 $1235,964,550  [107] 
Airbus Industrie A330-200 507,064 $1212,998,911  [107] 
Boeing 777-200ER/200LR/233LR 580,000 $1257,747,409  [106] 
Boeing 747-400 800,000 $1244,270,927  [109] 
B747-800 975,000 $1351,400,000  [106] 
 
                         
                                    
       
(11)  
To rectify this shortcoming, a different approach was taken to model the impact of 
technology on aircraft price. The process is to take operations data, compare the fuel burn 
savings between the two technology levels for a comparable aircraft, extrapolate savings 
out to the aircraft’s useful life to determine lifetime fuel savings, calculate the total fuel 
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cost savings from that value, and finally apply a percentage of the fuel savings as a price 
premium. This process is illustrated in Figure 46. 
 
Figure 46. Future Aircraft Price Calculation Approach 
BTS data from 2013 was used to get operational information including range and 
traffic information for all five represented aircraft models.[38] There is a significant 
amount of information in this data set but the only information that is of particular 
interest is the flight distance and number of operations. As an example, a small subset of 
the operations is included in Table 21 and will be used in a demonstration of this 
approach. The BTS is not as easily grouped as compared to Table 21 as it is 
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Given this operational data, the next step is to use aircraft performance 
information to determine the fuel burn and flight time for each of these flights. One 
approach could be to run an aircraft performance code to model the performance of the 
individual flights. Given that surrogates of fuel burn and block time were generated for 
each aircraft to be used in GREAT, they were additionally used to calculate aircraft 
performance for this purpose. A comparison of the fuel burn of the two aircraft is in 
Figure 47 while the flight time is provided in Figure 48. The changes in flight time are 





Figure 47. Comparison of the Fuel Burn for Example Aircraft 
 
Figure 48. Block Time for Example Aircraft 
Using this aircraft performance information, the aircraft level and route total fuel 
burn block time are calculated and shown in Table 22. Aircraft fuel burn and block time 






































and block time values are for all the operations. Bottom row of Table 22 contains the 
grand totals for each aircraft for both metrics. 





















1947 2892 020,910 05.22 6.05E+7 15,107 018,426 05.21 5.33E+7 15,070 
3953 0731 043,420 09.77 3.17E+7 07,143 038,469 09.75 2.81E+7 07,130 
5066 0026 056,947 12.26 1.48E+6 00318 050,475 12.24 1.31E+6 00318 
4735 0449 052,847 11.52 2.37E+7 05,173 046,838 11.50 2.10E+7 05,164 
Grand Total:   1.17E+8 27,743   1.04E+8 27,682 
 
Using the associated utilization assumptions, one can determine the contribution 
of one aircraft to the total flight time – at this speed, a single aircraft corresponds to 
14.8% of the total time. This percentage is then applied to the total fuel burn to calculate 
an individual aircraft’s fuel burn on an annual basis. This is 1.74E+7 kg for the baseline 
technology M0.76 small twin and 1.54E+7 kg for the future technology vehicle, yielding 
a difference of 1.99E+6 kg. To calculate the lifespan fuel cost savings of the vehicle, 
multiply the annual fuel burn by the lifespan and the fuel price. For a fuel price of $3/gal 
and lifespan of 20 years, the annual fuel savings are $39.1 million. 
The additional premium is calculated by applying a fraction of the fuel savings. It 
was assumed for this work that the value would be half the fuel savings such that the 
premium for this example is $19.6 million. The baseline M0.76 small twin aisle’s price 
was $180.5 million such that the future aircraft would cost the airlines $200.1 million. 
Aircraft prices for all aircraft are provided in their respective chapters. 
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5.2 Intermediate Stops 
Given that reduced range aircraft will have a lesser capability, operations will 
need to be modified to accommodate them to enable their usage on long range flights. In 
this case, long range flights will have to introduce an intermediate stop to increase 
adoption of a short range variant. This requires an approach to determine whether a 
particular route will benefit from an intermediate stop based on airport locations and 
aircraft performance to ultimately select the final route. 
The method used to generate routes utilizing intermediate stops is provided in 
Figure 49. Generation of intermediate stops requires multiple inputs: a list of airport 
latitude/longitude locations and corresponding runway length/width data, the origin-
destination pairs that are to be considered for intermediate stops, and aircraft performance 
data for fuel burn and block time to conduct evaluation of prospective routes from an 
environmental and cost perspective. The corresponding code used for this research is 
provided in Appendix A. A brief summary of the logic used is provided in this chapter 
and then trends and observations from the analysis are provided. 
 
Figure 49. Intermediate Stop Modeling Approach 
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5.2.1 Intermediate Stop Logic 
5.2.1.1 Airports 
At the aircraft modeling level, the general assumptions are that the intermediate 
stop airport lies directly along the original route and at the midpoint of the mission or 
even thirds in the event that one uses two stops. At the fleet level, intermediate stops 
cannot just occur at a select point in a long range mission as there may not be an airport 
available in that location. This requires consideration of airport location with respect to a 
given route as the driving factor in intermediate stop viability. Additionally, not all 
airports are capable of operating all types of aircraft – smaller regional airports are 
primarily used for general aviation aircraft, regional jets, and possibly single aisle aircraft 
and would be unable to handle larger aircraft traffic. This must be considered when 
selecting an intermediate stop location as this could be the difference between trying to 
land a 747 at the original Wichita destination of McConnell Air Force Base vs the much 
smaller Col. James Jabara Airport and facing significant difficulty departing again.[110] 
Therefore, the first step is starting with an initial list of airports that contains 
latitude/longitude data along with runway length and width information. This information 
can come from a variety of sources: FAA airport diagrams[111], AirNav[112], or other 
compiled databases. The data source used for this work was from a database of all ICAO 
coded airports. 
The runway information will be the primary filter to reduce an initial list down to 
only those relevant airports as this is a fair measure of airport capability. To filter by 
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runway width, the Manual Aerodrome Standards from ICAO should be used to give 
guidance and relevant data is provided in Table 23[113]. The definitions of code numbers 
and code letters in Table 23 are provided in Table 24. Both are defined in meters with 
conversions in feet provided in parentheses. The aircraft being considered for 
intermediate stop adoption all have takeoff field lengths greater than the 1,800 meters 
such that code number 4 values will be used. The wing spans for the small twin, large 
twin, and large quad are 154.8 feet, 199.1 feet, and 208.1 feet respectively such that code 
D, E, and E will be used. This width requirement will significantly reduce the airport set 
to a more manageable list. 
Table 23. Airport Runway Width Requirements [113] 
Code 
Number 
A B C D E F 
1 18 (60) 18 (60) 23 (75)    
2 23 (75) 23 (75) 30 (98)    
3 30 (98) 30 (98) 30 (98) 45 (147)   
4   45 (147) 45 (147) 45 (147) 60 (197) 
 
Table 24. Translation for the Above Codes [113] 
Code element 1 Code element 2 
Code 
number 




1 < 800 (2,625) A < 15 (49) 
2 800 – 1,200 (2,625 – 3,937) B 15 – 24 (49 – 79) 
3 1,200 – 1,800 (3,937 – 5,905) C 24 – 36 (79 – 118) 
4 > 1,800 (5,905) D 36 – 52 (118 – 170) 
   E 52 – 65 (171 – 213) 




Runway length is the other filter that is required as it ensures that there is 
sufficient runway for takeoff. One of the challenges in using runway length is that 
required runway length is a function of takeoff weight and reduced range aircraft being 
lighter would in theory have access to a much larger number of airports than their longer 
range counterparts. However these new airports may also lack sufficient gate 
infrastructure to handle these new aircraft as accommodating these larger aircraft may 
have never been in the original plans of the airport owners. To simplify this effort, a 
comparison of aircraft runway performance within each seat class was used against data 
available from airport planning documents for the maximum takeoff weight of the 
aircraft. The datum operations set was also used as a source for runway lower bound 
limits based on departure airport and similar aircraft information. The final lower bound 
values for field length used in this work were 7,500 ft for the small twin, 8,500 ft for the 
large twin, and 10,000 ft for the large quad. 
As a part of the airports function, the great circle distance between airports is 
calculated using the latitude/longitude coordinates. Many functions for this calculation 
have been developed by others using the Vincenty formula and one by Steve Ratts will be 
used here.[114] The Vincenty formula is provided as Equation 12 where φ1λ1 and φ2λ2 
represent the longitude and latitude of two points and their central angle is represented by 
Δσ. To get the great circle distance, Δσ is multiplied by the Earth’s radius. 
         (
√                                           





5.2.1.2 Prospective Routes 
Once the candidate airport list has been created, the next step is to determine what 
the prospective routes would be. This requires origin-destination information from the 
initial operations set. The routes considered for analysis are input and then all potential 
route options are analyzed. 
Each input airport is modeled as a prospective intermediate stop for each origin-
destination pair using the great circle distance data created in the airport step. This would 
yield a significantly large number of candidate routes in the aircraft evaluation step. 
However for a large number of airports, many options that would be undesirable due to 
significant increases in extra flown distance. Additional filtering was added to eliminate 
the clearly unsuitable routes from future steps. 
The primary filter is with regards to the baseline flight distance and the new 
intermediate stop mission. A ratio is applied to the baseline flight and the new mission 
total distance is evaluated to check if it is below that value. The default value of the ratio 
is 1.2, allowing for up to a 20% additional flight distance; although, Langhans’ analysis 
suggests that ratio values exceeding 1.1 will provide fuel burn penalties.[49][50] 
The final two filters were determined to be necessary during testing of the 
algorithms. One filter checks to see if any segment is longer than the initial flight distance 
and rejects them in the event they are. This can happen where other major cities are close 
enough to either the origin or destination airport that prospective flights could involve 
flying past the destination airport or away from the destination to stop and then coming 
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back to the destination. This makes no sense operationally so this filter exists to remove 
this behavior. An example of this behavior is the blue line in Figure 50 where the flight 
from Los Angeles stops in Boston and then returns to New York City. 
 
Figure 50. Example of Secondary Range Constraints 
The other filter checks to see that the intermediate stop is not too close to either 
the origin or destination airport. In cities with multiple airports, one route could be to 
land at another airport in the city and then go to the destination. This also makes no sense 
operationally so the filter prevents these routes from being evaluated. Implementation is a 
fraction of the baseline mission flown distance and defaulted at 10% distance. The red 
line in Figure 50 shows this behavior where the Los Angeles flight to New York City 
stops in Philadelphia. 
The original plan was to model two stops as well as a single stop; however, the 
vehicle level indicated that both the small twin and large quad aircraft burn more fuel 
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over the one stop strategy on long range flights. The large twin vehicle does show savings 
from making the transition but they are small over one stop such that the cost of landing 
would not be made up in fuel savings. Therefore, the code developed here does not 
account for them. The previously described constraints would remain necessary but 
require modification based on utilization of a two stop strategy. 
5.2.1.3 Route Evaluation 
The final step is to evaluate the routes in comparison to the non-stop flight. 
Aircraft performance information is required for fuel burn and block time if operating 
cost is of concern. Both are input as 2
nd
 order quadratic functions with flight distance 
being the only input. Fuel burn analysis is straightforward and the cost evaluations are 
identical to that described in the previous section. 
Once all the candidate routes have been run for all aircraft, the final step is to 
select the best route. This can be done through fuel burn minimization or operating cost 
minimization. The introduction of reduced range vehicles will require additional filtering 
as some prospective routes may not be feasible for a new aircraft with reduced range. 
This data can be extracted and then processed by the user to select the new route. 
5.2.2 Example Problems 
To aid in understanding of how the algorithm works, a small example problem 
has been conducted. For this problem, 50 airports were selected to be considered for 
intermediate stops on 3 routes for 1 aircraft. The airports used are shown on the map as 
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black dots in Figure 51. Note that a number of these airports are infeasible and this was 
done intentionally to demonstrate their rejection. The three routes all originate at Los 
Angeles International and head to Charles de Gaulle in Paris, John F Kennedy in New 
York City, and Melbourne Airport. These airports are indicated by a blue dot for Los 
Angeles and red dots for the three destination airports. The aircraft used is a second 
generation 747. The associated input files for the airports, routes, and aircraft are 
provided in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 51. Example Problem Airport Locations 
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Table 25. Example Problem Airports 
City Country City Country 
Melbourne Australia Moscow Russia 
Sydney Australia Seoul South Korea 
Gander Canada Madrid Spain 
Montreal Canada Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates 
Toronto Canada Dubai United Arab Emirates 
Beijing China London Gatwick United Kingdom 
Guangzhou China London Heathrow United Kingdom 
Shanghai China Anchorage United States 
Nadi Fiji Atlanta United States 
Paris France Boston United States 
Frankfurt Germany Chicago United States 
Guam Guam Cincinnati United States 
Jakarta Indonesia Dallas United States 
Rome Italy Denver United States 
Nagoya Japan Detroit United States 
Osaka Japan Honolulu United States 
Tokyo Japan Houston United States 
Georgetown Malaysia Los Angeles United States 
Kuala Lumpur Malaysia Miami United States 
Mexico City Mexico New York City United States 
Casablanca Morocco Newark United States 
Amsterdam Netherlands Philadelphia United States 
Auckland New Zealand Phoenix United States 
Christchurch New Zealand Salt Lake City United States 
Lima Peru San Francisco United States 
Mandaue City Philippines Washington DC United States 
Manila Philippines   
 
5.2.2.1 Paris 
The prospective routes are identified on the map in Figure 52 with the baseline 
path in blue, the minimum fuel and cost route in red, and the other candidate routes are in 
black. A summary of flight distance, fuel burn, and cost for each route is provided in 
Table 26 for each of the intermediate airports. There are five routes that provide fuel 
savings over the direct flight – these are stops in Gander, Montreal, Toronto, Chicago, 
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and Detroit; however, only Gander actually provides cost savings. Given that the fuel 
savings are not that large (2.1% maximum savings), the cost of the additional stop ends 
up negating the fuel cost savings for those other four. 
 
Figure 52. Los Angeles to Paris Routes 
















Gander 5114.3 104.1% 57-43 97.9% 99.8% 
Montreal 5119.2 104.2% 42-58 98.1% 100.1% 
Toronto 5137.1 104.5% 37-63 99.0% 100.9% 
Chicago 5111.3 104.0% 30-70 99.6% 101.4% 
Detroit 5149.6 104.8% 33-67 99.7% 101.6% 
Baseline 4915.0 100.0% - 100.0% 100.0% 
Boston 5252.4 106.9% 43-57 100.6% 102.5% 
Denver 4977.4 101.3% 15-85 100.6% 102.0% 
Salt Lake City 4915.0 100.0% 10-90 100.8% 102.0% 
Newark 5290.3 107.6% 40-60 101.6% 103.5% 
New York City 5295.8 107.7% 40-60 101.7% 103.6% 
Cincinnati 5248.7 106.8% 32-68 102.1% 103.8% 
Philadelphia 5313.4 108.1% 40-60 102.2% 104.0% 
Washington DC 5330.1 108.4% 37-63 102.8% 104.6% 
Dallas 5360.3 109.1% 20-80 107.3% 108.6% 
Atlanta 5497.6 111.9% 30-70 107.3% 108.9% 




The routes that did not provide savings do so for a variety of reasons. Some routes 
result in significant excess flight distance that results in greater fuel consumption than the 
direct route. Examples include Newark, New York City, and Boston. Other routes result 
in similar flown distance but end up with an intermediate stop further from the ideal 
midpoint location. Airports like Denver and Salt Lake City are closer to 10-15% into the 
flight. 
5.2.2.2 Melbourne 
Los Angeles to Paris offers a significant number of intermediate airports from 
which to choose. Flying to Melbourne provides a challenge as much of what lies below 
the aircraft is the Pacific Ocean. This provides only a handful of alternative routes for 
consideration. Two of these routes provide significant fuel savings compared to the direct 
flight – Fiji and Honolulu. A third route is Auckland, New Zealand provides a much 




Figure 53. Los Angeles to Melbourne Flights 
















Fiji 6889.0 100.0% 70-30 91.0% 93.5% 
Honolulu 7010.2 101.8% 32-68 92.5% 94.7% 
Auckland 7086.3 102.9% 80-20 97.0% 99.0% 
Baseline 6888.7 100.0% - 100.0% 100.0% 
Christchurch 7291.6 105.8% 82-18 101.2% 102.9% 
 
Although the number of routes is somewhat limited, there are significant savings 
available through introduction of an intermediate stop. One observation though is that 
these locations will provide significant challenges, particularly with regards to providing 
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sufficient fuel to these island locations. Another would be prospective capacity concerns 
as land usage is at a premium for these locations. So although fuel savings are available, 
other limitations may prevent them from being available or fully realized. 
5.2.2.3 New York City 
Unlike the other two routes, New York City is vastly shorter. This results in the 
direct flight being the best route for fuel and cost. Short range flights do not benefit from 
intermediate stops. A map with the prospective routes is provided in Figure 54 and results 
are provided in Table 28. 
 
Figure 54. Los Angeles to New York Flights 
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Baseline 2145.9 100.0% - 100.0% 100.0% 
Denver 2157.1 100.5% 35-65 108.0% 110.0% 
Chicago 2154.4 100.4% 70-30 108.2% 110.2% 
Cincinnati 2158.0 100.6% 76-24 109.0% 110.8% 
Detroit 2157.0 100.5% 80-20 109.3% 111.1% 
Phoenix 2188.2 102.0% 15-85 111.4% 113.1% 
Toronto 2204.4 102.7% 86-14 112.2% 113.8% 
Salt Lake City 2237.0 104.2% 23-77 112.4% 114.2% 
Dallas 2277.6 106.1% 47-53 112.4% 114.5% 
Atlanta 2347.7 109.4% 72-28 116.5% 118.3% 
Houston 2426.0 113.1% 50-50 118.6% 120.5% 
Montreal 2436.1 113.5% 88-12 122.8% 124.0% 
 
One of the consequences of intermediate stops is that more of the flight is spent 
climbing and descending so for short range flights, this becomes a much greater portion 
of the total flight distance, penalizing fuel burn. Additional landing costs from adding the 
stop further penalizes the advantage that intermediate stops might have. 
These three routes are here to simply serve as examples of how the intermediate 
stop modeling algorithms work. An analysis of global traffic will follow based on the 






CHAPTER  6 
SPEED REDUCTION SAMPLE PROBLEM 
This chapter focuses on the impact of speed reduction and is broken into three 
parts: vehicle impact, fleet impact, and experimental results. The primary objective of the 
vehicle impact section is to determine whether speed reduction is beneficial to the 
individual aircraft and if so, how much. The fleet impact section focuses on those aircraft 
that benefit and measure the impacts to the figures of merit. Also within the fleet impact 
section in this chapter is the fleet results with no specification changes to provide a 
reference for the fleet analysis. Finally, the experimental results are discussed using the 
information gained from the fleet impact analysis. 
6.1 Vehicle Design 
The first step is to evaluate the respective mission specification change at the 
vehicle level. Details about how these aircraft were designed are available in Chapter 4. 
6.1.1 Bounds of Mission Specification Changes 
Speed reduction was conducted in steps of M0.02 from the baseline cruise Mach 
number, redesigning the aircraft for each speed, until a resulting vehicle design increased 
in fuel consumption from the previous design. This rise in fuel burn indicates that the 
minimum fuel burn has been reached and any further reduction in cruise speed will only 
yield designs with increasing fuel burn for the respective vehicle. Baseline Mach 
numbers are provided in Table 29 for all five reference vehicles. 
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Regional Jet 0.66 0.80 
Single Aisle 0.68 0.78 
Small Twin Aisle 0.68 0.80 
Large Twin Aisle 0.70 0.84 
Large Quad 0.73 0.85 
 
Cruise speed reduction also has an impact on engine performance. As the initial 
engine has been designed to operate at the baseline Mach number, all the reduced speed 
engines need to be redesigned for optimal performance. This entails increasing the 
overall pressure ratio of the engines slightly. On the regional jet, this involves changes to 
the fan and high pressure compressor pressure ratios. The other four vehicles vary only 
the pressure ratios of the fan and low pressure compressor. 
In changing the engine pressure ratios, a couple of engine performance constraints 
have also been added to maintain technical viability. These constraints include engine 
temperature limits at the high pressure compressor exit for the engine aerodynamic 
design point and the engine takeoff at hot day, the combustor exit temperature at 
aerodynamic design point, and the engine bypass ratio. These limit values change with 
technology level. For the temperature limits these constraints were not to be exceeded 
while the bypass ratio was a target objective with small bounds of acceptable deviation, 
±0.05. 
A comparison of changes to the engine overall pressure ratios (OPR) is available 
in Figure 55. These results are for the baseline technology aircraft for all five vehicles 
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and all engine OPRs are normalized with respect to the initial engine models. As cruise 
speed is reduced, the OPRs all increase and this trend is the same for future technology 
introduction. In some cases, the top of climb thrust had to be varied to maintain climb 
performance or stay within temperature limits. For the most part, the trends are linear 
with respect to reduced cruise speed in higher pressure ratios. However, points like 
M0.66 for the regional jet are an outlier. This is due to variation in lapse rate of the 
engine to maintain temperature limits. 
 
Figure 55. Impact of Speed Reduction on Engine Overall Pressure Ratio 
6.1.2 Vehicle Design Results 
All aircraft have been evaluated with fuel burn performance against the baseline 
aircraft. Results will be presented for the regional jet and large twin aisle with the single 
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6.1.2.1 Regional Jet 
A simplified analysis using first principle analysis will be provided to walk 
through some of the implications of speed reduction for the regional jet. This analysis 
will utilize the Breguet range equation and simplified weight and fuel burn build up 
methods using historical trends from Raymer.[97] The Breguet range equation is detailed 
in Chapter 2 but provided here as a reminder. The initial weight estimation is provided in 
Equation 14 where the crew and payload weights are defined in mission requirements, the 
fuel burn estimation Wf/W0 is provided in Equation 15, and the empty weight estimation 
We/W0 is provided in Equation 16. The values in Equation 16 were selected from 
historical data. Table 30 contains fuel burn estimations for non-cruise portions of the 
mission profile and Table 31 provides the cruise assumptions used in the analysis. One 
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0.80 461.1 0.670 16.0 
0.78 449.6 0.660 16.4 
0.76 438.1 0.651 16.8 
0.74 426.6 0.642 17.1 
0.72 415.0 0.634 17.4 
0.70 403.5 0.625 17.7 
0.68 392.0 0.616 17.9 
0.66 380.4 0.607 18.1 
 
To size the vehicle, one must first provide an estimate of a number of these 
parameters. The engine specific fuel consumption and the lift to drag ratio has estimates 
provided in Raymer while the cruise speeds were assumed for the associated Mach 
numbers of interest at 35,000.[97] Reductions in cruise speed provides reductions in 
engine specific fuel consumption while desweeping the wing provides increases in 
aerodynamic efficiency, providing a higher L/D ratio. These trends are also documented 
in Raymer.[97] Crew and payload weights were assumed for 4 crew weighing 190 
pounds and 86 passengers weighing 210 pounds. Using these numbers and trends, the 
weight estimates and fuel performance was then solved for iteratively between Equation 
14 and Equation 16. 
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Figure 56 compares the impact that speed reduction has on vehicle performance 
for the regional jet aircraft (design range 1,980 nm). Overall, there are moderate benefits 
to fuel consumption due but beyond M0.70, fuel burn begins to be penalized due to 
increased flight time, even with slightly increased engine and aerodynamic efficiency. 
The aerodynamics benefits from speed reduction begin to taper off around Mach 0.72 
such further reduction results in fewer gains in combination with the slower speeds. This 
approach does not come without shortcomings. Given that the design range of the aircraft 
is fixed, the speed reduced aircraft are less sensitive to meeting particular performance 
constraints; however, they do exist and it does have performance implications. The 
second is that many of the parameters are assumed constant throughout the mission 
profile, something that is not reflective of actual mission performance. Although there are 
a number of techniques that one can take to improve the level of analysis with this 
approach, tools that are more flexible have been developed. 
 




























For a more fundamental understanding, a brief analysis will be provided looking 
at the drag and wing weight changes that occur from speed reduction. A through drag 
estimation method has been documented by Gur using a number of empirical 
methods.[115] Equation 17 through Equation 21 are related to the impact that speed 
reduction has on aerodynamic and wing weight properties of the aircraft. Profile drag is 
decreased through reduced through wing area reduction but also significantly reduced 
through wave drag. Induced drag also decreases through increased aspect ratio of the 
wing from the assumption of holding span constant while decreasing wing area. 
The critical elements of determining the wave drag in Equation 18 are the 
following two equations: Equation 19 relates the critical Mach number to the drag 
divergence Mach number, MDD, where Equation 20 calculates that value. MDD requires 
the half sweep angle 𝞚0.5 as well as the average wing thickness to chord, section lift 
coefficient Cl, and the Korn factor 𝞳A – which is defined as 0.95 for supercritical 
airfoils. The combination of increasing thickness and decreasing sweep not only 
raises section Cl but ultimately reduces MDD, lowering Mcrit and therefore, wave drag. 
In the wing weight equation (Equation 21), the wing area S of the aircraft is 
decreasing as is the vehicle weights (TOGW, ZFW) and the sweep of the load path, 𝞚load. 
Average wing thickness to chord ratio increases due to speed reduction while load factor 
Nult, wing span b, and taper ratio 𝞴 are all constant. Nult was assumed to have a value of 
3.75, wing span at 75.93’, and taper ratio was 0.281. 
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Results of this analysis are provided in Table 32 for the aerodynamic results and 
Table 33 for the wing weight results. The predominant impact of speed reduction and 
desweeping the wing is that the drag divergent Mach number and critical Mach number 
have both reduced and that has significant implications in terms of wave drag. There are 
also significant benefits to wing weight but note that the percent changes are with respect 
to the wing and not total vehicle. 






Cl MDD Mcrit Cdw 
0.80 0.109 23.8 0.58 0.833 0.725 6.46E-4 
0.78 0.113 21.9 0.60 0.818 0.710 4.71E-4 
0.76 0.116 20.1 0.62 0.805 0.697 3.07E-4 
0.74 0.120 18.2 0.63 0.794 0.686 1.75E-4 
0.72 0.124 16.3 0.64 0.783 0.675 8.20E-5 
0.70 0.127 14.5 0.66 0.773 0.665 2.92E-5 
0.68 0.131 12.7 0.67 0.764 0.656 6.49E-6 

















0.80 25.75 83,160 64,310 6,788 --0% 
0.78 23.85 82,483 63,960 6,553 --3% 
0.76 21.98 81,908 63,663 6,340 --7% 
0.74 20.12 81,687 63,549 6,159 --9% 
0.72 18.26 81,564 63,485 5,994 -12% 
0.70 16.41 81,411 63,406 5,843 -14% 
0.68 14.57 81,595 63,501 5,713 -16% 
0.66 12.74 81,742 63,577 5,597 -18% 
 
A more detailed analysis follows, which was conducted using the Environmental 
Design Space. 
Speed reduction provides a moderate benefit to fuel burn for the regional jet at the 
minimum fuel burn Mach number. The baseline mission is represented in Figure 57 by 
the blue line and indicates that minimum fuel burn occurs at Mach 0.70, a 0.1 reduction 
from the baseline cruise speed. These fuel burn benefits max at 4.3% before increasing 
with further reductions in Mach number. It is also worth noting that a significant portion 
of the benefits are realized at M0.74 such that penalties from increased flight time may be 




Figure 57. RJ Fuel Burn Impact of Speed Reduction 
Technology infusion provides a significant impact to fuel savings – 10.2% for the 
baseline mission alone. This is indicated back in Figure 57 as well. The green line, 
representing the design range mission, shows that the benefits of speed reduction are 
somewhat reduced with the introduction of advanced technology, 3.6% savings vs the 
base 4.3%. The bucket location shifts from M0.70 to M0.68. The economic mission, the 
purple line, indicates similar trends to the baseline economic mission where continued 
speed reduction does not penalize fuel burn. 
These benefits are due in part to two things: wing and engine redesign. Wing 
redesign occurs because the sweep is reduced while the thickness is increased. Less 
sweep creates a lighter wing and this translates into fuel savings. Engine redesign 
improves the cruise performance as the lower cruise speed results in less energy in the 
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that the engine can operate under higher pressure ratios and allows for more efficient 
combustion. Together these work together to provide fuel savings. 
However, these benefits are not constant. Reductions in sweep diminish as cruise 
speed is reduced such that wing weight savings begin to taper off. Engine benefits are 
still present but the challenge is that now the aircraft has to flight longer to complete the 
same mission and the duration of the mission begins to penalize the fuel burn. Eventually, 
the length becomes significant enough that the aircraft is penalized and requires more 
fuel to complete the mission than the previous speed. 
Back in Figure 57, the 800 nm economic mission shows fuel savings beyond the 
bucket at Mach 0.70 by the red line. The maximum benefits are also slightly greater than 
the design range impact by 1%. One of the consequences of speed reduction is that flying 
long range takes a significantly longer period of time and will eventually result in greater 
fuel consumption. As this economic range is short, consequences are not felt here. 
A comparison of flight times changes between the different speed reduced aircraft 
is provide in Figure 58. Differences in flight time due to technology changes are minimal 
such that only the comparisons for the baseline aircraft will be provided. For the design 
mission, which is indicated by the blue line, each step in Mach number results in 
approximately a 2% increase in flight time. This means that the baseline mission 
increases from 5.05 hours at Mach 0.80 to 5.81 hours at Mach 0.66 – an increase of 45 
minutes. The economic mission flight time does not increase as significantly as the 
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design mission; however, the time increase is almost 20 minutes (2.47 hours to 2.76 
hours). 
 
Figure 58. Impact of Speed Reduction on RJ Flight Time 
Increases in flight time translate to increases in crew and maintenance costs such 
that understanding the impact of speed reduction from an airline perspective is important. 
Given though the fuel burn analysis demonstrated that most of the fuel burn benefits have 
been realized at M0.74, Figure 59 shows that there is no savings to an airline and at 
slower speeds, the penalties to the airline are much more significant. Although the future 
technology aircraft designs show cost savings relative to the baseline, many of the 
benefits are significantly reduced from the future aircraft. This would indicate that it may 

































Figure 59. RJ Operating Cost Impact of Speed Reduction 
Based on vehicle analysis results, the regional jet should move on to the fleet 
level for speed reduction. It should be noted that the single aisle trends are quite similar 
to the regional jet and it also moves on to fleet analysis. 
6.1.2.2 Large Twin Aisle 
The large twin aisle aircraft initially provides significant benefits in terms of fuel 
savings. Stepping from Mach 0.84 to 0.82 to 0.80 and then 0.78 provides savings of 
2.9%, 5.5%, and 7.3% for the baseline mission. Further reductions can still provide 
meaningful savings but nowhere near as large at those first three steps. The minimum 
fuel burn occurs at Mach 0.74 with 8.8% savings. Similar benefits are available for the 
primary economic mission; however, at Mach 0.70 and 0.72, the fuel savings remain the 
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Figure 60. LTA Fuel Burn Impact of Speed Reduction 
Technology introduction results in the minimum fuel burn Mach number hitting 
the minimum bounds but the change from M0.72 to M0.70 is not significant. Fuel 
savings are 7%, which is less than the 8.8% from the baseline case. The level of impact is 
close to that of technology on its own – 12.9%. Additionally, the economic mission 
shows similar fuel burn trends to the design mission, as it did in the baseline technology 
example. 
The causes of fuel savings are similar to that of the regional jet. Speed reduction 
allows for wing sweep reduction that provides wing weight reductions. Engine redesign 
allows for a more efficient engine with higher overall pressure ratios. The impact is larger 
here also because the aircraft itself is larger and flies a much longer range. 
Figure 61 contains comparisons of the flight time for both missions. Notice that 
the trendlines essentially overlap for this aircraft. This is due to the much longer ranges of 
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respective missions have an increase in flight time of 17% and 16.8% - resulting in an 
increase in flight time of 2.74 hours for the design mission and 1.49 hours for the 
economic in relation to the baseline times of 16.14 and 8.88 hours respectively. 
 
Figure 61. Impact of Speed Reduction on the LTA Flight Times 
Like the regional jet, increases in flight time have a significant penalty on crew 
and maintenance costs. However unlike the previous seat class, the large twin aisle saves 
far more fuel from speed reduction in comparison to the shorter range regional jet. This 
ultimately results in cost savings for all speed reduced variants as fuel costs are the 





























Figure 62. LTA Operating Cost Impact of Speed Reduction 
Based on these findings, the large twin aisle will move on to fleet analysis for 
speed reduction. Trends for the small twin aisle and large quad are more in line with this 
aircraft but relevant figures are available in Appendix B. 
With the design and analysis of the five vehicles complete, the next step is to 
evaluate the impact that these aircraft will have at the fleet. Since each seat class showed 
benefit s from cruise speed reduction, all will be carried over to the fleet level. 
6.2 Fleet Results 
An initial section will discuss the baseline results as well as the future technology 
results with no specification changes to provide perspective on how future growth 
impacts metrics. Then the speed results will follow. Finally, the experimental results will 
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6.2.1 Fleet Forecasting Results 
Aviation growth is projected to be significant through under the forecast period of 
investigation. The objective of this section is to bring perspective to the overall fleet 
results as the fleet results will be measured by percent difference from their respective 
technology level baselines. Noise will not be addressed in this section as only 2036 and 
2050 are being analyzed. 
Figure 63 shows that operations growth is projected to result in 4.5 times the 
number of the initial 2006 flights at 2050. This growth will have a significant impact 
throughout the system with respect to all metrics. Note that these results are reflective of 
the forecast used and the initial operations set. 
 
Figure 63. Forecasted Operations Growth from 2006-2050 
A further breakdown of operations by individual seat class is provided in Figure 




























single aisle makes up the significant portion of the datum flights followed by the small 
regional jet, regional jet, and then the final four by increasing size. When the forecast 
ends in 2050, the four larger seat classes have all increased significantly as has the 
regional jet in proportion to the total number of operations. On the other hand, the small 
regional jet and single aisle have decreased largely due to the significant increase in those 
classes. Now the small regional jet and very large aircraft will not be modified in this 
analysis such that approximately 10% of fleet operations at 2050 will not receive 
technology or mission specification changes. These fleet breakdowns are provided in 
Table 34. 
 


































SRJ RJ SA STA LTA LQ VLA
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SRJ 20.8% 07.2% 
RJ 11.7% 22.1% 
SA 57.7% 38.8% 
STA 06.9% 14.7% 
LTA 02.2% 08.0% 
LQ 00.6% 07.1% 
VLA 00.2% 02.1% 
 
Baseline fuel burn growth is expected to be 6.59 times that of year 2006 in 2050 
while the introduction of technology aircraft without mission specification changes 
reduces it to 5.99 of the initial fleet in 2006. This is a 9.1% reduction in fuel consumption 
at 2050 and is significant; however, it does come short of carbon neutral goals. This is 
represented in Figure 65. 
 
Figure 65. Forecasted Fuel Burn Growth from 2006-2050 
For additional reference, Figure 66 contains a breakdown of the total fuel burn 
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future, the components from regional jet through large quad are reduced while the small 
regional jet and very large aircraft classes are identical to the baseline as they are not 
receiving technology. This figure largely serves to provide context to the fleet results as 
even a 10% reduction in one seat class’ fuel burn would not correspond to a 10% 
fleetwide reduction. 
 
Figure 66. Fuel Burn Breakdown by Seat Class – Baseline Technology 
NOx growth trend is similar to fuel burn although the magnitude of growth is 
higher – 7.31 for the status quo. Technology infusion is substantial on NOx growth such 
that the factor is reduced to 5.68, a 22.4% reduction. Figure 67 shows a comparison of the 









































Figure 67. Forecasted NOx Growth from 2006-2050 
Figure 68 compares the impact of growth and technology introduction on the 
combination of fuel, crew, maintenance, route, and landing fees. Baseline technology 
results in a 6.23 factor of growth in 2050 over 2006 while technology represents a 5.85 
factor. The 6.1% savings is entirely due to fuel savings as the other costs are unchanged 
since the mission specifications are the same as the baseline aircraft. Figure 69 compares 
the combination of the operating costs in Figure 68 with changes in capital cost of the 
replacement aircraft. The margin between the two technology levels is significantly 
reduced due to the higher prices of the future aircraft. But the future technology total 
costs are still less than the baseline because of the much larger operating cost savings due 
























Figure 68. Forecasted Operating Cost Growth from 2006-2050 
 
Figure 69. Forecasted Total Cost Growth from 2006-2050 
As operations do not change between the two technology levels, safety is constant 
between the two scenarios. Using accident rates with respect to both operations and flight 
time, the trends are pretty much the same and in terms of absolute numbers are close as 





















































Figure 70. Forecasted Accident Count from 2006-2050 
Now that the overall fleet results have been shown, the following section will 
show the impact that speed reduction has on the fleet. 
6.2.2 Fleet Impact of Speed Reduction 
The impact of cruise speed reduction will be assessed for both the regional jet and 
large twin aisle with figures for the other aircraft located in Appendix B. As a reminder, 
Table 35 contains the bounds of the speed reduction analysis and the minimum fuel burn 
at the vehicle level for each aircraft. 














Regional Jet 0.66 0.80 0.70 0.68 
Single Aisle 0.68 0.78 0.70 0.74 
Small Twin Aisle 0.68 0.80 0.70 0.70 
Large Twin Aisle 0.70 0.84 0.74 0.70 





















Accidents per Ops Accidents per Time
153 
 
Speed reduction has a significant impact on total number of aircraft required. To 
better highlight the impact that speed reduction has on other metrics, the total number of 
required aircraft for each seat class has been separated from cumulative summary figures. 
These impacts are in Figure 71. Note that 1% represents almost 900 additional required 
aircraft. 
 
Figure 71. Number of Required Aircraft due to Baseline Speed Reduction 
The impact is significant for all seat classes but the single aisle stands out much 
more noticeably. As shown back in Figure 64, the single aisle contributes to far more 
operations in the fleet than the other vehicles and therefore is much more sensitive to 
changes in cruise speed with respect to required number of aircraft. Analysis of the 
regional jet and large twin aisle aircraft are provided to further understand the fleet level 
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6.2.2.1 Regional Jet 
Figure 72 provides a cumulative summary of fuel burn, operating cost, capital 
cost, total cost, NOx, and the increase in number of accident due to adoption of speed 
reduction for the regional jet over the 2006 to 2050 timeframe for the datum set. Fuel 
burn initially begins to steadily decrease but by M0.72, the benefits begin to significantly 
diminish. Operating cost minimizes at M0.72 and then the increases in crew and 
maintenance rates as well as more required aircraft offset the fuel related savings. Capital 
cost and accident count both steadily increase as cruise speed is reduced. Both are due to 
the increase in required flight time where the former is due to the increased number of 
required aircraft, as shown back in Figure 71, while the latter is calculated as a function 
of flight time. A summary of the cumulative results is provided in Table 36. 
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0.80 -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.78 -0.03% -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.07% 0.07% 0.02% 
0.76 -0.06% -0.02% 0.02% -0.01% -0.13% 0.22% 0.06% 
0.74 -0.10% -0.03% 0.05% -0.01% -0.22% 0.38% 0.11% 
0.72 -0.14% -0.05% 0.05% -0.02% -0.29% 0.45% 0.13% 
0.70 -0.15% -0.05% 0.09% -0.01% -0.31% 0.62% 0.18% 
0.68 -0.16% -0.03% 0.14% -0.01% -0.34% 0.81% 0.24% 
0.66 -0.17% -0.04% 0.15% -0.01% -0.39% 0.85% 0.25% 
 
Future technology provides benefits to most of the metrics except for capital cost, 
which increases due to the higher aircraft prices from its integration into the vehicle, and 
accidents, which are unaffected by technology introduction. However, the overall 
sensitivity has greatly lessened for all metrics except for accidents. This is largely due to 
a significant portion of the fuel burn and NOx benefits from speed reduction have been 
reduced. Capital cost on the other hand is reduced simply due to the overall increase in 
aircraft prices for all seat classes. Figure 73 compares the sensitivity of the metrics to 
changes in speed reduction with future technology with the corresponding initial values 

















Figure 73. RJ Future Cumulative Speed Reduction Fleet Results 















0.80 -5.13% -3.33% 5.01% -1.39% -12.74% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.78 -5.15% -3.34% 5.00% -1.40% -12.77% 0.07% 0.02% 
0.76 -5.17% -3.34% 5.02% -1.40% -12.78% 0.20% 0.05% 
0.74 -5.20% -3.35% 5.02% -1.40% -12.83% 0.36% 0.08% 
0.72 -5.21% -3.35% 5.02% -1.40% -12.86% 0.44% 0.10% 
0.70 -5.23% -3.36% 5.02% -1.41% -12.89% 0.47% 0.11% 
0.68 -5.24% -3.35% 5.06% -1.39% -12.88% 0.64% 0.14% 
0.66 -5.25% -3.35% 5.10% -1.38% -12.92% 0.78% 0.18% 
 
One observation that is that the impact of speed reduction for the regional jet is 
the benefits at the fleet level are not overwhelmingly large. This is due to a couple of 
reasons. The first is that the regional jet does not correspond to a significant proportion of 
the total fleet operations. This is a significant factor in terms of limiting the benefits of 
the future aircraft. In terms of fuel burn, this margin is even smaller such that the overall 
fleet impact is even more lessened. Similar trends occur for all other metrics as well. It 























FB Ops Cost Capital Cost
Total Cost NOx Accidents
157 
 
6.2.2.2 Large Twin Aisle 
The large twin aisle’s summary chart is provided in Figure 74. The first major 
difference between this chart and the regional jet’s is that there is a second vertical axis. 
This is only for the NOx as the changes are much larger than the other metrics and 
otherwise, those trends would be less apparent. The fleet minimum fuel burn occurs at 
Mach 0.70 with savings of 0.78%. Mach 0.72 and Mach 0.74 are both pretty close with 
benefits of 0.76% each. The vehicle level optimum was at Mach 0.74 for the design 
mission but the economic mission did indicate additional savings for speeds below the 
optimum. These fuel savings provide substantial cost savings at Mach 0.74 but total cost 
savings are maximized at Mach 0.80 such that the significant capital cost increases from 
greater speed reduction are offset. A summary of the 2050 results is provided in Table 38. 
 














































FB Ops Cost Capital Cost
Total Cost Accidents NOx
158 
 















0.84 -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.82 -0.24% -0.13% 0.02% -0.10% -0.72% 0.12% 0.05% 
0.80 -0.45% -0.24% 0.04% -0.18% -1.41% 0.22% 0.09% 
0.78 -0.59% -0.30% 0.12% -0.20% -1.85% 0.35% 0.15% 
0.76 -0.66% -0.32% 0.21% -0.20% -2.38% 0.46% 0.19% 
0.74 -0.76% -0.36% 0.31% -0.20% -2.82% 0.58% 0.25% 
0.72 -0.76% -0.32% 0.48% -0.14% -3.08% 0.72% 0.30% 
0.70 -0.78% -0.31% 0.61% -0.09% -3.25% 0.85% 0.36% 
 
While future technology provides benefits for the large twin aisle, these benefits 
are reduced similarly to the regional jet. Much like the other seat class, technology 
already provides significant savings for all metrics or the penalty, as in the case of capital 
cost, is lessened due to overall aircraft prices rising. Figure 75 compares the impact of 
technology on the cumulative results with Table 39 containing the relevant data. Like the 
baseline technology case, Figure 75 has a secondary axis on the right to be used only for 
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0.84 -5.13% -3.33% 5.01% -1.39% -12.74% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.82 -5.29% -3.41% 4.98% -1.46% -13.11% 0.11% 0.04% 
0.80 -5.42% -3.48% 4.94% -1.52% -13.47% 0.20% 0.07% 
0.78 -5.49% -3.50% 4.96% -1.53% -13.81% 0.32% 0.10% 
0.76 -5.57% -3.53% 5.03% -1.54% -14.32% 0.41% 0.14% 
0.74 -5.61% -3.54% 5.10% -1.53% -14.47% 0.53% 0.17% 
0.72 -5.63% -3.52% 5.25% -1.48% -14.60% 0.66% 0.22% 
0.70 -5.65% -3.51% 5.37% -1.44% -14.71% 0.79% 0.26% 
 
Compared to the regional jet, the large twin benefits are much larger overall. This 
is not overwhelmingly surprising as although the large twin is a smaller proportion of the 
overall operations, it is a much larger contributor with respect to fuel burn and other 
metrics. 
6.3 Experimental Results 
With the fleet impact of speed reduction completed, the final step is to address the 
hypotheses and experimental results. This discussion will be in the following order: 
influence of different fleet metrics of best speeds, comparison of best vehicle to best fleet 
results, a comparison of replacement strategies, and an evaluation of the influence of 
technology introduction on the sensitivity of speed reduction. 
6.3.1 Influence of Different Fleet Metrics on Best Speeds 
Based on the fleet level analysis, the next step was to identify the maximum 
benefit vehicles for the fleet based on the following metrics: fuel burn, operating cost, 
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and total cost. The corresponding speeds for the minimum results of each metric are in 
Table 40. 
Table 40. Comparison of Cruise Speeds Corresponding to Different Metrics 
Seat Class 











Regional Jet 0.66 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.70 0.70 
Single Aisle 0.70 0.72 0.78 0.68 0.74 0.74 
Small Twin Aisle 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.68 0.74 0.76 
Large Twin Aisle 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.74 0.76 
Large Quad 0.75 0.75 0.81 0.75 0.77 0.77 
 
The predominant trend is that the speeds for minimum fuel burn and the two costs 
are not the same. In some cases, the two costs are the same and when there is a 
difference, it is due to the change in capital and crew/maintenance costs increasing faster 
than the fuel savings. The baseline technology single aisle is such a large outlier because 
of the impact it has over such a larger number of operations and its lesser fuel savings 
compared to other aircraft. 
So while there is a best speed for fleet fuel burn, it does not necessarily represent 
the minimum cost and depending on perspective, might not be the most ideal outcome. 
Any organization interested in reducing the environmental impact of aviation would 
strongly prefer an outcome with the greatest reduction in fuel burn. On the other hand, 
airlines will be far more interested in minimizing their costs such that minimum operating 
cost or total cost is the more relevant outcome. 
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This debate in which metric one should use will have significant implications on 
the manufacturers as it is in their best interests to develop aircraft and engines that are 
capable meeting any future regulatory changes as well as being attractive to the operators 
and leasing companies that purchase them. Historically, the typical consideration is that a 
system or operating scheme has to buy its way onto the aircraft. 
One pertinent question is the impact that shifting selection metric has among the 
other fleet metrics. Figure 76 compares all three strategies on fuel burn, NOx, operating 
cost and total cost. With respect to fuel burn, minimum operating cost is not that much 
less in terms of savings as fuel costs contribute significantly to fleet costs but total cost is 
a percent less such that the influence of capital cost is more significant. NOx essentially 
follows fuel burn. Looking at operating cost, there is very little variation between the 
three strategies but that 0.1% difference between minimum fuel and minimum operating 
cost represents $3.4B cumulatively from 2006-2050 with the datum six week set. 
Meanwhile, the 0.4% difference in total cost for the minimum fuel burn and minimum 
total cost scenarios represents $15.3B over the same timeframe. 
Technology introduction shows a lot of the same trends. All three strategies 
provide greater savings than no action except for total cost with the minimum fuel burn 





Figure 76. Fleet Performance Based on Metric Minimization 
Noise analysis will be limited to the minimum fuel burn variants as variation 
within speed reduction does not result in significantly different noise contours and given 
that the certification numbers are all within small variation. Figure 77 compares the 55 
dB contour area summations for the representative airports defined in Chapter 4 over 
both technology levels. Overall, noise exposure is relatively constant among all of the 
airport groupings. There are small increases in the high and medium traffic airports but 





















































has little impact on airport noise. The increases are due to reductions in climb out thrust 
from the vehicle optimization, resulting in the aircraft spending slightly more time in the 
terminal area and generating more noise. 
  
 
Figure 77. Noise Impact Comparison from Speed Reduction – 55 dB 
6.3.2 Comparison of Best Vehicle to Best Fleet Results 
As a significant portion of literature has been focused on the vehicle level benefits 
of mission specification changes, it follows that a comparison of the vehicle best results 
should be compared to the fleet level results. Given that vehicle optimization was focused 
on minimizing fuel burn at each speed, fleet comparisons will focus on the minimum fuel 
burn results. This data is available in Table 41. 
Table 41. Cruise Speed Comparison for Minimum Fuel Burn 
Seat Class 









Regional Jet 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.66 
Single Aisle 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.68 
Small Twin Aisle 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.68 
Large Twin Aisle 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.70 
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At the baseline technology level, the regional jet and large twin aisle both have 
fleet optimum speeds that are slower than their vehicle level counterpart. This trend 
occurs when a significant number of operations are further from the design range. It can 
also be seen in the vehicle operating range trends such that their minimum fuel points are 
slower than the design curves. Future technology levels result in the same behavior for all 
vehicles except the large twin aisle, whose speeds are the same – the minimum bounds. 
Similarly, a comparison of the operating cost results was conducted. For many of 
the seat classes, the vehicle optimum is much faster than the fleet outcome, only two 
cases differ. This again highlights the importance of conducting fleet level assessment 
rather than looking only at the design mission outcomes. Secondary assessment at the 
vehicle level through economic mission would address this somewhat but ultimately, 
even one or two flight distances is not enough to fully capture the fleet level impact. 
Table 42. Cruise Speed Comparison for Minimum Operating Cost 
Seat Class 









Regional Jet 0.78 0.72 0.80 0.70 
Single Aisle 0.76 0.72 0.76 0.74 
Small Twin Aisle 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.74 
Large Twin Aisle 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.74 
Large Quad 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.77 
 
Ultimately, both technology levels indicate the importance of looking at fleet 
level analysis when conducting changes in mission specifications, providing evidence 
that supports Hypothesis 2. 
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6.3.3 Comparison of Replacement Strategies on Future Operations 
The minimum fleet fuel burn results will be used to evaluate the impact that 
immediate replacement (the current approach in assessing fleet level impact of mission 
specifications) has in comparison to fleet evolution that is used in this research. If one 
used either cost scenario, there would be variation in the outcomes of the metrics but the 
observations would still be similar. 
Figure 78 demonstrates the cumulative impact that immediate replacement of 
vehicles has on the fleet in comparison to the impact of fleet evolution for fuel burn, NOx, 
operating cost, and total cost. The solid lines represent fleet evolution while the dashed 
lines are immediate replacement of all respective vehicles. These results are with respect 
to the baseline technology fleet with no specification changes. 
  
  


























































































































































Fuel burn benefits are greatly overestimated through immediate replacement over 
phased in replacement. For the current state of the art, the fuel savings are an additional 
2.2% over the 44 year period for immediate replacement. Future technology is almost an 
additional 7% savings. The increase in the gap between the two strategies is solely due to 
technology introduction as the gains from only speed reduction are not that large in 
comparison to the overall benefits of technology. 
NOx impacts are much greater for the same reasons. An additional source is that 
within the initial operations set, there are aircraft that are used in multiple seat classes – 
an example is the Boeing 777 that is flown in seat classes 6 through 9. This trend is less 
obvious in the fuel burn data and much more so here as the additional NOx savings are 
much higher than the fuel savings: 4.5% for the baseline and 17.0% with the future 
aircraft. Benefits are overwhelmingly large in the future because much of the fleet has 
now been replaced with aircraft utilizing advanced combustors that significantly reduce 
NOx production. 
Figure 78 indicates that operating cost trends are very similar to fuel burn and 
NOx except that the overall benefits from immediate replacement continue to decrease 
more aggressively than the fuel burn or NOx results based on the significant leveling out 
of the slow in the baseline case. Future technology does not see this trend as the fuel 
savings are much more significant overall. Additional savings are 0.7% for the base 
aircraft and 3.5% for future. 
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On the other hand, the total cost is negatively impacted with respect to the 
baseline technology results. Speed reduction immediately adds a number of aircraft into 
the fleet and requires a significant investment early but the differences in the two 
approaches have nearly reconciled by 2050; however, it is not enough to offset them 
completely and it pays a 0.1% penalty here. Future technology results drop by 1% as the 
gap in price between speed reduced aircraft is larger than for the baseline technology 
level. Additionally, the operating cost savings from technology provide a significant both 
to overall performance. 
One shortcoming in this analysis is that all the aircraft operating the year before 
will likely not have been fully paid off. In one case, the operators would have to continue 
paying the capital costs associated with ownership of these unused aircraft, resulting in 
higher total cost in the years post-entry. Or the annual capital cost would have increased 
to make up for the future loss of revenue, resulting in higher total in the years leading up 
to the entry year. Either way, the total capital cost penalty has not been fully captured. 
From an environmental perspective, complete replacement of respective vehicles 
looks like an appealing strategy. However, there are significant capital cost penalties that 
should be fully quantified to understand the impact. It should be noted that any evaluation 
with entire replacement of the associated vehicles in the fleet indicate that benefits 
represent a theoretical maximum and not something completely realizable. 
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6.3.4 Impact of Technology on Cruise Speed Reduction Effectiveness 
Additionally, the minimum fuel results will be used to explore the impact that 
technology has on the impact of mission specifications. Much of the existing literature 
has focused on a fixed technology level that is the current state of the art. The need exists 
to understand how significant an influence that technology integration will have on the 
sensitivity of mission specification changes. 
As the entry into service dates are different between the two technology levels, 
both will be given the same entry into service date to evaluate whether the cruise speed 
reduction is less effective on the next generation of aircraft. The future technology entry 
year was transitioned to be consistent with the baseline entry year (2020) and results are 
in Figure 79 for fuel burn, NOx, operating cost, and total cost and a cumulative summary 





Figure 79. Comparison of Technology Impact on Speed Reduction Effectiveness 









Speed Reduction -3.01% --6.71% -1.02% -0.19% 
Technology -6.36% -15.67% -4.13% -1.73% 










For the technology and speed reduction results, the percentage in the parentheses 
represents the difference between that case and technology alone. For all four metrics, the 
impact of technology has reduced the impact that speed reduction has on the fleet results. 
For fuel burn and operating cost, the impact is around 1.0% and 0.6% respectively. The 


























































































































































This chapter has been focused on the impact that speed reduction has at both the 
vehicle and fleet levels. The representative aircraft were designed with minimizing fuel 
burn subject to a number of performance constraints. These results were then analyzed to 
determine suitability as to whether each aircraft should be considered at the fleet level. 
As all aircraft provided fuel burn savings, it was determined that they would all advance. 
After a brief discussion of the baseline fleet forecasting results, speed reduction 
was assessed at the fleet level over multiple metrics – fuel burn, operating cost, and total 
cost (a combination of operating and capital cost). This analysis yielded insights into the 
importance of cruise speed variation on these metrics. An additional comparison was 
made with the vehicle optimal results to the fleet fuel burn optimal results to compare and 
assess their differences. 
Further analysis was conducted to determine the importance of vehicle integration 
whether it be through fleet evolution where retirement of existing aircraft is considered 
and new aircraft are phased in over time in comparison to the practice of conducting a 
complete fleet replacement of the associated vehicles in a given year. Using the optimal 
fuel burn vehicles, it showed a pretty significant discrepancy on fuel burn if the complete 
replacement results are forecasted out. 
Finally, an analysis was conducted to compare the impact that technology 
introduction has on speed reduction effectiveness. This required both technology levels to 
have the same entry into service years. Data clearly showed that the impact of speed 
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reduction was reduced when future technology was applied. While the benefits are still 
significant with respect to fuel burn, it is worth noting that the operating cost savings are 
significantly lessened. 
Based on this analysis, speed reduction is a viable fleet level strategy for reducing 
the environmental impact of aviation going forward. It does come at a price with respect 
to capital cost, as more aircraft will be required just to meet the projected growth and it 
offsets the cost savings from fuel savings. However, speed reduction will not be enough 
to reach carbon neutral growth on its own or with the aid of technology as demonstrated 
in Figure 80. 
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CHAPTER  7 
RANGE REDUCTION SAMPLE PROBLEM 
This chapter focuses on the impact of range reduction and is broken into four 
parts: vehicle impact, intermediate stop feasibility, fleet impact, and experimental results. 
The primary objective of the vehicle design section is to determine whether range 
reduction is beneficial to the respective seat classes and if so, how much. Intermediate 
stop feasibility is focused on understanding what ranges that intermediate stops should be 
used on in comparison to direct operations for aircraft going to the fleet analysis. The 
fleet impact section focuses on those aircraft that receive benefits and measures the 
impact to figures of merit. Within the fleet impact section is an assessment of the impact 
that ISO has on the fleet. Finally, the experimental results are discussed using the 
information gained from the fleet impact analysis. 
7.1 Vehicle Design 
The first step is to evaluate the respective mission specification change at the 
vehicle level. 
7.1.1 Bounds of Mission Specification Changes 
Range reduction was conducted in 5% steps from 100% design flight distance to 
35% of the baseline design value to allow for one intermediate stop evaluation for ranges 
up to 50% and two intermediate stops down to 35%. Engine optimization was not 
necessary as the cruise speed was held constant and airflow was simply scaled. Bounds 
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for range reduction are provided in Table 44. Initially, the plan was to include the 
regional jet and single aisle down to 35%; however neither showed benefits with just one 
stop such that analysis ended at 50% range reduction. As a reminder, the economic 
ranges for all aircraft are also included. The secondary economic range for the two larger 
aircraft is required as the short range variants will eventually be unable to fly those 
ranges. 







Range 1 (nm) 
Economic 
Range 2 (nm) 
Regional Jet 0,990.0 1,980 0,800 - 
Single Aisle 1,480.0 2,960 0,900 - 
Small Twin Aisle 2,072.0 5,920 1,800 - 
Large Twin Aisle 2,635.5 7,530 4,000 2,500 
Large Quad 2,471.0 7,060 4,400 2,400 
 
7.1.2 Vehicle Design Results 
All aircraft have been evaluated with fuel burn performance against the baseline 
aircraft. As the direct flight is no longer feasible due to design range reduction, the 
introduction of intermediate stops was modeled. If one stop shows significant benefit, 
then a second stop was also considered. Stops were assumed to be at the midpoint of the 
baseline design range for one stop and at a third of the baseline range for two stops with 
no excess distance flown. This means that for the large twin aisle, baseline mission 
performance comparison will be the fuel burn of two 3,765 nm flights for all aircraft 
variants to model one stop. For two stops, analysis would be the combined fuel burn of 
three 2,510 nm flights. 
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As with Chapter 6, discussion here will be limited to the regional jet and large 
twin aisle with the relevant information for the other seat classes in Appendix C. 
7.1.2.1 Regional Jet 
A simplified analysis using first principle analysis will be provided to walk 
through some of the implications of range reduction for the regional jet. This analysis 
will utilize the Breguet range equation and simplified weight and fuel burn build up 
methods using historical trends from Raymer.[97] The Breguet range equation is detailed 
in Chapter 2 but provided here as a reminder. The initial weight estimation is provided in 
Equation 23 where the crew and payload weights are defined in mission requirements, the 
fuel burn estimation Wf/W0 is provided through Equation 24, and the empty weight 
estimation We/W0 is provided in Equation 25. Table 45 contains fuel burn estimations for 
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Table 46. Breguet Range Input Assumptions 
Design 
Range (nm) 






1,980 0.80 461.1 0.670 16.0 
 
For the range reduced aircraft, the cruise speed, engine thrust to weight ratio, and 
wing sweep and thickness parameters are all similar among designs such that those 
values in the Breguet range equation can be assumed constant. Additionally, this means 
that all the aerodynamic considerations presented in Chapter 6 are not necessary for this 
analysis and all benefits are due to wing weight changes. In Equation 26 all of the terms 
can be assumed constant as the cruise speed is fixed except for the wing area and vehicle 
weights. The second term is much more sensitive to changes in the vehicle design due to 
range reduction and results in a lighter wing.  
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1,980 25.75 83,160 64,310 6,788 --0% 
1,881 25.75 80,785 63,082 6,702 --1% 
1,782 25.75 78,515 61,906 6,620 --2% 
1,683 25.75 76,345 60,779 6,542 --4% 
1,584 25.75 74,267 59,699 6,466 --5% 
1,485 25.75 72,277 58,663 6,393 --6% 
1,386 25.75 70,369 57,669 6,322 --7% 
1,287 25.75 68,539 56,713 6,254 --8% 
1,188 25.75 66,782 55,794 6,189 --9% 
1,089 25.75 65,094 54,911 6,126 -10% 
0,990 25.75 63,472 54,060 6,064 -11% 
 
The only variables are the cruise range, which is known, and the weight 
estimation results. After sizing the vehicle, then one can go back and determine the fuel 
burn for the one stop mission using the weights of the crew, payload, empty weight 
(determined from the previous sizing), and fuel burn (determined in the mission analysis 
for the one stop mission) to calculate the impact of intermediate stops in comparison to 
the direct mission. The gross weight guess used to calculate the fuel burn is then iterated 
on until the difference from the calculated weight and the guess is negligible. 
Figure 81 compares the impact of range reduction and intermediate stops on fuel 
burn performance for the regional jet using this method. Note that overall, there are 
significant penalties to applying intermediate stops at the longer ranges while for the 
shortest range, there is a slight savings in fuel burn. This is due to the addition of another 
climb segment for what is a very short design mission. Increased efficiency at cruise is 
not enough to offset the penalty to fuel burn that is from climb performance. However, 
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this method does have a number of shortcomings. The first is the lack of general 
performance constraints such as approach speed, takeoff field length, and other thrust 
requirements. This ultimately neglects some of the design constraints like a larger wing 
area being required to meet an approach speed. The second is that many of the parameters 
are assumed constant throughout the mission profile, something that is not reflective of 
actual mission performance. Although there are a number of techniques that one can take 
to improve the level of analysis with this approach, tools that are more flexible have been 
developed. 
 
Figure 81. Simplified Fuel Burn Analysis of RJ Range Reduction 
A more detailed analysis follows, which was conducted using the Environmental 
Design Space. 
Range reduction provided no benefits to fuel burn for the baseline technology 
aircraft and the corresponding variants. Even though the variants become lighter with 
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changes are not sufficient to provide any fuel savings for this seat class. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 82 by the blue line. 
The penalties from intermediate stops are due to a significantly increased portion 
of the mission being operated in the climb phase of the mission. Climb is the least 
efficient part of the mission and given the baseline design range of the regional jet, the 
savings provided in cruise are not sufficient to offset the penalties from the additional 
climbs. This penalty occurs for all variants equally. Given that one stop did not provide 
any benefits, analysis was stopped at the 50% range variant and two stops analysis was 
not conducted. 
The introduction of technology does provide fuel savings over the baseline 
regional jet’s performance for the design mission. For the future technology aircraft with 
100% range, the fuel savings from intermediate stops are 4.5% of the baseline aircraft. 
However, the same aircraft flying directly saves 10.2% of fuel in comparison 
(represented by the black dot). So although there is no penalty from using intermediate 
stops in comparison to the baseline aircraft performance, they do not provide any benefits 
when compared to direct operation of the aircraft. Additionally, the sensitivity of the 
future technology variants to range is less than that of the baseline aircraft – 1.7% savings 




Figure 82. RJ Fuel Burn Impact of Range Reduction 
In addition to fuel burn, an analysis of operating cost was conducted and results 
are in Figure 83. For both technology levels, intermediate stops penalize operating cost 
significantly in comparison to the baseline mission. Technology introduction does reduce 
the penalty but this is due only to the fuel savings. The landing fee from the additional 
cost is much more significant than those savings and ultimately penalizes this strategy. 
Assumptions for costs were operation in North America, $3/gallon fuel price, and crew 
costs during the stop were neglected, which would only increase the lack of cost 
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Figure 83. RJ Operating Cost Impact of Range Reduction 
For the 800 nm economic mission, all of the range reduced designs show 
improvements but overall, the benefits are fairly small. This is shown by the red line in 
Figure 84. With respect to future technology, the meager benefits of the economic 
mission are slightly reduced. Operating cost trends are fairly similar with lesser savings 
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Figure 84. RJ Fuel Burn Impact of Range Reduction on Economic Missions 
Based on these findings, the regional jet should not consider design range 
reduction and will not move on to the fleet analysis. These trends are consistent with the 
single aisle as well such that it will also not move on to fleet level analysis. 
7.1.2.2 Large Twin Aisle 
In comparison, the large twin aisle sees significant fuel burn benefits from the 
introduction of intermediate stops and range reduction. Figure 85 shows that one and two 
stops (blue and red respectively) are almost identical in terms of providing fuel savings 
for the design mission. Initially introducing intermediate stops provides 7.4% and 7.6% 
reductions for one and two stops. Continued reduction in design range provides 
significant benefits – 21.1% for 50% range with one stop and 23.4% for 35% range for 
two. The significance of the two strategies lying almost equally on top of each other 



























Percentage Baseline Design Range




the fuel burn penalties from the additional climb offsets those saving such that they are 
nearly identical to the one stop strategy. If the design range of the large twin aisle was 
significantly increased, this would likely result in two stops clearly outperforming one 
stop. Conversely, there is a clear separation between one and two stops for the small twin 
aisle, which has a much lower design range. 
Vehicle design trends are largely the same as observed for the regional jet – wing 
area and thrust are reduced while wing aspect ratio rises. Even though the climb phases of 
the mission are inefficient, the legs for both the one and two stop strategies are 
significantly long enough to save enough fuel to offset the penalties from climb. This is 
true for both technology levels. 
 
Figure 85. LTA Fuel Burn Impact of Range Reduction 
Technology introduction provides a similar benefit to the baseline initially but it 
tapers off as the design range is reduced. This is demonstrated in Figure 85 for one stop 
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increases the fuel savings due to moving from one stop to two but the overall benefit 
from intermediate stops is reduced from technology infusion. 
As seen with the regional jet, technology introduction also reduces the sensitivity 
of this seat class to range reduction. One stop provides 13.7% additional benefits as range 
is reduced for the baseline technology while the future aircraft gain only 8.8% savings. 
Two stops is reduced from 15.8% to 10.4% for the technology shift. 
Given the significant fuel savings provided from intermediate stops, it is not a 
surprise to find that the operating costs are reduced for all range variants, even with the 
additional landing fees for both strategies. Figure 86 demonstrates that although two 
stops was slightly more beneficial with respect to fuel burn, the fee associated with the 
additional stop ultimately penalizes it such that one stop is clearly preferable. Technology 
introduction does not result in any changes to preference in intermediate stop cost 
effectiveness as both strategies provide cost savings. But similar to fuel burn, the 




Figure 86. LTA Operating Cost Impact of Range Reduction 
The large twin aircraft has two economic missions as the 4,000 nm mission would 
not be feasible for the 50% range and below variants. One observation is that the savings 
from range reduction impacts to both the 4,000 nm mission and the 2,500 nm are 
essentially the same. The long range economic mission is represented by the blue and 
green lines in Figure 87 for the baseline and future levels respectively. The short range 
economic mission is represented by the red and purple lines. 
Operating cost trends look very similar to these results. The 4,000 nm economic 
mission maxes out at 10.6% savings for the baseline technology mission while the 2,500 
nm economic mission maxes out at 12.7%. Future technology provides 10% savings to 





























Base - 1 Stop Base - 2 Stops Future - 1 Stop




Figure 87. LTA Fuel Burn Impact of Range Reduction on Economic Missions 
Given that range reduction has shown benefit, large twin moves on to fleet level 
analysis. The small twin and large quad aircraft show trends similar to the large twin and 
also move on to fleet level analysis. Recall that the regional jet and single aisle do not. 
The next step is to identify prospective mission ranges where the aircraft should fly a 
direct route as opposed to fly one or two intermediate stops. 
7.2 Intermediate Stop Feasibility 
With the small twin aisle, large twin aisle, and the large quad aircraft having been 
identified as benefiting from the usage of intermediate stops, the next step is to 
investigate under what flight distances each aircraft should be flown for a direct route, 
one stop, or two stops. Each design was evaluated at full passenger payload. An analysis 
for each aircraft design will be presented in a format similar to Figure 88. All percent 
change results are with respect to fuel burn for the 100% design range aircraft for the 
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Figure 88. LTA Base 100% Intermediate Stop Feasibility Diagram 
Figure 88 is for the 100% range large twin at the baseline technology such that the 
direct flight results are the reference condition and represented by the blue line. The red 
line represents the impact that introducing one stop halfway through the mission and the 
green line is for two stops, splitting the mission into thirds. In Figure 88, direct flights are 
advantageous for any operation below almost 4,200 nm as the one stop and two stop 
strategies result in increases in fuel burn over the direct mission. Any flight beyond this 
range saves fuel with the introduction of a single stop at the midpoint. At approximately 
5,400 nm, two intermediate stops start to provide savings and eventually overtake one 
stop at around 7,200 nm. However, the savings are not that large – under 0.5%. 
To provide additional comparison, the 35% range variant for the large twin is 
provided in Figure 89. Here, the direct flight provides significant benefits over the 100% 
range aircraft for applicable ranges. The one stop strategy does provide fuel savings in 
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range is reached, the one stop strategy is required. There is a significant gap between the 
direct flight and one stop such that although fuel savings are still available over the 
reference condition, a significant amount of savings is lost due to the design range. This 
behavior also occurs in transition from one stop to two stops. 
 
Figure 89. LTA Base 35% Intermediate Stop Feasibility Diagram 
The remainder of this section is dedicated to exploring the impacts of the large 
twin aisle over each technology level. Trends for the small twin and large quad are 
similar and relevant figures are provided in Appendix C. 
With respect to direct flights, range reduction provides benefits as it continues to 
be reduced; however, these benefits are marginally diminished for continued range 
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Table 48. Impact of Range Reduction on LTA at 2,500 nm 
Range 









100% 0-0.0% - -13.3% - 
095% 0-2.2% 2.2% -14.9% 1.6% 
090% 0-4.3% 2.0% -15.9% 1.0% 
085% 0-6.0% 1.7% -17.0% 1.1% 
080% 0-7.5% 1.5% -18.1% 1.1% 
075% 0-9.1% 1.5% -18.9% 0.9% 
070% -10.6% 1.5% -19.8% 0.9% 
065% -12.0% 1.4% -20.8% 0.9% 
060% -13.1% 1.1% -21.5% 0.7% 
055% -13.9% 0.8% -22.2% 0.7% 
050% -14.8% 0.9% -22.8% 0.7% 
045% -15.7% 0.8% -23.4% 0.5% 
040% -16.4% 0.8% -23.9% 0.5% 
035% -17.1% 0.7% -24.5% 0.6% 
 
Figure 90 demonstrates that transition to one stop from direct flights remains 
fairly constant through the 55% design range aircraft. This distance is approximately 
4,100 nm and just over half of the baseline design range. Further reduction result in a 
discontinuity between the direct flight and one stop operations as the two no longer 
intersect. This occurs due to reductions in range being more significant than the fuel 
savings from operating in ISO. It is preferable that one designs an aircraft that does not 
have these discontinuities as it provides smooth fuel consumption within operating 
ranges. Otherwise, the result is penalty to fuel burn due to design range reduction. 
Although the gap at 50% range is not that large, the gap for the 35-45% aircraft increases 




The biggest difference overall though is the viability of two stop operations in 
comparison to a single stop. Unfortunately, the two stop strategy is only really viable for 
the design range for all aircraft of 50% range or higher but the fuel savings are 0.1-0.2%, 
which isn’t going to be enough to truly justify this type of operations. For the 35-45% 
aircraft, two stops is the only viable strategy for the only range flights. The savings from 
a two stop 35% aircraft vs a one stop 50% is 23.4% to 21.1% fuel burn savings. The 2.3% 
difference is pretty significant but this is also only for the 7,530 design range. At 6,000 
nm, the difference between the two is 19.8% vs 18.5% resulting in a much smaller gap. 
Additionally, the operating costs of two stops suggest that one stop is still a preferable 
strategy. 
Technology reduces both the impact of range reduction as well as the transition 
point for one stop operations in Figure 91. This is due to technology ultimately improving 
efficiency throughout the mission, including climb. Viability of two stops is not 
significantly changed. Based on this analysis, it would indicate that aircraft designed for 
less than 50% of the baseline range are not worth pursuing as well as a two stop strategy 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.3 Fleet Analysis of Range Reduction 
The impact of range reduction will need to first be measured with respect to the 
introduction of intermediate stops to isolate their impact on the fleet against the impact 
that the reduced range variants will have on the fleet in conjunction with intermediate 
stops. The general fleet growth results are in Chapter 6. This section will first address the 
impacts that intermediate stops have and then look at the reduced range variants for the 
large twin aisle. 
7.3.1 Impacts of Intermediate Stops 
The only way to model intermediate stops is to modify the initial operations set. 
This will result in their introduction at the initial year of 2006 as opposed to the planned 
entry years of 2020 for the baseline technology level and 2024 for the future. Therefore, 
the approach will be to use results from no action up to each respective entry year and 
then use the intermediate stop results from that year to 2050. This will result in a sudden 
change for all metrics. Noise will also only be addressed in the final results. 
7.3.1.1 Baseline 
The initial focus here will be on the change in number of operations as 
intermediate stops effectively double the number of operations for the flights adopting 
this strategy. The percent change in number of total fleet operations for all three aircraft 
is provided in Figure 92. While 0.5% or 1.5% might not sound like a big deal, it 
corresponds to approximately 74,700, 27,000, and 17,700 operations for the small twin, 
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large twin, and large quad respectively in year 2020. Forecasted forward, the smaller two 
aircraft operation percentage decreases but this is due the growth in other seat classes. In 
2050, the total increase in operations from 2020-2050 due to intermediate stops is 
approximately 314,000, 137,500, and 185,800 for the respective aircraft. These annual 
numbers are from the datum six weeks such that 52 week numbers can be scaled up. 
 
Figure 92. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Operations 
With respect to safety, the increase in accidents that occur due to intermediate 
stops are identical to that of the increase in operations if one uses the safety approach that 
is based on the rate per million operations. When using the rate that is based on flight 
hours, the impact of intermediate stops become somewhat smaller and is provided in 
Figure 93. With this method, the large quad grows significantly and eventually outpaces 





























Figure 93. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Accidents 
Regarding fuel consumption, intermediate stops alone are not overwhelming 
significant in terms of cumulative savings – 0.22%, 0.09%, and 0.22% overall. This is not 
substantially large overall but intermediate stops impact only a portion of an individual 
seat class’ operations such that the overall margin is lower. Additionally, the total number 
of flights would also drive how significant the benefits are overall. A comparison of the 
percentages to totals is included in Table 49. 




Small Twin 4.9B 
Large Twin 1.9B 































Figure 94. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Baseline Fuel Burn 
The NOx impact is overly similar to fuel burn with the only real difference being 
that all three aircraft provide similar levels of reduction. Given that NOx production is 
also tied to fuel burn, this outcome is not surprising. 
 
Figure 95. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Baseline NOx 
The introduction of intermediate stops has a significant impact on both the 
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locations do not lie along the direct flight path, there will be the introduction of excess 
flight distance, which requires more flight time and increases the number of aircraft 
required. This impact is shown in Figure 96. Like the operations impact, the percent 
change is not that significant but it corresponds to an additional 95 small twin, 34 large 
twin, and 82 large quad aircraft for each seat class in 2020. This also clearly shows where 
the largest driver in fleet growth is as the large quad shows significant exponential 
growth in the replacement aircraft total by 2050 – 269 STA, 117 LTA, and 485 LQ. 
 
Figure 96. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Baseline Number of Aircraft 
These extra aircraft impact the capital costs of the fleet and this impact is in 
Figure 97. The biggest impact is to the large quad but impacts of the small twin and large 
twin are not insignificant. The cumulative increase in capital cost at 2050 is $4.9B, 
$2.6B, and $10.3B for each seat class respectively. Keep in mind that these numbers are 

































Figure 97. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Baseline Capital Cost 
As previously mentioned, additional flight time is incurred from using 
intermediate stops. This has a direct impact on crew and maintenance costs as they are 
charged in hourly rates by flight hours. The excess distance will have an impact on the 
routing fees. And the intermediate stop will come with landing fees for each airport. So 
although there is fuel savings by operating in this fashion, Figure 98 demonstrates the 
other costs will ultimately offset the fuel cost savings. By 2050, this means a total 

































Figure 98. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Baseline Operating Cost 
The fleet total operating costs are included in Figure 99, combining the results of 
the previous two figures. While the trends of the small and large twin aircraft are 
generally the same, their magnitudes have increased from the operating costs chart in 
Figure 98. The large quad shows a significant change in trend and this is from the 
significant increase in capital costs due to introducing intermediate stops. 
 
































































Operations growth is identical even with the introduction of the technology 
package as operations growth is dependent on the forecast used, not the aircraft 
technology level. The only change from Figure 92 is that intermediate stops begin in 
2024 instead of 2020. Therefore, this figure will not be provided. The remaining figures 
for this section are with respect to the future technology baseline results. 
Fuel burn trends are similar to that of the no action future technology results. The 
overall cumulative benefits aren’t that large and pretty hard to distinguish in Figure 100. 
Table 50 compares the impact of future technology to the intermediate stop results for 
each seat class. Note that the overall impact is quite small when compared to the benefits 
of future technology and the savings are smaller than those shown in Table 49. 
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Small Twin 117.8B 4.5B 
Large Twin 115.0B 1.8B 
Large Quad 117.8B 4.6B 
 
NOx doesn’t perform similar to fuel burn here but that is due to the introduction of 
technology significantly reducing NOx for most seat classes. 
 
Figure 101. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Future NOx 
As the cruise speed is fixed, technology changes do not impact the number of 
aircraft required. Therefore, the impact is the same as the baseline except for the 2024 
entry into service changes. Results are identical to Figure 96 except for the 2024 entry 
into service date. 
Capital cost trends are fairly similar even with the significant increase in aircraft 
price from technology introduction, which adds $51.8B to total capital costs over the 
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breakdown over the three aircraft is an additional $4.7B, $2.5B, and $10.4B by 2050. 
Again, remember that all four capital cost values are for the datum six weeks summed 
over the timeframe. 
 
Figure 102. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Future Capital Cost 
Operating cost is generally unaffected as technology introduction does not change 
four of the five components: crew rates, maintenance rates, route fees, and landing fees. 
While fuel savings occur, fuel costs are also not as significant a part of these costs 
because technology introduction reduces overall fleet fuel burn significantly. Cumulative 
benefits of technology make up $111.4B while intermediate stops represent a penalty to 





























Figure 103. Impact of Intermediate Stops on Future Operating Cost 
The combined cost displays similar trends to the prior case as well. This is not 
surprising since the operating cost and capital cost elements showed similar trends to 
their baseline technology counterparts. While utilizing intermediate stops with future 
technology still provides cost savings, there is a penalty in comparison to no action. 
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7.3.2 Impact of Reduced Range Variants 
Results in this section will focus on the large twin aisle and those for the small 
twin and large quad can be found in Appendix C. In the following figures, the yellow dot 
represents the current approach of having one fixed range aircraft while the green dot 
represents the variant that minimizes the metric of interest. Contours are presented as 
variations in design range and short range variant distribution. The latter was varied from 
a 50%-50% split to 100%-0% in 10% increments of the variants below the range 
threshold being the short range aircraft or the long range aircraft. For operations beyond 
the threshold, they were only the long range variant. 
The impact range reduction has on the fleet for the large twin is quite significant 
at both technology levels. Figure 105 demonstrates that the reducing range to the 60% 
variant has a 1.1% reduction in cumulative fuel burn at baseline technology levels over 
the fixed variant results with intermediate stops. Future technology results are reduced to 
0.6% fuel savings for the same variant. This is not particularly surprising as technology 
adoption takes away some level of the overall potential benefits, which was also observed 
at the vehicle level. 
Range reduction is a much greater driver in terms of overall fleet results but as the 
variant moves towards shorter range variants, the impact begins to lessen. This is caused 
by the range threshold of these variants encountering the largest chunk of operations and 
it becomes a trade of increased fuel savings for fewer overall operations. For ranges like 
90% and 80%, this is not as big a deal as the contour is quite steep in those regions but 
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this behavior really begins to appear in the 60% and 70% aircraft. This behavior is also 
more pronounced at the more equitable SR variant distribution levels such as 70%-30% 
and lower. 
 
Figure 105. Fuel Burn Sensitivity for the LTA under Range Reduction 
NOx trends are different from fuel burn as continued reduction in range provides 
increased savings. Minimum NOx occurs at the 50% range variant for both technology 
levels but the magnitude is significantly different. At the baseline level, the savings 
attributed to range reduction are 0.9% while future technology benefits are 0.3%. This is 
due to the significant improvements that have already occurred due to technology 





Figure 106. NOx Sensitivity for the LTA under Range Reduction 
Operating cost trends are similar to the fuel burn such that the variants with the 
minimum values are the same. This is due to operating cost components like crew, 
maintenance, landing, and route fees being constant among all the variants such that fuel 
burn is the only means to provide any influence. At baseline technology levels, there are 
0.70% savings over one long range aircraft while savings of 0.40% are possible for future 
technology. This behavior was also observed at the vehicle level. Variant distribution has 
a significant influence here as well as more short range variants provide greater overall 





Figure 107. Operating Cost Sensitivity for the LTA under Range Reduction 
Capital cost for the baseline case is minimized for the 50% design range variant. 
This is not particularly surprising as aircraft price is a function of vehicle weight and the 
vehicle weight is minimized at the lowest design range. With the addition of future 
technology, the overall capital cost for the fleet significantly increases with respect to the 
baseline but capital cost is minimized at the 55% range aircraft. This difference is 
attributed to differences in the range threshold for the short range variant as this value 
will determine the number of operations that are viable for that aircraft. Variant 
distribution has a significant influence here as well as more short range variants provide 





Figure 108. Capital Cost Sensitivity for the LTA under Range Reduction 
Total cost minimum location is not influenced by the capital cost trends under the 
baseline technology level such that it remains at the same 60% variant. The overall fuel 
burn savings are larger than the capital cost savings; however, the 50% and 55% range 
aircraft are very close in terms of performance. Future technology shifts to the 55% 
variant as the fuel savings from greater range reduction are not enough to offset the 
capital costs from shorter range aircraft. But again, the nearby variants are also incredibly 
close as well. The sensitivity to variant distribution is carried over as well as both 





Figure 109. Total Cost Sensitivity for the LTA under Range Reduction 
With the fleet impact of range reduction completed, the final step is to address the 
hypotheses and experimental results. 
7.4 Experimental Results 
This discussion will be in order as presented in Chapter 6: influence of metrics on 
optimal variants, comparisons of vehicle and fleet level optimal variants, the influence of 
replacement strategies, and impact technology has on the sensitivity of range reduction. 
7.4.1 Influence of Different Fleet Metrics on Best Ranges 
Fleet analysis results have identified which range reduced variants minimize fuel 
burn, operating cost, and total cost and these are located in Table 51. It is worth noting 
that the 100%-0% SR-LR variant distribution always resulted in the fleet total minimum 
therefore the 70%-30% distribution is also provided to represent more realistic fleet 































 Small Twin Aisle 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 
Large Twin Aisle 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 55% 








 Small Twin Aisle 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 
Large Twin Aisle 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 55% 
Large Quad 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
 
The first observation is that for the small twin and large quad, changing metrics 
provides no impact to what the associated optimal aircraft is. The large twin only 
experiences a change in selected aircraft when considering capital cost as a part of total 
cost for future technology only. At first, this was surprising as there was an expectation 
that different metrics should still yield different vehicles. However in thinking about each 
of the metrics, the explanation is fairly simple. 
When considering operating cost, range reduction does not impact crew or 
maintenance costs as the cruise speed is fixed so it only impacts fuel burn, route fees, and 
landing fees. Intermediate stops provides a fuel savings on its own while slightly 
penalizing the other cost elements but the addition of the range reduced aircraft provides 
significant fuel savings compared to the now fixed crew, maintenance, route, and landing 
fees with intermediate stops. 
With the additional of capital cost, the optimal aircraft for total cost was largely 
unchanged except for the large twin with future technology and even then it was a single 
step reduction. Even though the minimum capital cost results always favor the 50% range 
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variant aircraft, the fuel savings from the larger variants is large enough to offset the 
capital cost increases from utilizing a longer range variant. 
For comparison purposes, the cumulative impact of range reduction with respect 
to the different metrics is provided in Figure 110 for both technology levels. Results are 
with respect to the baseline results. Intermediate stops have also been included to 
compare their impacts with respect to the scenarios and the baseline. These results are not 
as interesting as their speed reduction counterparts as the minimum aircraft is the same 
for two of the three scenarios. And with respect to total cost, the difference lies in the 





Figure 110. Fleet Performance Based on Metric Minimization 
As in the speed reduction results, the impact of the range reduced variants doesn’t 
provide overwhelmingly significant changes to the noise counters for the representative 
airports in the high, medium, and low categories. This is not remotely true for the 
intermediate stop airports. Figure 111 illustrates that for these five airports, the 2036 55 
dB results are 13.4 times larger than the original operating set results and the 2050 results 
are 12.7 times larger. Similar magnitudes of growth occur for the future technology 

























































Figure 111. Noise Impact Comparison from Range Reduction – 55 dB 
Although population concerns were not accounted for in this work, it is incredibly 
likely that the surrounding communities will be negatively affected. 65 dB figures are in 
Appendix C. Even though the sensitivity of range reduction to the other metrics was 
stagnant, quantifying and understanding the impact of noise is the critical component for 
this sample problem. Given that Chicago O’Hare has received $565 million to date for 
noise abatement, the number of impacted airports for intermediate stops is going to be 
significant as will the costs of increasing capacity.[7] 
7.4.2 Comparison of Best Vehicle to Best Fleet Results 
Given literature’s predominant focus on the vehicle level, the fleet minimum 
should be compared to the vehicle minimum. The focus here is again on fuel burn with 
comparisons in Table 52. For two of the three seat classes, the results are different, thus 
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Table 52. SR Variant Comparison for Minimum Fuel Burn 
Seat Class 









Small Twin Aisle 50% 55% 50% 55% 
Large Twin Aisle 50% 60% 50% 60% 
Large Quad 50% 50% 50% 50% 
 
From an operating cost perspective, results are identical between the vehicle and 
fleet levels, presented in Table 53. Based on the analysis from the previous section, this 
outcome is not surprising since minimum fuel burn, operating cost, and total cost aircraft 
are all largely insensitive to range reduction. 
Table 53. SR Variant Comparison for Minimum Operating Cost 
Seat Class 









Small Twin Aisle 50% 55% 50% 55% 
Large Twin Aisle 50% 60% 50% 60% 
Large Quad 50% 50% 50% 50% 
 
Based on the analysis conducted in this chapter, it indicates that Hypothesis 2 is 
partially supported but not entirely. The large quad aircraft disproves the theory that 
vehicle and fleet results will be different while the other two vehicle results do support it. 
It is not likely that this hypothesis is something that should be considered on a seat class 
by seat class basis and instead conclude that the fleet level results are largely dependent 
on the initial operations set, in particular where the aircraft are specifically flying. An 
operations set that operates predominantly over land mass will have a much easier time 
utilizing intermediate stops and providing suitable airports for feasibility. Additionally, 
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the small twin aisle has far more prospective airports given its smaller size than the large 
twin and large quad due to the shorter takeoff field length and runway widths required. 
7.4.3 Comparison of Replacement Strategies on Future Operations 
As previously conducted, the minimum fuel burn results will be used to evaluate 
the impact of immediate replacement of aircraft as opposed to fleet evolution. Figure 112 
demonstrates the impact that immediate replacement of vehicles has on the fleet in 
comparison to the impact of fleet evolution for fuel burn, NOx, operating cost, and total 
cost. The solid lines represent fleet evolution while the dashed lines are immediate 
replacement of all respective vehicles. These results are with respect to the fleet where 
the replacement vehicles are the current baseline aircraft. 
Similar to the speed reduction results, the fuel burn benefits are overpredicted 
through immediate replacement compared to the phased in evolution. At baseline 
technology levels, this impact is an additional 1.4% cumulative while future technology 
is much greater with 5.6% savings more. The additional benefits are so much greater in 
this case in part because the regional jet and single aisle are both receiving technology 
packages and are also assumed to have immediate replacement. Even then, the 





Figure 112. Cumulative Comparison of Replacement Strategies – Range 
NOx impacts are largely similar for the same reasons. NOx savings are much 
higher for the future results due to the aircraft utilization mentioned in the previous 
chapter. There are aircraft that are used in multiple seat classes – an example is the 
Boeing 777 that is flown in seat classes 6 through 9. Replacing a large twin in the small 
twin seat class with a small twin aircraft will provide significant NOx reductions on its 
own. That, in combination with advanced combustors, is the cause of the significant 
reduction in NOx. Additional savings are 1.2% and 11.2% for the two technology levels 
respectively. 
Operating cost trends are similar to fuel burn overall. Note that there is an initial 
bump in 2020 and 2024 due to the transition from direct flights to intermediate stops. 
This bump does not occur for the immediate replacements as the fuel savings are 





























































































































































reduced aircraft are introduced to the fleet, these costs continue to drop from both 
perspectives as the fuel savings continue to increase. Differences between approaches are 
1% for the baseline results and 3.7% for the future. 
Total cost faces a larger initial bump due to the inclusion of capital costs for the 
evolution approach but this is again due to the transition from direct to intermediate stop 
flights. Unlike the speed reduction results, there is no bump for the immediate 
replacement as the range reduced variants that are immediately adopted cost much less 
than their long range counterparts. In addition with the fuel savings, the rise in costs 
disappears. Overall, the cumulative difference is 1.5% and 2.8% respectively. 
One could then argue that their introduction would be a boon to the airlines as a 
lower capital cost improves profitability. But like the speed reduction discussion 
mentions, the immediate approach is underestimating the costs of replacing all the 
aircraft in the fleet. Those unused aircraft that were previously in operation have no 
customer to sell them to other than for scrap such that it will result in a pretty hefty loss 
for either the airlines or leasing companies. Or the annual capital cost would have 
increased to make up for the future loss of revenue, resulting in higher total in the years 
leading up to the entry year. Additionally, as tail tracking is not done, it could mean that 
even more aircraft are required due to potential scheduling issues regarding planned 
flights and also leaves airlines with less fleet flexibility. Regardless, the total capital cost 
penalty has not been fully captured. 
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7.4.4 Impact of Technology on Range Reduction Effectiveness 
The minimum fuel results will be used to explore the impact that technology has 
on the impact of mission specifications. Much of the existing literature has focused on a 
fixed technology level that is the current state of the art. The need exists to understand 
how significant an influence that technology integration will have on the fleet sensitivity 
of mission specification changes. 
As the entry into service dates are different between the two technology levels, 
both will be given the same entry into service date to evaluate whether range reduction is 
less effective on next generation of aircraft. The future technology entry year was 
transitioned to be consistent with the baseline entry year (2020) and results are in Figure 
113 for fuel burn, NOx, operating cost, and total cost and a summary of the cumulative 
numbers in Table 54. These numbers are with respect to the baseline fleet results. Note 
that the technology results are with respect to the baseline operations while results with 





Figure 113. Comparison of Technology Impact on Range Reduction Effectiveness 









Range Reduction 0-3.05% 0-3.24% -1.24% -1.88% 
Technology 0-6.36% -15.67% -4.11% -1.69% 










For the technology and speed reduction results, the percentage in the parentheses 
represents the difference between that case and technology alone. For all four metrics, 
technology introduction has reduced the impact that range reduction has on the fleet 
results. For fuel burn, it is reduced by a third while NOx is cut by over half. Operating 
























































































































































This chapter has focused on the impact that range reduction has at both the 
vehicle and fleet levels. The representative aircraft were designed with minimizing fuel 
burn subject to a number of performance constraints. These results were then analyzed to 
determine suitability as to whether each aircraft should be considered at the fleet level. 
This involved utilization of intermediate stops such that the design range was broken into 
two or three (if two stops was beneficial) flights to use less fuel. Not all aircraft realized 
fuel savings. The regional jet and single aisle seat classes showed increases in fuel or 
trivial benefits such that adoption for those aircraft was deemed unnecessary. This was 
due to the increases in climb fuel being a much greater penalty than the savings in the 
more efficient cruise portion of flight. 
The three larger seat classes all indicated that there were significant savings by 
utilizing one or two stops at the design range such that the next step was to evaluate what 
ranges each strategy was optimal. All though the large twin aisle under both technology 
levels and the future large quad preferred two stops at the design range, the benefits 
overall were not significant enough to merit their usage such that one stop was deemed 
the better operational strategy. This also considered other implications of two stops such 
as landing fees and viability within total fleet operations. 
This then required the evaluation of operations from the initial set to determine 
which direct flights would be updated to use intermediate stops. This is documented in 
Chapter 5. A brief discussion of the impact of intermediate stops at the fleet level is 
provided for each seat class.  Following that, the impact of range reduction over the 
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metrics of fuel burn, operating cost, and total cost (a combination of operating and capital 
cost) was conducted. This analysis indicated that the impact of range reduction is quite 
uniform over these three metrics. An additional comparison was provided with respect to 
a different replacement strategy over the short ranges but resulted in no changes in 
outcome. 
Further analysis was conducted to determine the importance of vehicle integration 
whether it is through fleet evolution where retirement of existing aircraft is considered 
and new aircraft are phased in over time in comparison to the practice of conducting a 
complete fleet replacement of the associated vehicles. Using the optimal fuel burn 
vehicles, it showed a pretty significant discrepancy on fuel burn if the complete 
replacement results are forecasted out. 
Finally an analysis was conducted to compare the impact that technology had on 
the effectiveness of range reduction. This required both technology levels to have the 
same entry into service years. Data clearly showed that the impact of speed reduction was 
reduced when future technology was applied. While the benefits are still significant with 
respect to fuel burn, it is worth noting that the operating cost savings are significantly 
lessened. 
Based on this analysis, range reduction is a viable fleet level strategy for reducing 
the environmental impact of aviation going forward. It does have significant 
consequences with respect to noise for intermediate airports that will need to be 
considered if one was to move forward. Additionally, intermediate stops do increase the 
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potential for accidents whether one uses the rate per operations or flight time such that it 
could be a cause for concern. However, range reduction will not be enough to reach 
carbon neutral growth on its own or with the aid of technology demonstrated in Figure 
114. 
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CHAPTER  8 
SPEED AND RANGE REDUCTION SAMPLE PROBLEM 
Based on the finding from the previous two chapters, the small twin, large twin, 
and large quad aircraft benefited from both speed and range reductions. Therefore, all 
three aircraft will be assessed jointly. The large twin results will be presented here while 
the figures from the other two aircraft will be in Appendix D. 
8.1 Vehicle Design Results 
At a given speed, the engine assumptions were consistent with what was 
presented in Chapter 6. For variations in range at a speed, only the airflow was varied. 
Similarly, assumptions used for average wing thickness and wing sweep were treated in a 
similar fashion. As this chapter focuses on both speed and range reduction, contour plots 
of fuel burn performance will be provided in lieu of single axis charts. Yellow dots 
represent the baseline design while green dots represent the optimal resulting aircraft. 
Figure 115 compares the impact of joint reduction over both one and two stops for 
both technology levels. Regardless of technology level or number of stops, the optimal 
vehicle for fuel burn is always the M0.70, 50% range variant. Two stops are still slightly 
more preferable for this aircraft but the difference between the two operating schemes is 
only marginal. Also of note is that technology introduction has significantly reduced the 
impact of joint reduction. 
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The initial impact of intermediate stops is around 7.5% fuel savings for the 
M0.84, 100% range aircraft and the benefits at M0.70, 50% range is approximately 
30.5%. With the introduction of technology, the results are 19.5% for the initial aircraft 
down to 36.6% for the optimum. Although the savings from joint reduction are still fairly 
large, technology infusion has significantly reduced their overall benefits. Weight savings 
from range reduction provide additional benefits that result in the speed fuel burn bucket 
disappearing for this seat class. 
 










Similar trends for operating cost are observed in Figure 116. While the two stop 
strategy is slightly more beneficial from a fuel consumption standpoint, the cost penalty 
from the extra stop results in two stops falling out of favor economically. Additionally, 
the impact of speed reduction is felt here as well, generating a cost bucket. The minimum 
operating cost results are for the M0.72, 50% variants instead of the M0.70 aircraft. 
 
Figure 116. LTA Joint Design Mission Operating Cost Performance 
The economic mission compares fuel burn performance for the respective 










while the 2,500 nm mission is the M0.70, 50% aircraft. These results are consistent with 
the design mission. 
 
Figure 117. LTA Joint Economic Mission Fuel Burn Performance 
The implications of operating cost on these two missions are provided in Figure 
118. As with the design mission, the optimal aircraft for minimizing operating cost is the 
slightly faster M0.72 variant at the minimum range. Again, these findings are not 













Figure 118. LTA Joint Economic Mission Operating Cost Performance 
8.2 Fleet Results 
An assessment of intermediate stop feasibility was conducted with respect to 
speed reduction for the base technology aircraft. This was to assess whether the transition 
range between a direct flight and one stop strategy was sensitive to reductions in cruise 
speed as well as identify whether any new operations would need to be modified for fleet 
analysis. Recall that technology infusion only showed slight decreases in that threshold 













The figures of intermediate stop feasibility are not particularly different than those 
previously seen. The small twin aisle is most sensitive to speed reduction; however, it 
was also much more sensitive to range reduction than the other two aircraft and the 
variation was no different than before. The two larger aircraft were not affected at all. 
This indicated that no additional operations needed to be modified for fleet analysis. 
Additionally, there are two final things worth noting. The first is that the long 
range variants match the cruise speed of the short range variant as it does not seem 
practical for a manufacturer to develop two aircraft with different ranges and different 
cruise speeds. The other is that only the analysis of 100%-0% was analyzed. Results 
presented here are the cumulative impact of joint reduction for the large twin aisle. 
Results for the small twin and large quad are in Appendix D. 
Figure 119 demonstrates the impact that joint reduction has on the cumulative fuel 
burn for both technology levels. Ultimately, the impact of technology is negligible on 
determining which aircraft is optimal as both levels result in the fleet minimum occurring 
at M0.70, 60% range. In terms of overall fuel savings, the baseline technology benefits 
are 1.9% with respect to cumulative fuel levels while the future savings are 1.1% in 
addition to the 5.1% savings just from technology infusion. Similar to the range only 
analysis, the preferable variant design is driven by operational distribution rather than 




Figure 119. LTA Joint Reduction Fuel Burn Fleet Impact 
Figure 120 compares the impact that joint reduction has on NOx emissions. 
Trends here are largely driven by cruise speed and range is left only as a measure of how 
many operations are viable for the short range variant to fly on. Additionally, technology 
introduction significantly reduces the benefits from joint reduction. This outcome is not 
all the surprising based on results from the speed and range sample problems. 
 





Compared to the fuel burn, the operating cost trends in Figure 121 are slightly 
different. This behavior is more in line with what was observed with the speed reduction 
results as continued reductions in cruise speed eventually increase the crew and 
maintenance costs at a faster rate than the fuel cost saved. For both technology levels, the 
optimal variant is the M0.72, 60% range aircraft. The maximum savings are reduced from 
technology adoption as well decreasing from 1.0% to 0.6%. 
 
Figure 121. LTA Joint Reduction Operating Cost Fleet Impact 
Figure 122 compares the capital cost trends. Unsurprisingly, the optimal aircraft 
for minimum capital cost is the baseline speed with reduced design range. Since speed 
reduction requires more aircraft to be purchased, this is ultimately less desirable from this 
metric’s standpoint. The difference between the two technology levels is due to changes 





Figure 122. LTA Joint Reduction Capital Cost Fleet Impact 
Figure 123 compares the implications of the combination of operating and capital 
cost for joint reduction. There is clearly a push between more fuel savings from joint 
reduction while faster aircraft have lower crew and maintenance costs and require many 
less aircraft. From this perspective, the speed of the selected variants again increases 
from M0.70 and M0.72 for fuel burn and operating cost to M0.74 for total cost. The 
variation in range is due to threshold changes due to technology infusions but both 





Figure 123. LTA Joint Reduction Total Cost Fleet Impact 
8.3 Experimental Results 
On completion of the joint speed and range reduction, the final step is to address 
the hypotheses and experimental results. This discussion will follow the hypotheses in 
order. Although only the small twin, large twin, and large quad aircraft were modeled at 
both levels for the joint speed-range analysis, the experimental analysis here has included 
the associated regional jet and single aisle from the speed only analysis for each 
respective metric. 
8.3.1 Influence of Difference Fleet Metrics on Best Vehicles 
Based on the fleet level analysis, the next step was to identify the maximum 




Table 55. Comparison of Joint Variants Corresponding to Different Metrics 
Seat Class 











Regional Jet 0.66,100% 0.72,100% 0.72,100% 0.66,100% 0.70,100% 0.70,100% 
Single Aisle 0.70,100% 0.72,100% 0.78,100% 0.68,100% 0.74,100% 0.74,100% 
Small Twin Aisle 0.70, 60% 0.70, 60% 0.74, 55% 0.68, 60% 0.72, 55% 0.76, 50% 
Large Twin Aisle 0.70, 60% 0.72, 60% 0.74, 55% 0.70, 60% 0.72, 60% 0.74, 60% 
Large Quad 0.73, 55% 0.73, 55% 0.81, 50% 0.73, 50% 0.75, 50% 0.81, 50% 
 
Even with both speed and range being modified, there is still a good bit of 
variation between the three metrics. The baseline small twin and large quad aircraft are 
the same with respect to fuel burn and operating cost but then increase it speed when 
capital cost is introduced. The baseline large twin on the other hand gradually increases 
its speed with small variation to the range over the three metrics. Technology infusion 
promotes this behavior in all three aircraft. 
This analysis demonstrates the benefits of utilizing both speed and range 
reduction within the fleet while still identifying tradeoffs of the different metrics in 
Figure 124. These results are much more in line trendwise with speed reduction than 
range reduction as there is variation between all three metrics. The magnitudes do vary a 
bit as fuel burn is greater than individually speed and range combined but operating cost 
and total cost are less due to increases in the number of aircraft required and 
crew/maintenance costs. Technology introduction follows similarly but the joint benefits 
are much greater with respect to fuel burn than either metric individually. Costs are more 





Figure 124. Fleet Performance Based on Metric Minimization for Joint Reduction 
Like the speed and range results, noise for the three primary airport groups is 
relatively constant. There are slight increases in noise but this is attributed to the climb 
rate differences in the vehicle variants. Noise at the intermediate stop group also 
significantly rises but less than range alone analysis. Comparisons of the 55 dB areas for 























































Figure 125. Noise Impact Comparison from Joint Reduced Vehicles – 55 dB 
Safety ultimately ends up not being a particularly interesting trend for any of the 
seat classes. Using the accident rate per operations, the safety penalties between seat 
classes are the same as the intermediate stop results back in Chapter 7 regardless of range 
or speed changes. When considering the accident rate per flight time, the trends are solely 
a function cruise speed and independent of range reduction such that their contours are 
constant lines in the speed axis and accident likelihood simply increases as aircraft speed 
is reduced. But this is not all that surprising as the long range variants are the same cruise 
speed as the short range aircraft. 
8.3.2 Comparison of Best Vehicle to Best Fleet Results 
At the vehicle level, all aircraft minimize their fuel burn with respect to the 
minimum range through utilization of intermediate stops. The large twin and large quad 
aircraft have their minimum fuel burn at the minimum speed analyzed. This is also true 
for the small twin with future technology. The baseline technology variant is slightly 
faster. For the fleet level analysis, the speeds are identical to that from the vehicle 
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distribution utilized in this analysis. This also occurs for the large quad under baseline 
technology. 
Table 56. Joint Comparison for Minimum Fuel Burn 
Seat Class 









Small Twin Aisle 0.70, 50% 0.70, 60% 0.68, 50% 0.68, 60% 
Large Twin Aisle 0.70, 50% 0.70, 60% 0.70, 50% 0.70, 60% 
Large Quad 0.73, 50% 0.73, 55% 0.73, 50% 0.73, 50% 
 
Table 57 examines the operating cost results between the vehicle and fleet levels. 
Like the fuel burn vehicle results, the vehicle minimums are at the 50% range variants but 
the speeds are faster than the minimum fuel burn. However unlike the speed reduction 
results, the fleet optimums are for the most part at the same speed as the vehicle level. 
Ranges differ for five of the six comparisons. Ultimately this is due to interactions 
between speed and range on the vehicle results. 
Table 57. Joint Comparison for Minimum Operating Cost 
Seat Class 









Small Twin Aisle 0.72, 50% 0.70, 60% 0.72, 50% 0.72, 55% 
Large Twin Aisle 0.72, 50% 0.72, 60% 0.72, 50% 0.72, 60% 
Large Quad 0.73, 50% 0.73, 55% 0.77, 50% 0.75, 50% 
 
This analysis supports Hypothesis 2 for the joint reduction problem. 
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8.3.3 Comparison of Replacement Strategies on Future Operations 
A comparison of the impact of immediate replacement in comparison to the 
evolution through retirement of existing aircraft and the phase-in of the replacement ones 
is conducted here. The minimum fuel burn aircraft are used for this analysis. 
Figure 126 demonstrates the impact that immediate replacement with the joint 
speed and range (speed only in the case of the regional jet and single aisle) for fuel burn, 
NOx, operating cost, and total cost. Solid lines represent evolution while dashed lines 
represent immediate replacement. Baseline technology is in blue and the future 
technology is in green. 
The impact to fuel burn is pretty significant between strategies – 3.6% and 7.8% 
additional gains over the respective technology levels. This is compared to the 6% and 
8.8% benefits from fleet evolution. The benefits are much larger than they are for speed 
reduction where all five seat classes were considered but they are also much larger than 
the range as well, where technology for the two smaller seat classes was still introduced 
immediately. Combination of speed and range reduction is much more substantial with 
both strategies. 
The trends in fuel burn and NOx trend much closer to speed reduction than range 
reduction with respect to cumulative results. Overall, the immediate replacement benefits 
are 5.6% and 17.3% for the respective technology levels on top of the 9.9% and 20.1% 
from the beginning. The sources causing the differences in NOx have been highlighted in 





Figure 126. Cumulative Comparison of Replacement Strategies – Joint 
On the economic side, the trends are far more similar to the range only analysis 
than the speed analysis. With respect to the evolutionary approach, this is partially due to 
the introduction of intermediate stops but future years continue to show cost reductions. 
Speed only analysis started to become less beneficial in the long term as the fuel savings 
were significant enough to offset the crew/maintenance costs while range only analysis 
showed more significant cost savings from the additional fuel savings without having to 
pay the price from block time dependent costs. 
Total cost is more in line with range reduction as well based on the general impact 
that any level of range reduction has on aircraft price. However, the joint element of 
speed reduction has a stronger impact on the magnitude of reduction as the future total 





























































































































































Much like the range reduction analysis, it might appear that joint reduction would 
be a significant boon to the airlines. But the shortcomings of immediate analysis have 
been discussed in the speed and range reduction sections. Specifically, they are an 
underestimation of capital costs and a lack of flexibility in aircraft scheduling. 
8.3.4 Impact of Technology on Joint Specification Effectiveness 
A comparison of the impact of technology on joint mission specification 
effectiveness was conducted using the minimum fuel burn results. Again, the technology 
infused aircraft entry year into service was modified to align with the baseline level 
redesigned aircraft – the year 2020. Figures for all four metrics are provided in Figure 
127. As with the range reduction results, the specification scenarios include intermediate 
stops while the future technology results use the baseline operations set. 
Table 58. Technology Impact on Joint Reduction Effectiveness 





Specifications --6.04% --9.88% -2.19% -1.97% 












There is a pretty significant reduction with respect to fuel burn and operating cost 
from technology introduction with the impact being reduced by a third and a half 
respectively. NOx benefits are reduced by a percent while total cost is reduced by just 
over half a percent. This supports the hypothesis that technology infusion reduces the 





Figure 127. Comparison of Technology Impact on Joint Reduction Effectiveness 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the impact that joint speed and range reduction has at 
both the vehicle and fleet levels. As with the previous chapters, the representative aircraft 
were designed with the objective of minimizing fuel burn, subject to a number of 
performance constraints. Based on the analysis from the previous two chapters, this 
analysis was limited to the small twin, large twin, and large quad aircraft. 
At the fleet level, the scenario relevant speed reduced regional jet and small twin 
aisle aircraft were also included. Fuel burn, operating cost, and total cost were the metrics 
of interest. A comparison of these three different scenarios showed that the trends were 
much more similar to speed reduction as there is significant variation between the three 
scenarios for both technology levels. Combining range and speed has the additional 

































































































































































An investigation was conducted to evaluate the importance that vehicle 
integration has at the fleet with respect to immediate replacement of relevant vehicles in 
comparison to fleet evolution over time with phased introduction and aircraft retirement. 
An analysis was conducted using the minimum fuel burn results and showed that this is a 
significant discrepancy among all metrics. Fuel burn is provided here as an example. 
Finally, an analysis was conducted to compare the impact that technology 
introduction has on joint speed and range reduction effectiveness. Both technology levels 
were introduced in 2020 to perform this evaluation. Data clearly shows that the impact is 
significantly reduced for fuel burn and the cost metrics and somewhat less so for NOx 
emissions. 
Based on this analysis, joint speed and range reduction is a viable fleet level 
strategy for reducing the environmental impact of aviation going forward. It does have 
some consequences as it does take the best and worst elements from both. There is a 
much greater number of aircraft required in the fleet such that it could potentially become 
undesirable for the airlines to even consider. Range reduction does offset a significant 
part of the capital cost concerns but that may not be enough to mitigate other challenges. 
Additionally, range reduction does impact noise significantly at the airports that are 
utilized as intermediate stops. Regardless, even joint considerations are not enough to 
result in carbon neutral growth such that additional solutions will be required to offset the 
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CHAPTER  9 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF ASSUMPTIONS 
In the previous three chapters, all of the inputs were fixed except for the 
respective specification change of interest. Although there is nothing inherently wrong 
with that approach, changing some of the underlying assumptions will have impacts as to 
what the resulting best case aircraft would be at the fleet level. The chapter explores three 
elements to understand how variation in those parameters impacts the best case fleet 
results. These are changes in the five cost elements, changes in annual aircraft utilization, 
and variation in the distribution of intermediate stops over the relevant routes. 
9.1 Cost Changes 
Fixed cost assumptions do not take into account the impact that any changes in 
costs would have on the fleet. This could have a significant impact in terms of what 
strategy would become preferential. Therefore, the goal of this study is to assess the 
influence that any changes would have on total cost due to speed and range reduction. As 
a reminder, the five cost elements are fuel price, crew rates, maintenance rates, route fees, 
and landing fees. 
9.1.1 Speed Reduction 
For speed reduction, the initial operations set is constant such that any changes in 
route or landing fees would be across the board, which means any changes would be 
constant. This leaves fuel price and crew/maintenance rates as the remaining assumptions 
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of interest. While it would be ideal to look at increases in crew and maintenance cost 
separately, there is no easy way to separate the speed reduced aircraft from the baseline 
speed versions just from the results and therefore their changes will be modeled jointly. 
To get perspective on how influential increasing these costs are, Figure 129 
compares their impact on cumulative total cost for the baseline technology levels with no 
speed reduction. The trends are nearly identical for the future results so these will not be 
provided. Total cost shows significant sensitivity to smaller increases in fuel price with 
almost a 50% increase in cost from doubling fuel price. This is not surprising as fuel 
price is a significant portion of fleet costs. In tripling the current crew and maintenance 
costs, there is a 53% increase in cumulative total cost. On the other hand, while a two 
thirds fuel price reduction and halving crew/maintenance rates both provide reductions to 
total cost, reductions in fuel price are significantly more effective. 
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Fuel price was varied from a third of the baseline price at $1.00/gallon up to 
$6.00/gallon in $1/gallon intervals to assess the sensitivity that it would have on total cost 
with respect to each fuel price. The lower bound represents something closer to the turn 
of the century while the maximum represents a much more severe version of the spike in 
fuel price during the 2000s. 
Figure 130 compares the optimal cruise speed for minimum total cost for all five 
aircraft seat classes as a function of fuel price for the baseline technology level. As fuel 
price rises, the larger seat classes shift towards slower cruise speeds. This is not 
particularly surprising given the strong effect that fuel burn has on total fleet costs. It is 
worth noting though that as fuel price rises, the total cost benefits yield diminishing 
returns such that the additional benefits are not as large compared to nearby variants. 
Conversely, when fuel price drops, the cruise speed for minimum total cost is faster for 




Figure 130. Optimal Cruise Speed for Minimum Total Cost based on Fuel Price - 
Base Technology 
The introduction of technology has different effects to the minimum cruise speed 
based on the seat class of interest. The regional jet speeds are slower than its baseline 
counterpart. But for the other four aircraft, the cruise speeds at the higher fuel prices are a 
step or two faster while largely unchanged for fuel prices below the baseline fuel price. 
The increase in speed for the larger aircraft is due to the fact that technology has already 
significantly reduced fuel consumption such that the other cost components become 
slightly more significant. Additionally, speed reduction is less effective in terms of fuel 
burn reduction with the introduction of technology such that the fuel savings are much 
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Figure 131. Optimal Cruise Speed for Minimum Total Cost based on Fuel Price - 
Future Technology 
Crew and maintenance rates were uniformly varied from the 50% of the baseline 
value up to 300% for all seat classes. As previously mentioned, it is far harder to 
distinguish the two so they have been assessed together. The trends here are the opposite 
of the fuel price, the expected outcome. If the flight crew unions were to insist on much 
higher salaries or parts shortages increased maintenance costs, the financial benefits of 
speed reduction are quickly diminished. However if business continues as usual with 
flight crew salaries continually decreasing and reliability continuing to improve and bring 
down maintenance costs, the penalties to flying slower cruise speeds are significantly 
diminished. 
Figure 132 contains the baseline technology trends of optimal cruise speed for 
minimum total cost for all five aircraft. For the majority of seat classes, increasing the 
crew and maintenance rates eventually result in faster cruise speeds. The single aisle is 
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that the larger aircraft are much less sensitive with respect to cruise speed and cost 
increases than the regional jet as increases for those aircraft are only one variant faster 
while the regional jet is three. If rates are reduced, three aircraft see potential benefits in 
cost by flying slower. 
 
Figure 132. Optimal Cruise Speed for Minimum Total Cost based on 
Crew/Maintenance Rates - Base Technology 
Figure 133 demonstrates the impact of crew and maintenance rate variation for 
the future technology aircraft. Many of the results are similar between the two technology 
levels at the higher rates except for the regional jet, which has a much greater preference 
towards flying faster, especially with a 50% increase in rates. For rates at 150% or less, 
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Figure 133. Optimal Cruise Speed for Minimum Total Cost based on 
Crew/Maintenance Rates - Future Technology 
9.1.2 Range Reduction 
For range reduction, cruise speed is fixed such that any changes in crew and 
maintenance rates would be across the board, resulting in any changes being constant. 
This leaves fuel, route fees, and landing fees as the cost assumptions to explore. The 
latter two are particularly important as range reduction is also modeled in conjunction 
with intermediate stops such that any changes to these two components could completely 
offset fuel cost savings from range reduction. It is worth noting that the operations set 
with intermediate stops is constant among a given vehicle such that increases to both 
costs will also be constant – however, these operations are different from the baseline set 
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To get perspective on how influential increasing the three costs are, Figure 134 
compares their impact on cumulative total cost for the baseline technology levels with no 
range reduction. Like the speed analysis, the trends are nearly identical to the future 
results. Fuel price trends are identical to the previous case. Route fee increases ultimately 
provide no significant penalty – even at ten times the baseline values, the increase in total 
cost is just over 10%. Landing fees can end up providing a significant impact to fleet total 
cost but it takes a significant increase to make that happen. At six times the baseline 
values, total cost increases by 36%. For reference, if landing fees were halved, the cost 
savings would only be 4%. 
 
Figure 134. Total Cost Sensitivity to Fuel, Route, and Landing Rate Variation for 
Range Reduction 
Fuel price was varied over the same ranges as before: $1.00/gallon to $6.00/gallon 
in $1.00/gallon increments. Route fees were varied from the baseline values to ten times 
those values. The original objective was to scale route fees until the percent change in 
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changes to total cost, it was deemed no longer worth of pursuing. Landing fees were 
examined from half the baseline values up to six times their value. This upper bound was 
explored due to concerns over operations growth outpacing that of total capacity growth 
and airports responding with higher fees. 
Fuel price variation does not have any significant impact on what short range 
variant would be considered the optimal aircraft for minimum total cost except for the 
baseline technology case at $1.00/gallon price. This is demonstrated in Figure 135. For 
fuel prices $2.00/gallon and above, the short range variant is the same and for the 
$1.00/gallon price, it becomes the 50% variant for all seat classes due to the significant 
capital cost savings. However, the initial variants are all relatively close to the 50% 
results. Future technology remains constant for all fuel prices with the small twin and 
large twin both minimizing total cost with the 55% variant and the large quad at 50%. 
 









































Varying route fees ultimately proved to be a trivial endeavor with ranges going 
from the baseline values to 10 times growth. But as route fees do not make up much of a 
significant component of fleet costs, this is not a surprising finding. With respect to 
variation on total cost, the impact is most noticeable as vehicle range is reduced and even 
then, it’s at most 0.1% over the three vehicles. 
Landing fees were varied from the half the baseline values to up to six times that 
and unlike route fees, there is a pretty significant impact from landing fee growth even 
though the changes are constant between all the variants. Although this does not impact 
which aircraft results in the minimum total cost, the interesting element is where the 
breakeven design range is for each seat class as that varies significantly between the 
variations in landing fees. For example, the small twin aisle in Figure 136 initially starts 
with the 95% range variant being the first to breakeven but when landing fees increase to 
3 times, it becomes the 90% variant. At 4 times, the 85% variant is the breakeven variant 
and then at 5 times, the 80% variant is the breakeven. The large twin and large quad also 




Figure 136. Break Even SR Variant for Landing Fee Variation – Base Tech 
Technology introduction has a much greater impact on landing fee sensitivity as 
its introduction to the aircraft significantly lowers fuel costs and raises capital costs. In 
Figure 137, there is a much greater level of influence that landing fee increases have on 
break even variant. Note that all future technology variants save on cost with respect to 
the cumulative baseline total costs; however, a number of the variants total costs are 
greater than those with future technology without intermediate stops or range reduction 






































Figure 137. Break Even SR Variant for Landing Fee Variation – Future Tech 
The small twin aisle does not break even beyond increased landing fees three 
times the initial value as the cost penalties from intermediate stops offset the fuel savings 
that occur. The large twin and large quad require much greater range reduction to break 
even with respect to the cumulative total cost by 2050 such that for even higher landing 
fees, the large quad might not break even either. 
9.2 Utilization Changes 
One of the consequences of speed reduction and intermediate stops is that some 
flights in the schedule may not work as the aircraft that was intended to be used for one 
operation has not landed and been turned over, requiring additional aircraft. The analysis 
in the previous chapters held annual utilization constant and the assumption was that 
slower aircraft will result in additional flight time and that will require more aircraft. For 





































arrive at the destination, which will require additional flight time and therefore increase 
the required total number of aircraft. 
However, it may end up that mission specification modified aircraft may not be 
capable of flying as many hours due to scheduling challenges. In the case of speed 
reduction, the aircraft may still be capable of operating the same number of flight hours 
but ultimately these slower cruise speeds may result in the aircraft no longer being able to 
operate from a particular airport due to curfews or a different aircraft may end up flying 
that route. For range reduction, the introduction of intermediate stops will require 
additional turnaround time plus and additional flight time from deviating from the flight 
track. This would lead to a reduction in annual utilization which will require additional 
aircraft, ultimately leading to increases capital cost and total cost as well. Therefore, 
exploring what the sensitivity of utilization on speed and range reduction is important as 
it will highlight what the impact is as more aircraft are required. 
To address the impact that utilization might have on fleet metrics, annual 
estimates were reduced by 5% and 10% for evaluation for all seat classes modified in the 
study. As utilization is only used to determine the total number of aircraft, the only 
metrics evaluated here are the number of replacement aircraft, capital cost, and total cost. 
9.2.1 Speed Reduction 
Given the number of vehicles, only the trends for the large twin aisle will be 
provided here. The trends for the other four seat classes are located in Appendix E. 
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Figure 138 demonstrates the impact that utilization changes have on the required 
number of aircraft for the large twin for both technology levels. Although it is a little 
difficult to tell, the future technology results are slightly less due to the four year later 
entry into service dates for those aircraft. For reference, 1% is approximately 900 aircraft.  
 
 
Figure 138. LTA Utilization Sensitivity for Speed Reduction on Number of Aircraft 
Capital cost trends are fairly similar to that of the total number of replacement 
aircraft for the baseline technology results but slightly different for the future technology. 
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the aircraft price is reduced. Trends for the large twin aisle are in Figure 139 where 1% 
represents $10.2b cumulatively over six weeks of operations from 2006-2050. Note that 
the base and future charts are not on the same axis boundaries – the future technology 
capital cost is much larger due its introduction. 
 
 
Figure 139. LTA Utilization Sensitivity for Speed Reduction on Capital Cost 
Total cost trends provide further insight to the consequences of lowered 
utilization and are available in Figure 140 for the large twin aisle. At the baseline 
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aircraft can provide total cost savings but they are completely gone at 90% utilization. 
While all speed reduced variants provide total cost savings over the baseline results, the 
M0.84 bar (the first one on the left) is the no action savings with just technology. One can 
see that there are similar trends with utilization reduction in moving from 100% to 95% 
and 90% when using that bar for comparison purposes. Note that the base and future 
charts are not on the same axis boundaries – the future technology capital cost is much 
larger due its introduction. In this figure, 0.1% represents $4.4B over the 2006-2050 for a 





Figure 140. LTA Utilization Sensitivity for Speed Reduction on Total Cost 
9.2.2 Range Reduction 
Range reduction was modeled slightly differently. It was assumed for the short 
range variants that the utilization would be decreased by the corresponding percentages 
while for the long range variants, it would remain the baseline value. This decision was 
made as the short range variant was most likely to be used on intermediate stops but 
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are impacted by intermediate stops. The large twin aircraft is presented here. Trends for 
other two vehicles are located in Appendix E. 
For the baseline utilization, the number of aircraft required is constant as all 
aircraft have the same speed such that there is no contour to be generated. Instead, 
comparisons will be made between the 95% and 90% results. For reference, the number 
of required aircraft with 100% utilization is 0.29% for the small twin, 0.13% for the large 
twin, and 0.53% for the large quad. 
Figure 141 compares the differences in the number of aircraft required for the 
large twin aisle between both utilization and technology levels. The left column is the 
baseline changes while the right column is the future increase. The top row is the 95% 
results and their shared contour definitions with the bottom row being the 90% results. As 
expected, the future results are slightly less than the baseline as the entry into service date 
is four years later. Another expected behavior from this analysis is that increasing the 
short range variant distribution results in more aircraft being necessary as those variants 
have their utilization modified. Again for reference, 1% is approximately 900 aircraft. 
The new trend that is the asymptotic behavior of the number of aircraft required 
beyond a particular range. This occurs due to reaching peak saturation of operations for 
those variants. So for variants beyond 75% of the original design range of the large twin, 




Figure 141. Large Twin Aisle Utilization Sensitivity for Range Reduction on 
Number of Aircraft 
Capital cost trends are similar to total costs such that they will not be provided. A 
comparison of the total cost impact is available for the utilization and technology levels 
of the large twin aisle in Figure 142. Note that the columns represent the utilization level 
while the rows represent the technology level. The corresponding legend for the 
technology levels is on the right. Decreasing utilization has a profound impact on total 
cost with respect to range reduction. In particular, the results transition from near 
universal benefit on the left to approximately 75% benefits. Again, 0.1% represents $4.4b 











Figure 142. Large Twin Aisle Utilization Sensitivity for Range Reduction on Total 
Cost 
9.3 Intermediate Stop Distribution Variation 
Variation in the intermediate stop distribution could occur due to a difference in 
travel strategies between passenger types. Business or wealthier leisure travelers may 
ultimately prefer to pay an extra premium for a direct flight over having to make an 
additional stop. Or some airlines may not adopt the practice at all for logistical reasons. 
To address this, the range reduced vehicles and variant distributions from the range 
results are modeled with a 50-50 split of direct-intermediate stop flights for the selected 
operations and then the initial operating set as is with no modifications. Results for the 










The impact to fuel burn is quite significant at both technology levels. Figure 143 
demonstrates the sensitivity for the large twin aisle with baseline technology on the top 
row and future on the bottom. The columns read from intermediate stops to direct only. 
The impact for the baseline aircraft is around 0.2% greater minimum fuel burn for each 
transition. The intermediate stop and 50-50 strategies maintain the 60% variant at the 
minimum fuel burn aircraft but for direct operations, the 65% variant is fuel optimal. The 
introduction of future technology reduces the impact to 0.1% and the minimum fuel 
aircraft remains fixed at the 60% range design. 
 
Figure 143. Sensitivity of Intermediate Stop Adoption for Large Twin Aisle Fuel 
Burn – Range Reduction 
Total cost trends behave nearly identical to the fuel burn trends for the baseline 










selected variants for minimum metric are identical. Future technology behaves fairly 
similar; however, the aircraft that minimizes total costs remains the 55% design for all 
strategies. The most notable outcome from transitioning operating schemes is that the 
nearby variants provide benefits much closer to the 55% variant. For reference, 0.1% 
represents $4.4B over the 2006-2050 for a six week period. 
 
Figure 144. Sensitivity of Intermediate Stop Adoption for Total Cost – Range 
Reduction 
An analysis of the baseline technology noise sensitivity to the variation in 
operations is available in Figure 145. For the intermediate stop airports, the noise is 
reduced as expected but when transitioning the operations to the 50-50 split, the noise is 
also not halved but approximately 60% of the intermediate stop values. The other finding 
is that noise increases for all the other airport classes in moving from intermediate stops 










noise would remain in the same general magnitude as the no action. It turns out the 
increase in noise is due to a mix of the return of louder long range flights that utilize the 
long range variants and the noisier short range variants operating for short range flights. 
Combined, they actually increase noise. 
 
Figure 145. Noise Sensitivity to Intermediate Stop Adoption Variation – 55 dB 
Based on these findings, it would appear that varying the level of intermediate 
stops does not particularly impact the minimum fuel burn or cost aircraft all that 
significantly. That does not mean to say that 5% or 10% changes in range is small but the 
initial thought of this study was that the 70% or 75% SR variants would be 
predominantly more beneficial under direct flights and that was not the case. That being 
said, the change in magnitudes for all metrics is varied somewhat significantly such that 
benefits can be reduced by almost half for fuel burn and much less for cost metrics as the 
fuel savings are somewhat offset by the route and landing fees from using an additional 
stop. This also suggests that current aircraft designs are overdesigned with respect to 
range to accommodate a handful of select routes and that it would be far more 
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manufacture two variants. The latter strategy was somewhat considered with the 787-300 
but this aircraft was ultimately cancelled from a lack of interested buyers and program 
delays. 
9.4 Summary 
The trade studies conducted here have helped to quantify the sensitivities of 
mission specification changes to changes in economic and operational assumptions. If 
there is a significant drop in the price of oil, the financial appeal speed and range 
reduction becomes less appealing strategy even if it reduces uncertainty in operating 
costs. If there is a continued trend towards reduced crew and maintenance costs, this 
negative impact is mitigated but one must still address the increase in aircraft. Range 
reduction, and therefore intermediate stops, will largely be at the mercy of airports and 
operators will have to hope that landing fees do not significantly increase or this 
operational strategy will be much less appealing. 
Changes to the annual aircraft utilization assumptions were made to help address 
potential consequences due to baseline estimates potentially being too conservative for 
estimating the number of aircraft required. For speed reduction, those utilization changes 
result in many of the aircraft seat classes being no longer cost effective with 95% 
utilization as the higher capital costs offset the fuel savings and all seat classes being not 
cost effective at 90%. Range utilization reduction impacts all the variants but 
predominantly the longer range aircraft are more greatly impacted. This is due to how 
utilization reduction was modeled – the short range variant was reduced while the long 
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range variant was not as the assumption was that the short range variant was going to 
operate predominantly on intermediate stop routes. 
Variation in operational strategies from intermediate stops to direct flights shows 
a number of interesting trends. There are reductions in fuel savings as flights transition 
from intermediate stops to direct but this makes sense as it is the major driver of their 
usage. Depending on the design range of the variant, total operating costs could rise or 
decrease due to the interplay between fuel and landing costs. Shorter range variants see 
operating cost increases while the longer range variants see cost decreases. Additional 
concerns with respect to capital cost see that higher range aircraft see lower capital costs 
as the excess distance and flight time from intermediate stops is reduced. Although noise 
at intermediate stop airports is decreased by shifting back towards direct flights, the 
louder noise properties of the short range variants in combination with the noise longer 




CHAPTER  10 
CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 Conclusions 
This work began by examining the consequences that aviation growth will have 
on the environment and looked at some of the potential mitigation strategies that are 
being pursued to aid in reducing the severity of the future impact. This examination led to 
the observation that many of these efforts are predominantly vehicle or fleet level focused 
but that mission specification changes are vehicle level changes that could have 
significant fleet level implications based on the new design requirements. This motivated 
the research objective of this thesis. 
Research Objective: to create a methodology that will enable the evaluation of 
aircraft mission specification changes at the fleet level over a multitude of metrics. 
To address this objective, a literature review on mission specification changes was 
conducted to understand the state of the art. This identified a predominant number of 
studies that have been conducted that were focused only at the vehicle level, with only a 
fixed technology level, predominantly interested in fuel burn only, and one specification 
change of interest. A handful of these studies looked at the fleet but results were limited 
only to a fixed technology level, fuel burn, and only one year of fleet operations – 




This led to a series of research questions related to mission specification changes: 
Research Question 1: What other metrics should be considered when looking at 
mission specifications? 
Research Question 2: How does the introduction of mission specifications 
impact those metrics? 
Research Question 3: How does future growth impact the fleet level metrics? 
Research Question 4: How significantly different are the results comparing the 
immediate replacement vs evolution? 
Research Question 5: Does the introduction of advanced technology reduces the 
impact of mission specification changes? 
These questions led to additional literature reviews to eventually generate the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Fuel burn only analysis is insufficient to adequately capture the 
impact of mission specification changes at the fleet level. 
Hypothesis 2: Mission specification changes must be evaluated at the fleet level 
and forecasted into the future to capture the overall impact. 
Hypothesis 2a: Fleet evolution will be a significant contributor to reducing the 
overall impact of mission specification changes at the fleet level. 
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Hypothesis 3: Aircraft technology infusion will reduce the sensitivity of mission 
specification changes at the fleet level. 
When looking at range reduction, one also needs to consider the introduction of 
intermediate stop operations. This led to two additional questions and one more 
hypothesis: 
Research Question 6: How does one select intermediate airport locations? 
Research Question 7: How does airport location impact results in comparison to 
vehicle level analysis? 
Hypothesis 4: A graph theory approach can be used to modify an operations 
schedule to conduct intermediate stop operations analysis. 
To test the Hypotheses 1-3, a modeling and simulation environment was 
constructed that utilized a number of modeling and simulation tools to conduct vehicle 
design and fleet forecasting analysis. The metrics that were evaluated were fuel burn and 
certification NOx and noise on the vehicle side while the fleet level focused on fuel burn, 
NOx emissions, operating cost, capital cost, total cost, safety, and noise over a small set 
of airports. Three demonstration problems were then conducted to test the methodology: 
cruise speed reduction, design range reduction, and combined speed and range reduction. 
Five reference vehicles were used to design and evaluate mission specification 
changes that covered the following passenger levels: regional jet, single aisle, small twin 
aisle, large twin aisle, and large quad. A technology package was identified through 
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literature reviews of current technology programs based on an approximate entry into 
service date of 2024. These impacted both the engine and airframe such that the 
interdependencies between the different technologies could be modeled. Mission 
specification changes were first evaluated at the vehicle level to determine suitability for 
fleet level consideration. 
Cruise speed reduction found that all aircraft benefit from this specification 
change and therefore moved on to fleet analysis. In testing Hypothesis 1, the results 
found that all five seat classes have different cruise speeds at the fleet level depending on 
the metrics of interest. Looking at fuel burn encourages much lower Mach numbers than 
when one considers operating costs and even more so from the inclusion of capital cost. 
As a part of testing Hypothesis 2, it was found that three of the seat classes had the same 
cruise speed for minimum fuel burn in both the vehicle and fleet level with baseline 
technology; however, the regional jet and large twin aisle showed that the fleet minimum 
was slower than the vehicle level, indicating that the operational utilization was 
predominantly much less than the design range. The addition of technology supported 
this as well. A comparison of the two replacement strategies was conducted to evaluate 
Hypothesis 2a and it found that when forecasting results to 2050 while baseline 
technology results ultimately ended up almost the same, the future technology results did 
not and result in an overestimation of fuel burn savings due to immediate replacement of 
2.7% for the baseline vehicles and 9.4% for the future. Finally a comparison of the 
impacts of speed reduction, technology, and their pairing was conducted to test 
Hypothesis 3. With respect to fuel burn, the impact was reduced by a quarter while the 
271 
 
operating cost and total cost were much more significantly impacted. This analysis 
largely supports all the hypotheses considered in this sample problem. 
Range reduction found that the regional jet and single aisle aircraft did not benefit 
from range reduction and intermediate stops and were excluded from fleet analysis. The 
other three aircraft did and required first to identify which operations benefits from their 
usage and then modification to implement them. The development of an intermediate 
stop modeling capability serves as a demonstration of Hypothesis 4. The test of 
Hypothesis 1 resulted in analysis indicating that the variants producing minimum fuel 
burn and operating cost were the same and when considering capital cost, was constant 
for the small twin and large quad. The large twin reduced to the minimum range variant 
as it yields significantly lower capital costs. In testing Hypothesis 2, it was found that 
with intermediate stops, the small twin and large quad aircraft share the same minimum 
fuel burn results as their vehicle counterpart while the large twin had a slightly larger 
range at the fleet level. The evaluation of Hypothesis 2a showed similar results to speed 
reduction and fuel savings over predictions from immediate replacement of 1.7% and 
7.9% for the baseline and future vehicles from entry into service to 2050. Regarding the 
impact that technology has on range reduction, Hypothesis 3 tests found that future 
technology reduces fuel savings by 40%, operating cost savings by 45%, and total cost 
savings by 12%. The cost savings reduction is also heavily influenced by the increase in 
capital cost from introducing technology. This analysis does not support Hypotheses 1 or 
2 but Hypotheses 2a and 3 are still supported. 
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Based on the results of the speed and range results, the small twin, large twin, and 
large quad were evaluated for joint speed and range reduction, with the respective speed 
reduced regional jet and single aisle included. In testing Hypothesis 1, the minimum 
results for fuel burn, operating cost, and total cost all showed trends that were quite 
similar to speed and range individually. The cruise speeds of the joint aircraft varied 
depending on the metric while the ranges did not vary except when capital cost was 
considered. Hypothesis 2 showed that the speed elements of joint reduction did not vary 
between vehicle and fleet level analysis; however, their interaction with range did draw 
the small twin fleet minimum fuel burn to a range that was larger than the vehicle level 
minimum. Overprediction from immediate replacement was against present in comparing 
the two replacement strategies with 4.6% more fuel savings reported for the baseline and 
10.7% for the future in testing Hypothesis 2a. Baseline technology results become almost 
the same with this approach but the future technology results are still separated by a large 
gap. With respect to Hypothesis 3, technology with joint reduction reduced fuel savings 
by 30%, operating cost savings by 50%, and total cost savings by 25%.  
Trade studies were conducted to evaluate how significant variations in the 
assumptions impact the outcomes from the speed and range analysis. These assumptions 
were changes in all five cost inputs, aircraft utilization assumptions, and variation of 
intermediate stops operations from full use to none. For increases in fuel price, both 
specification changes become more desirable and less so if they decrease. Increases to 
crew and maintenance rates by 50% will drive cruise speed preferences closer to the 
baseline speed. Route fee changes have minimal impact to range reduction while landing 
273 
 
fees can have a pretty significant impact with respect to what range variant is necessary 
to break even. Aircraft utilization reductions by even 5% have a significant increase in 
capital costs and ultimately eliminate the cost feasibility of speed reduction while range 
reduction is affected but far less significantly. Finally, a variation of intermediate stop 
feasibility has a strong impact on fuel burn savings but mixed impacts on cost. Both fuel 
savings and landing fees are reduced which results in higher costs for the short range 
variants but additional savings for the long range aircraft. Noise is also alleviated at the 
intermediate stop airports but increases slightly at the larger traffic airports due to 
interactions between the longer range flights and the noisier short range variants. 
10.2 Future Opportunities 
In the process of conducting this research, a number of potential future endeavors 
were found. The first is modifying the vehicle design requirements. In the process of 
designing the mission specification modified vehicles, the only objective was minimizing 
the design mission fuel burn. This resulted in very similar noise performance for those 
aircraft to the baseline variants. If one were to add noise or other metrics as a part of the 
evaluation process, the overall results will be much different. Additional considerations 
could be made to the vehicle performance constraints, especially with the addition of 
technology. This may result in higher fuel burn but could potentially reduce the noise 
impact of these aircraft and provide some insight to how much fuel burn savings would 
be sacrificed to get a certain level of noise reduction. 
Another observation that came up in doing this work is the limitations that occur 
when one does not consider tail-tracking. Aircraft do not fly the same route back and 
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forth for their entire lifespan but fly the routes where the airlines need them for future 
flights. An example might be a flight departing from San Francisco to New York then 
goes to Miami, Houston, and finally back to San Francisco. Each one of those flights has 
a departure time that is set based on a number of constraints. If cruise speed reduction 
were to disrupt one of those legs, then a different aircraft would have to fill that 
operation. This may not have any significant consequence to the airline if the original 
aircraft can fit into a later flight. Similar considerations would need to be made for range 
reduction. To do this analysis, one would need a reference time period, say a week or 
two, to conduct this analysis and then re-optimize the schedule around mission 
specification changes. This would give a more realistic picture of changes to the number 
of aircraft required as well as critical logistical changes that would occur. Ideally, one 
could also forecast that reference period into a future year and conduct similar analysis 
with more operations. 
Finally, the observation from all three sample problems is that mission 
specification changes with and without future technology are not a silver bullet in 
reducing the environmental impact of aviation. Logically, the next step is to evaluate 
other mitigation strategies that could be used to determine how significant their impact is 
at the fleet level. If it turns out there is no single mitigation strategy that is capable of 
doing this on its own, then the next step would be to develop a trade environment 
between mitigation strategies such that one can make informed decisions between what 
combinations would reduce the environmental impact of aviation and whether they have 




This work provided several contributions to understanding the impact of mission 
specification changes in both aircraft design and fleet environmental analysis. The 
primary contribution is the development of a methodology that one can use to evaluate 
the implications of mission specification changes from the aircraft design level and up 
through the fleet level. This enables one to have a repeatable process to expand on if 
other metrics come of interest or different approaches to modeling specification changes 
are desired. 
The second is the analysis of speed reduction, range reduction, and their 
combination on metrics beyond fuel burn at both the vehicle and fleet level. Much of 
literature has only focused on the fuel burn savings at the vehicle level and that does not 
paint the entire picture of the impact of specification changes. Speed reduction is 
particularly sensitive to cost changes such that increases in certain costs will drive 
airlines towards faster aircraft regardless of fuel savings. Range reduction is much less 
sensitive to cost impacts except for landing fees but the potential safety implications as 
well as noise impacts at the intermediate stop airports may make this strategy infeasible. 
The third contribution is a clear approach on how one should consider modeling 
and evaluating intermediate stops. Existing literature treats this process as a vague step 
when in reality, it is just as critical as vehicle design and fleet analysis. Criteria for airport 
selection stem from real physical constraints regarding aircraft size and this is essential to 
preventing selection of airports that cannot feasibly handle them. A graph theory 
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approach is utilized to identify and select routes based on viable distance and aircraft 
performance. 
The fourth is the importance of fleet forecasting and future technology to 
evaluating the impact of mission specifications. Traditional fleet level analysis in this 
area has largely focused on utilizing only one fixed year set of operations and applying 
the vehicles directly to determine the fleet level impact, which neglects the impact of 
future growth. While baseline technology level results may not particularly sensitive to 
this, future technology results are such that it can lead to expectations greater than what 
could feasibly happen. Additionally, the infusion of technology can offset some of the 
financial benefits of adopting mission specifications such that its consideration in 
analysis is important as mission specifications, just like technologies, have to buy their 




APPENDIX A INTERMEDIATE STOP ANALYSIS SOURCE CODE 
This section contains the source code used for the intermediate stop operations 
generation, analysis, and selection. The main executable is on the following page called 
ISO_calculate. It sets up some of the assumptions as well as the associated file names 
where data is located. ISO_calculate also calls the three main functions. 
AirportSetup reads in all the airport data as well as calculates the great circle 
distance between all the input airports for rapid route generation. It requires the lat and 
long data of all the airports and uses the function greatcircledistance.m, which follows 
immediately after airportSetup. Note that any filtering based on runway length and width 
must be done as the code does not conduct any of that analysis itself. 
CalculateIntermediateAirports conducts all the distance constraint analysis and 
generates all the prospective flight paths that should be considered for the performance 
step. This iterates between all input routes of interest before moving to assess 
performance. 
CalculateIntermediatePerformance does all the fuel burn and cost analysis based 
in input aircraft data. The current assumption is that aircraft data is input as a second 
order function of fuel burn and block time as a function of flown distance. If one wishes 
to directly call an analysis tool, this will need to be developed independently. It was felt 
that it would be far more rapid to use a surrogate of the code rather than direct calls as the 
number of prospective flights grows with the number of airports and routes considered. 
Some code was written to aid in world plot generation and that is made available 
for future convenience to anyone that wishes to use it. Finally, the input files for the 





% MAIN PROGRAM FOR INTERMEDIATE STOP OPERATIONS % 
 
             %SETUP% 
% Route Generation Inputs 
  % contains airport id number, lat/long information, and airport region 
  % code 
airportsfile = 'airports3.csv'; 
  % contains airport identifier pairs and the aircraft identifier numbers 
  % for each route 
odpairsfile = 'odpairs2.csv'; 
GCratio = 1.2; 
LBratio = 0.1; 
 
% Route Evaluation Inputs 
  % contains aircraft identifier number and performance surrogates for fuel burn and block time - 
  % quadratic fit 
acdata = importdata('aircraft_data.csv'); 
aircraftdata = acdata.data; 
seatclass = 7; 
fuelprice = 3; 
  % both are seat class across 
crewcost = [190.06 449.72 449.72 475.76 562.59 777.88 886.08 972.88 1165.95 1336.87]; 
maintenancecost = [276.32 421.1 421.1 421.1 511.79 511.79 511.79 574.64 574.64 574.64]; 
 
  % seat class down, region across 
landingfees = csvread('landingfees.csv'); 
  % seat class down, route group across 
routefees = csvread('routefees.csv'); 
 
routearray.setup = 'false'; 
 
% Read in airport information and create a distance matrix between all 
% airports 
[airports, GCmatrix] = airportSetup(airportsfile); 
% Create the prospective routes based on the airports used and the distance 
% between them for the odpairs that are input 
[routes, routearray] = calculateIntermediateAirports(airports, GCmatrix, odpairsfile, GCratio, 
LBratio, routearray); 
% Calculate the performance of the aircraft assigned along the routes of 
% interest 
[fuel_cost, routearray] = calculateIntermediatePerformance(airports, routes, odpairsfile, 




function [airports, GCmatrix] = airportSetup(airportsfile) 
% for a given input list of airport indentifiers and associated lat/long 
% coordinates, this calculates the great circle distance between  
% 
% INPUTS: 
% airportsfile = string containing the name of the csv file with the 
%    airport information 
% 
% OUTPUT: 
% airports = airport array from the csv file 
% GCmatrix = matrix containing the great circle distance between all the 
%    airport pairs - note this is an upper triangular matrix 
 
% read in the airprot data and find the total number of airports 
airports = csvread(airportsfile); 
apcnt = size(airports,1); 
 
% size the distance matrix appropriately 
GCmatrix = zeros(apcnt); 
 
% for each airport, run through and calculate the great circle distance 
%    between it and the others remaining on its row. this matrix is an 
%    upper triangular as it is symmetrical 
for i=1:apcnt, 
   lat1 = airports(airports(:,1)==airports(i,1),2); 
   long1 = airports(airports(:,1)==airports(i,1),3); 
   for j=i:apcnt, 
       lat2 = airports(airports(:,1)==airports(j,1),2); 
       long2 = airports(airports(:,1)==airports(j,1),3); 
       gcdist = greatCircleDistance(lat1*pi/180,long1*pi/180,lat2*pi/180,long2*pi/180) * 
0.539957; 
       % greatCircleDistance uses radians so lat/long needs to be converted 
       GCmatrix(i,j) = gcdist; 
   end 





function d = greatCircleDistance(phi_s, lambda_s, phi_f, lambda_f, r) 
% compute the great circle distance given lat and long for two points  
% optionally, a fifth parameter (r) can be specified. If this paramter 
% isn't specified it's assumed to be the mean radius of the earth. The  
% calculation is done using the Vincenty formula. 
% 
% INPUTS: 
% phi_s    = latitude of the standpoint (base) [rad] 
% lambda_s = longitude of the standpoint (base) [rad] 
% phi_f    = latitude of the forepoint (destination) [rad] 
% lambda_f = longitude of the forepoint (destination) [rad] 
% r        = radius of the sphere [units determine units of d] 
% 
% OUTPUT: 
% d        = great circle distance from standpoint to forepoint 
% 
% See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great-circle_distance 
 
% If no arguments, bail out 
if nargin < 4 
    fprintf('Usage: greatCircleDistance(phi_s, lambda_s, phi_f, lambda_f, r)\n') 
    return 
end 
 
% If no radius supplied, assume the mean radius of the earth in km 
if nargin < 5 
    r = 6371.01; % km 
end 
 
% convert from degrees minutes seconds to radians as needed 
if isstruct(phi_s) || (length(phi_s) > 1 && ~isstruct(phi_s)) 
    phi_s = dms2r(phi_s); 
end 
if isstruct(lambda_s) || (length(lambda_s) > 1 && ~isstruct(lambda_s)) 
    lambda_s = dms2r(lambda_s); 
end 
if isstruct(phi_f) || (length(phi_f) > 1 && ~isstruct(phi_f)) 
    phi_f = dms2r(phi_f); 
end 
if isstruct(lambda_f) || (length(lambda_f) > 1 && ~isstruct(lambda_f)) 
    lambda_f = dms2r(lambda_f); 
end 
 
% Compute Delta lambda (delta longitude) 
Delta_lambda = lambda_f - lambda_s; 
 
% Compute Delta sigma (central angle) 




    sin(phi_s)*sin(phi_f) + cos(phi_s)*cos(phi_f)*cos(Delta_lambda)); 
 
d = r*Delta_sigma; 
 
function r = dms2r(dms) 
 
if isstruct(dms) 
    r = sign(dms.deg)*(abs(dms.deg) + (dms.min + dms.sec/60)/60)*pi/180; 
elseif length(dms) == 3 
    r = sign(dms(1))*(abs(dms(1)) + (dms(2) + dms(3)/60)/60)*pi/180; 
elseif length(dms) == 2 
    r = sign(dms(1))*(abs(dms(1)) + dms(2)/60)*pi/180; 
else 




function [routes, routearray] = calculateIntermediateAirports(airports, GCmatrix, odpairsfile, 
GCratio, LBratio, routearray) 
% for a given input list of airport indentifiers and associated lat/long 
% coordinates, this calculates the great circle distance between  
% 
% INPUTS: 
% airports    = matrix containing all the airport information 
% GCmatrix    = matrix containing the great circle distance between all 
% odpairsfile = string containing the name of the odpairs for analysis 
% GCratio     = the ratio for which the threshold for neglecting a route 
%    of a distance beyond the initial great circle distance 
%    threshold = GCratio * (baseline GCdistance) 
% LBratio     = the ratio for which the threshold for including an airport based 
%    on distance from the departure or arrival airports 
% 
% OUTPUT: 
% routes      = matrix of dimensions: # airports x 6 x # routes 
%  the six columns are origin airport, intermediate airport, destination 
%               airport, segment 1 distance, segment 2 distance, total distance 
% routearray = storage array for all major data 
 
% read in the odpairs data and find the total number of routes 
odpairs = csvread(odpairsfile); 
odct = size(odpairs,1); 
 
% create a matrix to store all the prospective route information 
apcnt = size(airports,1); 
routes = zeros(apcnt,6,odct);  
debug = zeros(apcnt,6); 
% loop through each odpair 
for r=1:odct, 
    % locates the correct row for distance calculations and the initial 
    %    great circle distance 
    deprow = find(airports(:,1)==odpairs(r,1)); 
    arrrow = find(airports(:,1)==odpairs(r,2)); 
    gcdist = GCmatrix(deprow,arrrow); 
    if(gcdist == 0) 
        gcdist = GCmatrix(arrrow,deprow); 
    end 
     
    % adds the initial route to the routes matrix 
    routect = 1; 
    disp(r); 
    routes(routect,:,r) = [odpairs(r,1) 0 odpairs(r,2) gcdist 0 gcdist]; 
    debug(routect,:) = [odpairs(r,1) 0 odpairs(r,2) gcdist 0 gcdist]; 
    routect = routect + 1; 
 
%   prospective route generation calculations 
%   - loop through that row in the matrix to evaluate routes 
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%       if a segment distance is greater than the GC distance, ignore it 
%       if the total distance is greater than GCratio * baseline GC 
%          distance, ignore it 
%       if both conditions met, then add to a matrix storing all the 
%          prospective routes 
    for k=1:apcnt, 
        if(airports(k,1) ~= odpairs(1,1) && airports(k,1) ~= odpairs(1,2)) 
            seg1 = GCmatrix(deprow,k); 
            seg2 = GCmatrix(k,arrrow); 
            % as the matrix is upper triangular, inverse reference if the 
            %    distance is 0 
            if(seg1 == 0) 
                seg1 = GCmatrix(k,deprow); 
            end 
            if(seg2 == 0) 
                seg2 = GCmatrix(arrrow,k); 
            end 
            routedist = seg1 + seg2; 
             
            % evaluate conditions 
            if(seg1 >= gcdist || seg2 >= gcdist || routedist > GCratio * gcdist || seg1 <= LBratio * 
gcdist || seg2 <= LBratio * gcdist) 
            else 
                routes(routect,:,r) = [odpairs(r,1) airports(k,1) odpairs(r,2) seg1 seg2 routedist]; 
                debug(routect,:) = [odpairs(r,1) airports(k,1) odpairs(r,2) seg1 seg2 routedist]; 
                routect = routect + 1; 
            end 
        end 
    end 





function [fuel_cost, routearray] = calculateIntermediatePerformance(airports, routes, odpairsfile, 
aircraftdata, fuelprice, crewcost, maintenancecost, landingfees, routefees, seatclass, routearray) 
 
% for a given input list of routes, this determines the performance and cost information for all  
% relevant aircraft 
% 
% INPUTS: 
% airports    = matrix containing all the airport information 
% routes      = matrix of dimensions: # airports x 6 x # routes 
% odpairsfile = string containing the name of the odpairs for analysis 
% aircraftdata = input array of surrogate data for aircraft performance 
% aircraft name, aircraft id, fuel burn coefficients, block time coefficients 
% fuel price = price of fuel 
% crewcost = crew cost array organized by seat class 
% maintenancecost = maintenance cost array organized by seat class 
% landingfees = landing fees organized by airport region 
% routefees = route fees organized by route group and seat class 
% seatclass = input setting for the associated seat class of interest 
% routearray = storage array for all major data 
% 
% OUTPUT: 
% fuel_cost      = matrix of dimensions: # airports x 6 x # routes 
% the six columns are origin airport, intermediate airport, destination 
%    airport, segment 1 distance, segment 2 distance, total distance 
% routearray = storage array for all major data 
 
 
odct = size(routearray,2); 
fuel_cost = zeros(size(routes,1),10,5,odct); 
odpairs = csvread(odpairsfile); 
 
routegroupmatrix = [18 17 6 17 17 1 2; 
                    17 19 5 4 10 4 4; 
                    6 5 20 3 7 1 2; 
                    17 4 3 21 17 9 21; 
                    17 10 7 17 22 1 2; 
                    1 4 1 9 1 23 8; 
                    2 4 2 21 2 8 21]; 
 
for i=1:odct, 
    apcnt = size(routearray(i).routes,1); 
    disp(i); 
    for j=1:apcnt, 
        accnt = 1; 
        while (accnt + 2 <= size(odpairs,2)) && (odpairs(i,2+accnt) ~= 0) 
            fuel_s1 = aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),2) + aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),3) * 
routes(j,4,i)+ aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),4) * routes(j,4,i)^2; 
            fuel_s2 = aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),2) + aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),3) * 
routes(j,5,i)+ aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),4) * routes(j,5,i)^2; 
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            if(routes(j,5,i) == 0) 
                fuel_s2 = 0; 
            end 
            tot_fuel = fuel_s1 + fuel_s2; 
             
            % cost calculation 
            time_s1 = aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),5) + aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),6) * 
routes(j,4,i)+ aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),7) * routes(j,4,i)^2; 
            time_s2 = aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),5) + aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),6) * 
routes(j,5,i)+ aircraftdata(odpairs(i,2+accnt),7) * routes(j,5,i)^2; 
            if(routes(j,5,i) == 0) 
                time_s2 = 0; 
            end 
            routegroup1 = 
routegroupmatrix(airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j,1,i)),4),airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j
,2,i)),4)); 
            routegroup2 = 
routegroupmatrix(airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j,2,i)),4),airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j
,3,i)),4)); 
            if(routes(j,5) == 0) 
                routegroup1 = 
routegroupmatrix(airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j,1,i)),4),airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j
,3,i)),4)); 
                %routegroup2 = 0; 
            end 
            cost_s1 = fuelprice * fuel_s1 * 2.20/6.71 + time_s1 * (crewcost(seatclass+1) + 
maintenancecost(seatclass+1)) + 0.539957 * routes(j,4,i) * routefees(seatclass+1,routegroup1) + 
landingfees(seatclass+1,airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j,2,i)),4)); 
            cost_s2 = fuelprice * fuel_s2 * 2.20/6.71 + time_s2 * (crewcost(seatclass+1) + 
maintenancecost(seatclass+1)) + 0.539957 * routes(j,5,i) * routefees(seatclass+1,routegroup2) + 
landingfees(seatclass+1,airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j,3,i)),4)); 
            if(routes(j,5,i) == 0) 
                cost_s2 = 0; 
                cost_s1 = fuelprice * fuel_s1 * 2.20/6.71 + time_s1 * (crewcost(seatclass+1) + 
maintenancecost(seatclass+1)) + 0.539957 * routes(j,4,i) * routefees(seatclass+1,routegroup1) + 
landingfees(seatclass+1,airports(find(airports(:,1)==routes(j,3,i)),4)); 
            end             
            tot_cost = cost_s1 + cost_s2; 
             
            fuel_cost(j,:,accnt,i) = [routes(j,1,i) routes(j,2,i) routes(j,3,i) odpairs(i,2+accnt) fuel_s1 
fuel_s2 tot_fuel cost_s1 cost_s2 tot_cost]; 
            routearray(i).aircraft(accnt).id = odpairs(i,2+accnt); 
            routearray(i).aircraft(accnt).fuelburn(j,:) = [fuel_s1 fuel_s2 tot_fuel]; 
            routearray(i).aircraft(accnt).cost(j,:) = [cost_s1 cost_s2 tot_cost]; 
            accnt = accnt + 1; 
        end 









model = 'LTA'; 
ISOflag = 0; 
 
if(strcmp('STA',model) == 1) 
    csvfile = 'STA-flights.csv'; 
    csv2 = 'STA-ISO.csv'; 
elseif(strcmp('LTA',model) == 1) 
    csvfile = 'LTA-flights.csv'; 
    csv2 = 'LTA-ISO.csv'; 
else 
    csvfile = 'LQ-flights.csv'; 








flights = csvread(csvfile); 
flights2 = csvread(csv2); 
 
ilimit = size(flights,1); 
jlimit = size(flights2,1); 
 
for i = 1:ilimit 
 
%[lat,lon] = track2(lat1,lon1,lat2,lon2) 
% Need to iterate on this function to do all of it! 
    latdep = flights(i,1); 
    londep = flights(i,2); 
    latarr = flights(i,3); 
    lonarr = flights(i,4); 
    [lat2,long2] = track2(latdep, londep, latarr, lonarr); 




for j = 1:jlimit 
 
%[lat,lon] = track2(lat1,lon1,lat2,lon2) 
% Need to iterate on this function to do all of it! 
    latdep = flights2(j,1); 
    londep = flights2(j,2); 
    if(ISOflag == 0) 
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        latarr = flights2(j,5); 
        lonarr = flights2(j,6); 
        [lat2,long2] = track2(latdep, londep, latarr, lonarr); 
        plotm(lat2,long2,'r'); 
    else 
        latiso = flights2(j,3); 
        loniso = flights2(j,4); 
        latarr = flights2(j,5); 
        lonarr = flights2(j,6); 
        [lat2,long2] = track2(latdep, londep, latiso, loniso); 
        plotm(lat2,long2,'r'); 
        [lat2,long2] = track2(latiso, loniso, latarr, lonarr); 
        plotm(lat2,long2,'r'); 
















airports = csvread('airports_example.csv'); 












ax = worldmap('World'); 
setm(ax, 'Origin', [0 180 0]) 
%worldmap world; 




flights = csvread('results.csv'); 
 
ilimit = size(flights,1); 
 
for i = 1:ilimit 
 
%[lat,lon] = track2(lat1,lon1,lat2,lon2) 
% Need to iterate on this function to do all of it! 
    j = ilimit - i + 1; 
    if(j == 1) 
        latdep = flights(j,1); 
        londep = flights(j,2); 
        latarr = flights(j,5); 
        lonarr = flights(j,6); 
        [lat2,long2] = track2(latdep, londep, latarr, lonarr); 
        plotm(lat2,long2,'b','LineWidth',3); 
    else 
        latdep = flights(j,1); 
        londep = flights(j,2); 
        latiso = flights(j,3); 
        loniso = flights(j,4); 
        latarr = flights(j,5); 
        lonarr = flights(j,6); 
        [lat2,long2] = track2(latdep, londep, latiso, loniso); 
        if(j == 2) 
            plotm(lat2,long2,'r','LineWidth',3); 
        else 
            plotm(lat2,long2,'k','LineWidth',1.5); 
        end 
        [lat2,long2] = track2(latiso, loniso, latarr, lonarr); 
        if(j == 2) 
            plotm(lat2,long2,'r','LineWidth',3); 
        else 
            plotm(lat2,long2,'k','LineWidth',1.5); 
        end 




Input vehicle information 
Note that the heading rows are provided only for context for the reader. They should be 
removed in implementation. Additionally, the airports list has been split to be included all on one 
page. It should be only fifty three rows by three columns (CITY NAMES SHOULD BE 
REMOVED – they are provided for reference). 
Vehicle Name TotFB a TotFB b TotFB c TotBT a TotBT b TotBT c 
B747 G2 5624.4001 16.598963 0.0010421 0.169425666 0.002040988 2.33E-10 
 





APT_ID LAT LON City APT_ID LAT LON City 
1 24.44339 54.65271 Abu Dhabi 28 52.30861 4.763889 Amsterdam 
2 25.25142 55.37056 Dubai 29 -37.0081 174.7917 Auckland 
3 -37.6733 144.8433 Melbourne 30 -43.4889 172.5322 Christchurch 
4 -33.9461 151.1772 Sydney 31 -12.0219 -77.1143 Lima 
5 48.93702 -54.5681 Gander 32 10.30754 123.9794 Philippines 
6 43.67722 -79.6306 Toronto 33 14.50865 121.0196 Philippines 
7 45.68042 -74.0387 Montreal 34 55.9727 37.4148 Moscow 
8 23.39244 113.2988 Guangzhou  35 41.98165 -87.9067 Chicago 
9 40.07244 116.5975 Beijing 36 39.04884 -84.6678 Cincinnati 
10 31.14409 121.7924 Shanghai 37 32.89683 -97.038 Dallas 
11 50.03331 8.570456 Frankfurt 38 39.86167 -104.673 Denver 
12 40.49544 -3.56011 Madrid 39 42.21244 -83.3534 Detroit 
13 -17.755 177.4438 Fiji 40 42.36297 -71.0064 Boston 
14 49.01278 2.55 Paris 41 29.98443 -95.3414 Houston 
15 51.14806 -0.19028 London 42 33.63672 -84.4281 Atlanta 
16 51.4775 -0.46139 London 43 21.31868 -157.922 Honolulu 
17 13.48387 144.7972 Guam 44 40.63975 -73.7789 New York City 
18 -6.12572 106.6565 Indonesia 45 33.9425 -118.408 Los Angeles 
19 41.80448 12.2508 Rome 46 25.79536 -80.2901 Miami 
20 34.85842 136.8054 Nagoya 47 40.6925 -74.1687 Newark 
21 34.43361 135.2336 Osaka 48 39.87225 -75.2409 Philadelphia 
22 35.77706 140.3824 Tokyo 49 33.43428 -112.012 Phoenix 
23 37.46414 126.4405 Seoul 50 40.78839 -111.978 Salt Lake City 
24 33.36743 -7.58996 Morocco 51 37.61897 -122.375 San Francisco 
25 19.43644 -99.0719 Mexico City 52 61.17408 -149.998 Anchorage 
26 2.745578 101.7099 Malaysia 53 38.94744 -77.4599 Washington DC 




APPENDIX B SPEED REDUCTION FIGURES 
This appendix contains figures for the vehicles not included in the speed reduction 
chapter as well as respective aircraft prices. For vehicle design and fleet analysis, this is 
the single aisle, small twin aisle, and large quad. 
 






























Figure 147. SA Fuel Burn Impact of Speed Reduction 
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Figure 149. SA Operating Cost Impact of Speed Reduction 
 
 
































Base - Des Range Base - Econ Range





























Figure 151. STA Fuel Burn Impact of Speed Reduction 
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Figure 153. STA Operating Cost Impact of Speed Reduction 
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Figure 155. LTA Speed Reduction Aircraft Prices 
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Figure 157. Impact of Speed Reduction on the LQ Flight Time 
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Figure 159. LQ Speed Reduction Aircraft Prices 
 
 



















































FB Ops Cost Capital Cost
Total Cost NOx Accidents
299 
 















0.78 -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.76 -0.17% -0.04% 0.13% 0.00% -0.19% 0.51% 0.19% 
0.74 -0.26% -0.02% 0.34% 0.06% -0.32% 0.98% 0.37% 
0.72 -0.42% -0.06% 0.47% 0.06% -0.63% 1.43% 0.53% 
0.70 -0.52% -0.04% 0.72% 0.14% -0.72% 2.04% 0.76% 
0.68 -0.47% 0.06% 0.98% 0.28% -0.85% 2.52% 0.94% 
0.66 -0.43% 0.17% 1.31% 0.44% -0.92% 3.09% 1.15% 
 
 


























FB Ops Cost Capital Cost
Total Cost NOx Accidents
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0.80 -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.78 -0.25% -0.12% 0.04% -0.08% -0.32% 0.19% 0.09% 
0.76 -0.55% -0.27% 0.07% -0.19% -0.61% 0.39% 0.20% 
0.74 -0.70% -0.31% 0.18% -0.20% -0.85% 0.59% 0.30% 
0.72 -0.79% -0.32% 0.33% -0.17% -0.99% 0.83% 0.42% 
0.70 -0.87% -0.31% 0.48% -0.13% -1.09% 1.06% 0.53% 
0.68 -0.75% -0.18% 0.75% 0.04% -1.31% 1.30% 0.65% 
0.66 -0.25% -0.12% 0.04% -0.08% -0.32% 0.19% 0.09% 
 
 




























FB Ops Cost Capital Cost
Total Cost NOx Accidents
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0.85 -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% -0.00% -0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.83 -0.23% -0.13% 0.03% -0.09% -0.31% 0.12% 0.03% 
0.81 -0.38% -0.20% 0.16% -0.12% -0.57% 0.29% 0.07% 
0.79 -0.46% -0.23% 0.28% -0.11% -0.73% 0.44% 0.10% 
0.77 -0.55% -0.27% 0.41% -0.11% -1.01% 0.60% 0.14% 
0.75 -0.67% -0.32% 0.57% -0.11% -1.26% 0.75% 0.17% 
0.73 -0.39% -0.12% 0.95% 0.13% -1.33% 0.91% 0.21% 
 
 











































Figure 164. SA Future Cumulative Speed Reduction Fleet Results 
 















0.78 -5.13% -3.33% 5.01% -1.39% -12.74% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.76 -5.23% -3.35% 4.99% -1.41% -12.93% 0.37% 0.11% 
0.74 -5.35% -3.39% 5.00% -1.44% -13.40% 0.64% 0.19% 
0.72 -5.39% -3.34% 5.27% -1.34% -13.52% 1.24% 0.36% 
0.70 -5.42% -3.31% 5.29% -1.30% -13.56% 1.68% 0.49% 
0.68 -5.44% -3.25% 5.65% -1.18% -13.62% 2.19% 0.64% 
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Figure 165. STA Future Cumulative Speed Reduction Fleet Results 
 















0.80 -5.13% -3.33% 5.01% -1.39% -12.74% 0.00% 0.00% 
0.78 -5.31% -3.41% 4.99% -1.45% -13.31% 0.18% 0.07% 
0.76 -5.45% -3.46% 4.95% -1.51% -13.55% 0.35% 0.14% 
0.74 -5.52% -3.47% 4.98% -1.51% -13.69% 0.53% 0.20% 
0.72 -5.55% -3.45% 5.07% -1.47% -13.82% 0.74% 0.28% 
0.70 -5.57% -3.43% 5.12% -1.44% -13.94% 0.92% 0.35% 
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Figure 166. LQ Future Cumulative Speed Reduction Fleet Results 
 















0.85 -5.13% -3.33% 5.01% -1.39% -12.74% 0.00% -5.13% 
0.83 -5.25% -3.39% 4.97% -1.45% -12.90% 0.14% -5.25% 
0.81 -5.35% -3.44% 4.99% -1.47% -13.12% 0.27% -5.35% 
0.79 -5.43% -3.47% 5.07% -1.48% -13.40% 0.40% -5.43% 
0.77 -5.51% -3.50% 5.15% -1.49% -13.58% 0.54% -5.51% 
0.75 -5.52% -3.49% 5.23% -1.46% -13.62% 0.70% -5.52% 
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APPENDIX C RANGE REDUCTION FIGURES 
This appendix contains figures for the vehicles not included in the range reduction 
chapter as well as respective aircraft prices. For vehicle design, this is the single aisle, 
small twin aisle, and large quad. The intermediate stop feasibility of the small twin and 
large quad are provided. Finally, fleet analysis of the small twin and large quad are 
included. 
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Figure 169. SA Operating Cost Impact of Range Reduction 
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Figure 171. SA Operating Cost Impact of Range Reduction on Economic Mission 
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Figure 173. STA Operating Cost Impact of Range Reduction 
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Figure 175. STA Operating Cost Impact of Range Reduction on Economic Mission 
 
 



























































Figure 177. LTA Range Reduction Aircraft Prices 
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Figure 179. LQ Fuel Burn Impact of Range Reduction 
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Figure 181. LQ Operating Cost Impact of Range Reduction on Economic Missions 
 
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 187. STA Fleet Fuel Burn Range Reduction Sensitivity 
 
Figure 188. STA Fleet NOx Range Reduction Sensitivity 
 







Figure 190. STA Fleet Capital Cost Range Reduction Sensitivity 
 
Figure 191. STA Fleet Total Cost Range Reduction Sensitivity 
 







Figure 193. LQ Fleet NOx Range Reduction Sensitivity 
 
Figure 194. LQ Fleet Operating Cost Range Reduction Sensitivity 
 







Figure 196. LQ Fleet Total Cost Range Reduction Sensitivity 
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APPENDIX D JOINT REDUCTION FIGURES 
This appendix contains figures for the vehicles not included in the joint reduction 
chapter as well as respective aircraft prices. For vehicle design, this is the small twin aisle 
and large quad. The intermediate stop feasibility of the small twin and large quad is not 
included as cruise speed does not significantly impact results. Finally, fleet analysis of 
the small twin and large quad are included. 
 











Figure 199. STA Joint Design Mission Operating Cost Performance 
 












Figure 201. STA Joint Economic Mission Operating Cost Performance 
 
Figure 202. STA Joint Aircraft Prices 
 










































Figure 207. LQ Joint Economic Mission Operating Cost Performance 
 














Figure 209. STA Joint Reduction Fuel Burn Fleet Impact 
 
Figure 210. STA Joint Reduction NOx Fleet Impact 
 







Figure 212. STA Joint Reduction Capital Cost Fleet Impact 
 
Figure 213. STA Joint Reduction Total Cost Fleet Impact 
 







Figure 215. LQ Joint Reduction NOx Fleet Impact 
 
Figure 216. LQ Joint Reduction Operating Cost Fleet Impact 
 







Figure 218. LQ Joint Reduction Total Cost Fleet Impact 
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APPENDIX E TRADE STUDY FIGURES 
This appendix contains additional figures for utilization reduction and 
intermediate stop variation trade studies. The former contains the regional jet, single 
aisle, small twin, and large quad. The latter is the small twin and large quad. 
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Figure 234. STA Utilization Sensitivity for Range Reduction on Total Cost 
 


















Figure 236. Sensitivity of Intermediate Stop Adoption for STA Fuel Burn 
 


















Figure 238. Sensitivity of Intermediate Stop Adoption for LQ Fuel Burn 
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